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WHICH STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN A 10b-5 ACTION?
By GERALD RASKIN,* JAY W. ENYART**
INTRODUCTION

In the 1946 case of Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.' a federal
court first implied a private right of action for violation of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act")' and
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 promulgated
thereunder.' The United States Supreme Court later upheld that
decision, and removed any doubt as to the right,4 5 in
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.
No federal statute, however, limits civil actions brought
*Member, Hindry & Meyer, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1962, City College of New York;
LL.B., 1965, Columbia University.
**Associate, Hindry & Meyer, Denver, Colorado; B.S.B.A., 1967, Northwestern University; J.D., 1971, University of Colorado.
'69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
215 U.S.C. § 78j (1958):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
317 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of
any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
'Ruder, Civil Liability Under lOb-5: JudicialRevision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw.
U.L. REv. 627 (1963).
5404 U.S. 6 (1971).
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under section 10(b)l "since at the time the Act was passed there
was little indication that the courts would imply a private cause
of action based upon it [section 10(b)]." 7 As a result the courts
have been continually confronted with the problem of determining which limitation period should be applicable to a rule 10b-5
action. Understandably, this has led to confusion among the circuits, among district courts sitting within single circuits, and
even among district courts sitting in the same state.'
Although Congress did not specify a section 10(b) statute of
limitations, it did enact limitation periods for actions brought
pursuant to those sections of the 1934 Act expressly creating civil
liability. Sections 9(e), 18(c) and 29(b) contain statutes of limitation of 1 year from discovery (but in no event longer than 3 years
from the date of violation), and section 16(b) has a 2-year-fromviolation statute.9 Thus, when Congress was considering the 1934
Act, it determined that a relatively short limitation period should
govern the timeliness of claims under the express civil remedies
sections. Although this legislative history is well known and has
been forcefully argued, 0 the courts have rarely considered the
relatively simple and logical position that congressional purpose
would best be effectuated by applying to section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 actions a limitation period prescribed elsewhere in the
Act." That position has been rejected, in fact, by the few courts
which have squarely confronted it."
'Contrast section 10(b) with the Securities Act of 1933

§§

11(a), 12(1), (2), 15 U.S.C.

§§ 77k(a), l(1), (2) (1971) and with the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9(e), 16(b),
18, 29(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), p(b), r, cc(b) (1971). In each of the latter sections civil
liability is expressly created and a statute of limitations provided for.
'Klapmeier v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 363 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Minn. 1973).
'Recently, for example, the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, declined to determine the
applicable 10b-5 limitation period on the grounds that the members of the court (two
judges having excused themselves) were not able to agree. Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
874 (1973).
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9(e), 16(b), 18, 29(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), p(b),
r, cc(b) (1970).
"Schulman, Statutes of Limitations in 10b-5 Actions: Complication Added to
Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 635 (1967).
"The liability of insiders for shortswing profits made in transactions involving the
issuer's equity securities under section 16(b) of the 1934 Act is designed to be prophylactic
only. The other sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts are designed to be prophylactic as well
as remedial. Id. at 638. Therefore, the 2-year statute provided in section 16(b) is not
considered in this article, which deals with the remedial aspects of the federal securities
laws. Cf. 6 L. Loss, SECURIEs REGULATION 3900 (Supp. 1969).
"Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Inves., Inc., 440 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1971) (refusing to
apply limitations period found in section 29(b) of the 1934 Act on grounds that the period
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Since the courts have refused to look to the federal securities
laws for a rule 10b-5 limitation period, and since the authors
cannot agree with those who maintain that the appropriate rule
10b-5 limitation period is that applied by the forum state to actions in fraud, it is proposed that federal courts adopt the period
of limitations provided in the blue sky law of the forum state but
apply in each instance the federal tolling policy 4 so that the
limitation period will not commence to run until the violation is,
or reasonably should have been, discovered by the 10b-5 plaintiff.
Such an approach would provide litigants with an objective
method of determining the applicable limitation period regardless of the situs of the forum and would resolve the confusion and
uncertainty which currently exist.
I. SURVEY OF RECENT CASES
The limitation period most commonly applied to rule 10b-5
actions is that which the forum state, either by statute or by
judicial decision, applies to actions in fraud. 5 However, since
1970 several courts have applied the limitation period found in
the forum state's blue sky law. 6 Violations involving misrepresentation or omission of material fact made actionable by the state
blue sky laws may be divided into three categories: (1) Based
upon rule 10b-5; (2) based upon section 410(a)(2) of the Uniform
Securities Act; 7 and (3) based upon other standards, particularly
those designed to regulate the registration of securities rather
than to govern individual securities transactions.
applies only to actions brought in reliance on that section); Klapmeier v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co., 363 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Minn. 1973) (on grounds that such action may only
properly be taken by Congress or the Supreme Court).
"Note, Statutes of Limitations in lOb-5 Actions, 39 U. Mo. K.C.L. Rv. 283, 296
(1970-71).
"See text accompanying note 30 infra. Martin, Statutes of Limitation in lOb-5 Actions: Which State Statute is Applicable?, 29 Bus. LAWYER 369 (1974) concludes that
although the state blue sky statutes of limitation should apply in 10b-5 actions, the federal
tolling doctrine should be abandoned.
i"See Note supra note 13, at 287 n.25.
"E.g., Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852
(1970).
'"Uniform Securities Act § 410(a)(2) reads as follows:
(a) any person who
(2) offers or sells a security by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading (the buyer not knowing of the untruth or
omission), and who does not sustain the burden of proof that he did not
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A.

The Sixth Circuit
The first appellate court to carefully consider the possible
application of a blue sky limitation period to a rule 10b-5 action
was the Sixth Circuit in Charney v. Thomas. 8 In Charney, the
court below had applied the Michigan blue sky limitation period
(2 years from contract of sale), and dismissed the action. The
court of appeals reversed, holding that, since the Michigan blue
sky law contains no provision similar to rule 10b-5, the state 6year fraud statute was applicable notwithstanding that rule 10b5 and Michigan common law fraud actions are not entirely similar. While conceding that the blue sky limitation period might be
applicable under different circumstances, the court appears to
have been swayed by the fact that no court had ever applied the
local blue sky law limitation period in a 10b-5 action. 9
Charney was followed in Denny v. Performance Systems,
Inc.,' where the district court, when faced with the choice of
applying the Tennessee blue sky statute (1 year from date of
contract) or the 10-year general limitation period, chose the latter. It did so on the grounds that, for fraudulent securities transactions, the state blue sky law provided a remedy of rescission
only. Because the plaintiffs were seeking damages rather than
rescission, this action, the court reasoned, would have been subject to the general limitation period if brought in state court.
B.

The Eighth Circuit
The first appellate decision to actually apply the blue sky
limitation period was the Eighth Circuit case of Vanderboom v.
Sexton.2' In formulating the test to determine which limitation
period should apply, the Vanderboom court relied upon two basic
propositions, now established in the law of rule 10b-5: (1) Where
a right of action in fraud is created based upon federal legislation,
it is federal policy to adopt an appropriate local law of limitaknow, and, in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the
untruth or omission, is liable to the person buying the security from him, who
may sue either at law or in equity to recover the consideration paid for the
security, together with interest at six percent per year from the date of
payment, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees, less the amount of any income received on the security, upon the tender of the security, or for damages
if he no longer owns the security.
1372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967).
"Id. at 100. The Charney opinion contains no discussion of the federal tolling policy.
"[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
93,387 (M.D. Tenn. 1971).
21422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970).
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tions, generally looking to the forum state; 2 and (2) the federal
court should apply the local limitation period which best effec23
tuates federal policy.
Arkansas, the forum state, had adopted section 410(a)(2) of
the Uniform Securities Act, 4 which section is substantially the
same as section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933 Act"). 5
Both sections impose liability upon a seller of securities who misrepresents or omits necessary material facts unless the seller
proves that he did not know and, in the exercise of reasonable
care, could not have known of the untruths or omissions. Thus,
under Arkansas law, a seller may be held civilly liable for his mere
2
negligence .
At the outset the Vanderboom court indicated its preference
for the short blue sky statute of limitations on the grounds that
"it deals expressly with the sale of securities" 7 and "ordinarily
would be the most reasonable and logical type of statute to apply
to essentially what might be termed an 'implied federal blue-sky'
type of statutory action.

'2

Apparently deeming this rationale

insufficient, the court went on to focus on the elements of plaintiff's cause of action as determining "the local statute which bears
the closest resemblance to the federal statute involved. '29 Where
"UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966); Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S.
461 (1947); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946). Rule applicable to 10b-5 action:
Aboussie v. Aboussie, 446 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1971); Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Invs., Inc.,
440 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1971); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 852 (1970); Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967). On the question of
choice of law see 6 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 3900-01 (Supp. 1969); Dyer v. Eastern
Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Me. 1971) (law of State of Maine appropriate
source of 10b-5 limitation period since Maine was forum state, the parties resided there
and the alleged violation occurred in Maine).
"UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966); Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills,
Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967); Corey v.
Bache & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D. W. Va. 1973); Josefs of Palm Beach, Inc. v.
Southern Inv. Co., 349 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Richardson v. Salinas, 336 F. Supp.
997 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
"Arkansas Securities Act of 1959, § 22 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1256 (1966).
"Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2) (1958).
"Both section 410(a)(2) of the Uniform Securities Act and section 12(2) of the 1933
Act limit the civil remedy to buyers of securities whereas section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 have
been made equally available to sellers and buyers. This distinction, however, should not
preclude federal courts from applying blue sky limitations to 10b-5 actions since state law
dealing specifically with securities transactions would be a logical source of a limitation
period for its federal counterpart.
"422 F.2d at 1237.
nId.
"ld. at 1237-38.
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there was the "closest resemblance," federal policy presumably
was best effectuated. The court noted specifically that, in the
Eighth Circuit, negligent and intentional misrepresentation are
equally actionable under rule 10b-5 and section 410(a)(2) of the
Uniform Securities Act. Common law fraud in the state of Arkansas, however, requires a showing of scienter. Although recognizing
that rule 10b-5 and the civil liability section of the Arkansas blue
sky law are not identical, the court concluded that since the blue
sky law and rule 10b-5 share a common purpose (affording a civil
remedy in cases of securities fraud), and since neither requires a
showing of scienter, the 2-year statute of limitations provided in
the Arkansas blue sky law should govern in rule 10b-5 actions.
At this point the circuit court diverged from the lower court,
which had held that, as provided in the state blue sky law, the
limitation period began running on the date of the contract of
sale. The circuit court relied instead on the federal doctrine, first
announced in Bailey v. Glover,30 that in cases involving fraud the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until the fraud is, or
should have been, discovered. This principle has been held to
apply to actions at law as well as equity 3' and is now well settled
under rule 10b-5 decisions.32 Thus, both federal policies-the tolling doctrine and the remedial nature of the federal securities
laws-"would best be served by making any statute of limitations
run only from the date of discovery of the'fraud or from the date
the fraud upon reasonable inquiry should have been discovered. '33 Application of the tolling doctrine on the Vanderboom
facts saved the plaintiffs' rule 10b-5 claims for relief.
Variation in the scope and interpretation of state blue sky
laws has led, in the Eighth Circuit, to a different holding under
the Vanderboom resemblance test. In Klapmeier v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,34 the district court applied the Minnesota
-88 U.S. 342 (1874).
I'Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 821 (1961).
"United California Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004
(1973); Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 445 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972); Aboussie v.
Aboussie, 446 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1971); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969); Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat, 386 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1967);
Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965); Kramer v.
Loewi & Co., 357 F. Supp. 83 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D. 553
(D. Md. 1971).
"422 F.2d at 1240.
u363 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Minn. 1973).
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common law fraud statute of limitations in a 10b-5 action. Acknowledging that Vanderboom requires careful consideration of
the limitation period required by the forum state for securities
violations, 35 and that Vanderboom suggests that a short statute
is preferable," the court nonetheless found that, because Minnesota does not require scienter in common law fraud cases, and
because Minnesota securities regulation is aimed at registration
rather than individual transactions, a Minnesota fraud action,
rather than a state blue sky claim, more closely resembles a rule
10b-5 action. If the district court adheres to its analysis in
Klapmeier, however, it may be obligated to reverse its position
as Minnesota has since enacted a new blue sky law defining actionable violations in terms almost identical to rule 10b-5, but
retaining the "exercise of reasonable care" defense of section
37
410(a)(2) of the Uniform Securities Act.
C.

The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Parrentv. Midwest
Rug Mills, Inc. ,8 has recently held that the state blue sky limitation period (3 years), rather than the state general statute of
limitations (5 years) construed by state judicial decision to apply
to actions in fraud, should be applied in a rule 10b-5 action. The
securities law of the forum state, here Illinois, gives buyers of
securities a right of rescission for violations identical in substance
to the conduct prohibited by rule 10b-5. 9 Thus, as to the purposes
of the respective statutes, the resemblance test formulated by the
Charney and Vanderboom courts was satisfied. Moreover,
[tihe three year limitation period is also closer to the express limitation periods in the various sections of the federal act, noted above
in note 3 [Securities Act of 1933 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970), and
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9(e), 18, 29(b), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78ie, r, cc (1970)]. Furthermore, logic dictates selection of the
three year Illinois limitation as tending more toward an orderly development of law, then reaching into a different Illinois act ... for
the appropriate limitation."

The commonality of purposes and defenses test set forth in
Vanderboom was further met in that neither statute contains the
'Id. at 1214.
'11d. at 1217.
rMINN.

STAT. ANN. §

80A.23 (Supp. 1974) (effective Aug. 1, 1973).

-8455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972).

"Illinois Securities Act § 12, ILL.
4455

F.2d at 127.

REv. STAT. ch.

1211/2, § 137.12 (1971).
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defense that the seller "did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known" of the misrepresentation.4'
Since Parrentexpressly approved the Vanderboom court's interpretation of rule 10b-5,42 it would therefore follow that scienter is
not an element of a rule 10b-5 action in the Seventh Circuit, and
at least one district court sitting in that circuit has so concluded.43
Finally, the Parrentcourt applied the federal tolling doctrine so
that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the
plaintiff discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence,
should have discovered the fraud.
In Kramer v. Loewi & Co.,44 the district court decision referred to above, the Wisconsin blue sky law limitation period,45
rather than the 6-year state fraud limitation, was applied to a rule
10b-5 action. Interpreting Parrent to hold that in the Seventh
Circuit scienter is not a necessary element of a rule 10b-5 action,
the court found that a rule 10b-5 action more resembles an action
under the state blue sky law than a common law fraud claim,
where a showing of scienter is required. The Kramer court compared the civil liability section of the "new" Wisconsin blue sky
law (based upon section 410(a)(2) of the Uniform Securities Act)4"
to clause (2) of rule 10b-5, finding that both make unlawful the
same activities. Moreover, "the broader liability under 10b-5 supposedly makes a shorter limitations period appropriate." 47 This
court also applied the federal tolling doctrine.
The Seventh Circuit, therefore, has apparently abrogated
any scienter requirement in rule 10b-5 actions and, using that as
a stepping stone, has in Parrentand Kramer found the applicable
10b-5 limitation period to be that provided by the state blue sky
law. The resemblance test in both cases was satisfied notwithstanding that the language of the Illinois law is virtually identical
"Id.

"Id. at 126.

"Kramer v. Loewi & Co., 357 F. Supp. 83 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
"4Id.

'As to violations occurring prior to January 1, 1970, 3 years from the date the violation
was or, with reasonable inquiry, should have been discovered (under old blue sky law
providing limitation period of 3 years after contract of sale); as to violations occurring after
January 1, 1970, 1 year after violation is, or reasonably should have been, discovered
(under new blue sky law, Wis. STAT., § 551.59(5) (1971), providing a limitation period of
3 years after the date of violation or 1 year after discovery of the violation, whichever first
occurs).
4"WIs. STAT. § 551.59(2) (1971).
"357 F. Supp. at 86.
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to that of rule 10b-5, and the language of the Wisconsin statute
parallels that of section 410(a)(2) of the Uniform Securities Act.
D.

The Ninth Circuit
Even though scienter is not a necessary element of a rule 10b5 action in the Ninth Circuit,48 that circuit has declined to adopt
the Eighth Circuit's resemblance test and continues to apply instead the forum state's fraud statute of limitations. The leading
Ninth Circuit case is Frattv. Robinson," where the court selected
the Washington state limitation period applicable to fraud actions (3 years from discovery of the fraud), rather than that applicable to an action to recover on a liability created by statute (2
years after accrual of the cause of action), in a rule 10b-5 action."
Subsequent to the Fratt decision the Washington state legislature enacted a statute affording any person purchasing a security "by means of fraud or misrepresentation" a right of action
against the seller. 5' Although this section resembles section 410 of
the Uniform Securities Act, the exclusivity portion, which denies
the creation of causes of action not specified in the section, is
conspicuously absent.52 Thus, courts may reasonably be expected
to imply a civil remedy for violation of that section of the Washington blue sky law, which is identical in substance to rule 10b5.53 Since the limitation period in the civil liability section (3
years after the contract of sale) is identical to that provided by
the fraud statute (excepting the tolling provision), the court in
Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Investments, Inc.," when asked to
apply the Washington blue sky limitation period, could have
declined to do so merely on the grounds that application of the
federal tolling policy would lead to the same result. However, the
court decided that the fraud limitation period, which would begin
to run from discovery, was superior to the blue sky limitation
period, which would begin to run from the contract date. More
"Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961).
41203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
'Id. at 635.
"WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.430 (Supp. 1973).
"Uniform Securities Act § 410(h):
The rights and remedies provided by this act are in addition to any other
rights or remedies that may exist at law or in equity, but this act does not
create any cause of action not specified in this section or section 202(e)
[relating to actions on surety bonds required of registered broker-dealers and
investment advisors].
'3See note 2 supra.
-440 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1971).
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importantly, however, the court, in declining to adopt the blue
sky limitation period, stated:
[Flor us to change the applicable limitation period because the
local law of securities regulation has changed would add an unnecessary uncertainty to the prosecution of federal claims under section
10(b). We do not believe federal policy is advanced by changing the
law governing the timeliness of federal claims to correspond with
each change in the substantive elements of a claim under the local
securities law. Aggrieved persons have come to rely upon our prior
holdings. Reasonable stability in laws pertaining to voluntary relationships between parties, and the right of access to the courts to
question those relationships, is a worthwhile objective as well."

This language has since been the basis upon which the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has refused to alter its position that the
fraud limitation period applies to rule 10b-5 actions. In Turner
v. Lundquist,58 the Ninth Circuit, on the authority of Fratt,
adopted the California fraud statute of limitations (3 years from
the date of discovery of the fraud) and applied it to an action in
which California was the source of the local law. After the Turner
decision was announced, the California legislature enacted a new
blue sky law,57 which provides for civil liability under circumstances similar to those described in section 410(a)(2) of the Uniform
Securities Act. The applicable blue sky limitation period, however, is 1 year after discovery of the facts constituting the violation, but in no event longer than 4 years after the violation.' The
circuit court, in Mansfield Mills, Inc. v. Coward," declined a
petition on interlocutory appeal on the basis that the petitioner
failed to distinguish Douglass and that the broad remedial purposes of the federal securities laws were not to be narrowed by a
state statute of limitations.
Undaunted by the Ninth Circuit's stand on rule 10b-5 limitation periods, another aggrieved defendant, in United California
Bank v. Salik,10 was informed by the court of appeals that, notwithstanding the fact that the new California blue sky law civil
liability section was similar to section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the
court would continue to apply the state fraud limitation period
"Id. at 916.
w377 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1967).

§§ 25000-25804 (West Supp. 1974).
wId. § 25506.
"[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,693 (9th Cir. 1972) (petition for permission to appeal from interlocutory order denying motion to dismiss).
"CAL. CORP. CODE

-481 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004 (1973).
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rather than the 1-year blue sky limitation period. It reasoned that
federal policy is advanced by stability in laws governing timeliness of federal claims, the broad remedial policies of the federal
securities laws are best served by a longer rather than a shorter
statute of limitations, and adoption of the blue sky limitation
period would necessarily be piecemeal since the federal tolling
policy would dictate elimination of the 4-year maximum, and
"piecemeal adoption of the new statute is hardly preferable to
continuing utilization of the older fraud statutes."'" No consideration was given to the argument that, since the California blue
sky limitation period is nearly identical with the periods provided
in the civil liabilities sections of the 1933 and 1934 Acts,6" the
court, under the theory advanced by one writer,63 could have best
implemented federal policy by adopting the California blue sky
limitation period in toto.
The Fifth Circuit
Courts in the Fifth Circuit also have differed as to the appropriate rule 10b-5 limitation period. In the last 2 years, courts in
that circuit have reached contrary conclusions even when looking
to the law of the same state for the appropriate limitation period.
In Aboussie v. Aboussie,u the parties apparently agreed that
the 2-year Texas statute of limitations for fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit should be applied in a rule 10b-5 action. The only
controversy in that case centered upon the time of commencement of that period.
The civil liabilities section of the Texas Securities Act" is
virtually identical with section 410(a)(2) of the Uniform Securi6 recognized
ties Act. The district court in Richardson v. Salinas"
that there are major differences between rule 10b-5 and the civil
liability section of the Texas Securities Act, but concluded that
E.

"Id. at 1015.
"Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11(a), 12(1), (2), 15 U.S.C. §8 77k(a), l(1), (2) (1971);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9(e), 10(b), 16(b), 18, 29(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), p(b),
r, cc(b) (1971).
13Schulman, supra note 10.
"446 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1971). Cf. Sargent v. Genesco, Inc. [Current Transfer Binder]
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 94,496 (5th Cir. April 11, 1974) (declining to rule on applicability
of Florida blue sky limitation period to a rule lOb-5 action on grounds that transferee court
must apply state law, here that of New York, which would have been applied by transferor
court).
"TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(2) (1964).
"336 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
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the terminology of the latter section corresponds to clause (2) of
the rule. Texas state courts have applied a 2-year-from-violation
limitation period in fraud actions. On the other hand, the Texas
blue sky period of limitations is 3 years after the contract of sale."
The Richardson court chose the blue sky limitation period as
controlling on the 10b-5 claim since the blue sky law is closer in
substance and purpose to rule 10b-5 than other statutes considered, application of the blue sky statute of limitations appears to
be the "natural choice," and application of the blue sky statute
of limitations would give rule 10b-5 plaintiffs a longer period in
which to bring an action.
Section 517.21 of the Florida Securities Act provides in part
that "every sale made in violation of any of the provisions of this
chapter shall be voidable at the election of the purchaser .
",
Section 517.301(1) of that act is identical in substance to rule 10b569 Therefore, applying the resemblance test as an indication of
best effectuation of federal policy, it might seem that, in a rule
10b-5 action, a Florida district court would apply the blue sky
limitation period (2 years). However, the middle and southern
district courts of Florida have split on this question. In Beefy
Trail Inc. v. Beefy King International,° the court, in reliance
upon Azalea Meats, Inc. v. Muscat7 and A boussie, which did not
consider the applicability of a blue sky limitation period, held
that it was bound to apply the 3-year Florida fraud statute of
limitations to a 10b-5 claim for relief. A few months later the
district court in Josef's of Palm Beach, Inc. v. Southern Investment Co.,7" held that the Florida blue sky statute of limitations
rather than the state fraud statute of limitations applied in a rule
10b-5 action. The court was mindful of the dictum in Azalea
Meats that the state limitation period used in a 10b-5 action
should not be shorter than that applicable to a similar common
law fraud action.7 3 However, this statement was dismissed as inapposite, and the court, following the logic of Parrent4 and
67

EX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(c) (1964).

517.21 (1971).
'FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.301(1) (1972).
7348 F. Supp. 799 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
71386 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1967).
"349 F. Supp. 1057 (S.D. Fla. 1972).
"Id. at 1060-61.
74455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972).
"FLA. STAT. ANN. §
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Vanderboom,75 found the Florida blue sky limitation period the
most appropriate to apply.
F.

The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit has declined to alter its position that the
state fraud limitation period applies to rule 10b-5 claims for relief,7" and has distinguished Vanderboom on the grounds that,
while the Eighth Circuit has abrogated any scienter requirement
in rule 10b-5 actions, the Tenth Circuit has not." This is an
apparent inconsistency, as the Tenth Circuit has made available
to rule 10b-5 defendants the defense set forth in section 12(2) of
the 1933 Act (and section 410(a)(2) of the Uniform Securities Act)
that they did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known of the misrepresentation or omission.7
Thus, 10b-5 defendants in the Tenth Circuit may escape liability
by proving that, inter alia, they were not negligent. This shifting
of the burden placed upon the plaintiff at common law to the
defendant under rule 10b-5, as construed, was recently reaffirmed
without comment in FinancialIndustrialFund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.79
G.

Other Circuits
Several district courts sitting in circuits other than those
discussed above have elected recently to apply the blue sky limitation period rather than the fraud statute of limitations. In each
of these cases the forum state had a civil liabilities section which
was substantially the same as section 410(a)(2) of the Uniform
Securities Act. However, in each case the limitation period varied. In Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co.,8" the Maine blue
sky limitation period was 2 years after the contract of sale. The
court, however, applied the federal tolling doctrine. In Batchelor
v. Legg & Co., 8 the applicable Maryland blue sky limitation
75422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 582 (1970).
"Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964) (refusing to
apply Colorado blue sky limitation period on grounds that while rule lOb-5 requires proof
of scienter and reliance, the civil liability section of the state blue sky law does not).
"Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 104 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971).
"Id. at 102.
71474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973). The following decisions, however, require that a 10b5 plaintiff prove scienter: Allen v. H.K. Porter Co., 452 F.2d 675, 678 (10th Cir. 1971);
Jensen v. Voyles, 393 F.2d 131, 133 (10th Cir. 1968); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd.,
228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
0336 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Me. 1971).
852 F.R.D. 553 (D. Md. 1971).
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period was 2 years after the contract of sale. 2 The court relied on
Vanderboom, without any discussion of the resemblance test, in
support of its application of the blue sky limitation period, concentrating its attention on the federal tolling doctrine which it
also applied. Finally, in Corey v. Bache & Co., Inc.,81 the District
Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, applying Indiana law, s4 noted that the trend is to apply rule 10b-5 to negligent
as well as to intentional misrepresentation. Accordingly, since
"the nature of the alleged Wrongs does not amount to the elements of common-law fraud," 85 the 2-year blue sky limitation
period was deemed to best effectuate the policies of rule 10b-5.
II.

PRESENT CRITERIA CANNOT LEAD TO STABILITY AND UNIFORMITY

This confusion among the circuits has been created inadvertently by the courts in an effort to best implement federal policy
under acts which do not purport to discriminate against litigants
based upon their choice of forum. The fact that the circuits differ
as to the necessary elements of a 10b-5 action, coupled with differing state blue sky laws and judicial conservatism, has created
haphazard criteria. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the
courts have chosen limitation periods based upon differing answers to one or more of the following questions:
1. Does the civil liability section of the forum state's blue sky law
more closely resemble rule lOb-5, section 12(2) of the1933 Act, or
neither?
2. Does that particular circuit require scienter in a 10b-5 action?
3. Does the forum state's law of fraud require a showing of scienter?
4. Is the policy of the federal securities laws best effectuated by a
longer or a shorter rule 10b-5 statute of limitations?

The difficulty of determining applicable 10b-5 limitation periods
is enhanced by the position of those courts which maintain that
a policy of stability in the laws precludes changing a settled rule
even though the basis for the rule has been undermined by judicial decision (Ninth Circuit) and of other courts which cling to
theories of liability not reinforced by their own decisions (Tenth
Circuit).
82MD. CODE ANN. art.

32(A), § 34(e) (1957).
U355 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D. W. Va. 1973).
"Because action was transferred from federal court sitting in Indiana, "this Court,
as the transferee court, must apply the forum state statute of limitations of the transferor
court." Id. at 1125.
Old. at 1126.
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In section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, which is closest in practical
effect to section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, since both now give private
litigants a right of action for misrepresentation or omission of
material facts in connection with securities transactions, Congress determined to reduce the plaintiff's burden of proof from
that which was required by the corresponding common law action.86 The section 12(2) plaintiff, however, is required to bring his
action within a shorter period of time than is typically required
by state limitation statutes applicable to fraud or deceit. 7 The
federal policy in the event of a misrepresentation or omission of
a material fact in connection with a securities transaction is clear:
When giving a private right of action, simplify the burden of proof
upon the plaintiff, but require the plaintiff to bring the action
within a relatively brief period of time.
There is small doubt that the elements of a rule 10b-5 cause
of action, although dealing with securities fraud, are fewer than
the elements of common law fraud 8 but are for the most part
greater than the elements of an action under section 12(2) of the
1933 Act." It would seem logical, therefore, to apply an intermediate limitation period to 10b-5 actions, keeping in mind the
desirability of national uniformity in application of any federal
law. The Ninth Circuit's position, that the remedial policies underlying the federal securities laws militate in favor of a longer
statute of limitations in 10b-5 actions, simply cannot stand in
view of the policy expressed in the federal acts of applying a
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 100, at 700 (3d ed. 1964):
The elements of the tort cause of action in deceit are:
1. A false representation made by the defendant. In the ordinary case,
this representation must be one of fact.
2. Knowledge or belief on the part of defendant that the representation
is false or, what is regarded as equivalent, that he has not a sufficient basis
of information to make it. This element is often given the technical name of
"scienter."

"W.

3. An intention to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from action
in reliance upon the misrepresentation.
4. Justifiable reliance upon the representation on the part of the plaintiff, in taking action or refraining from it.
5. Damage to the plaintiff, resulting from such reliance.
(Footnotes omitted).
"See Note supra note 13, at 283, 288, where the commentator states that "the periods
under state fraud statutes range from one year to six, with an average of four years."
(Footnotes omitted).
"Id. at 291. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 97 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Douglass v. Glenn E. Hinton Invs. Inc., 440 F.2d 912, 915
(9th Cir. 1971); Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97, 99 (6th Cir. 1967).
03 L. Loss, SEcURrrIEs REGULATION 1699-1712 (2d ed. 1961).
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relatively short statute of limitations when granting a private
right of action. Moreover, the tremendous liabilities with which
issuers and their controlling persons 0 must contend for the making of negligent misrepresentations or omissions of material facts
(at least in the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and possibly Tenth Circuits) reinforce the argument for a shorter -limitation period in
order. to afford a degree of protection to such persons. The choice
of a limitation period for actions under rule 10b-5 should not rest
upon the resemblance test as advocated by the Eighth Circuit
since its application requires that the limitation period vary as
the blue sky law changes9 ' or as the necessary 10b-5 elements are
redetermined by the courts."
CONCLUSION

It would be highly desirable to create a uniform national
standard whereby all federal courts could look to the same state
law for the appropriate limitation period. The most logical limitation period would be either that applied to actions in fraud or that
provided in the local blue sky law. The statute of limitations
provided in approximately two-thirds of the blue sky laws of the
various states is either 2 or 3 years. 3 The fraud limitation period
for the various states ranges from 1 year to 6 years with an average
of 4 years.94 Since the blue sky laws deal specifically with securities, since federal policy favors a shorter limitation period, and
since the 10b-5 plaintiff's burden of proof falls between that required by section 12(2) of the 1933 Act and those typically required under traditional common law fraud concepts, 5 reason
would dictate that the blue sky limitation period, falling for the
most part between the section 12(2) and common law limitation
periods, should be applied in rule 10b-5 actions. However, since
the federal policy of tolling limitation periods is applicable to rule
10b-5 actions, the period provided by the state blue sky law
should not commence to run until the fraud is or should reasona"See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1958) (controlling person does, however, have a "good faith" defense).
"See Klapmeier v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 363 F. Supp. 1212 (D. Minn. 1973).
"See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Autolite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) (dispensing with element
of reliance in a fraud on the market situation in a private action for violation of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. 78n(a) (1970) and rule 14a-9 promulgated thereunder).
'3See Appendix I.
"See Note, supra note 13, at 283, 288.
"See W. PRossER, supra note 86.
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bly have been discovered by the plaintiff. Where the forum state
has a blue sky limitation period running from the date of the
contract of sale, the federal tolling policy would be adopted.
Where the applicable blue sky limitation period runs from the
date of discovery, but in no event for longer than a certain number of years from the date of violation, the limitation period
should be adopted exclusively as being closest in effect to other
federal limitation periods on remedies expressly granted.
Perhaps the best argument in favor of maintenance of the
status quo on rule 10b-5 limitation periods is that the federal
securities laws are currently being recodified under the direction
and supervision of Professor Loss and that the 10b-5 limitation
problem will be resolved in the new law. However, it is presently
contemplated that this proposed legislation will not be submitted
to Congress until 1976 or 1977,96 and, of course, prompt passage
or passage at all cannot be assured. In the meantime, both 10b-5
plaintiffs and defendants should be entitled to rely upon a uniformly applied rule governing determination and commencement
of limitation periods which will not fluctuate with changes in the
law of rule 10b-5 or in the substantive blue sky laws of the states.
"Loss, Introductory Memorandum to Tentative Draft No. 2 of the FederalSecurities
Code, reprinted in 199 BNA SEC. RFG. & L. REP. D-1 (April 25, 1973).
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APPENDIX
STATE BLUE SKY LAW
STATUTES OF LIMITATION
A.

Summary
Period

Number of States

1 year
2 years
3 years
5 years
None Given

B.

3
28
13
1
5

By States

State

Period

Statutory Reference

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts

2 years
3 years
1 year
5 years
2 years (1)*
2 years
2 years
2 years
2 years
2 years
2 years
3 years
3 years
2 years
2 years
none
3 years
2 years
2 years
3 years
2 years

ALA. CODE tit. 53, § 45(e) (1958)
ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.220(f) (1962)
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-2004 (1956)
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1256(e) (1966)
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25507(a) (West 1955)
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-1-21(5) (1963)
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 35-346(e) (1967)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7323(e) (1973)
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.21(1) (1965)

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota

2 years
3 years
2 years
2 years
none
2 years
2 years
none
2 years
2 years
none
2 years
3 years

GA. CODE ANN. § 97-114(c) (1973)
HAWAII REV. STAT. §

485-20(a) (1968)

IDAHO CODE § 30-1446(3) (1967)
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.13(d) (1974)
IND. CODE § 2-1-19(e) (1971)
IOWA CODE § 502.23 (1974)
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1268(c) (1967)

Ky.

§ 292.480(3) (1972)
51:715(E) (1950)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 881(4) (1964)
MD. ANN. CODE art. 32(A), § 34(e) (1957)
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110A, § 410(2)(e)
(1972)
MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 451.810(e) (1948)
MINN. STAT. § 80A.23(7) (1971)
MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-71-31(b) (1972)
Mo. REv. STAT. § 409.411(e) (1969)
REV. STAT. ANN.

LA. REV. STAT. §

NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 8-1118(3) (1943)

NEV. REV. STAT. §

90.200(5) (1971)

N.J. REv. STAT. § 49:3-71(e) (1937)
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-31(a) (1953)
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78-22 (1943)
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-17(1) (1959)
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35.

Ohio

2 years

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 (Page

Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas

2 years
3 years
3 years (2)**
none
2 years
3 years
1 year
3 years

OKLA. STAT. ANN.

1964)
ORE. REV. STAT. §
PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 71, § 408(e)(1971)

59.115(5) (1971)

tit. 70, § 1-504(a),(b) (1974)

S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-313 (1962)
S.D. CODE § 47-31-137 (1967)
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1645(A) (1953)
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(C)

(1965)
Utah
2 years
UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-22(5) (1953)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4225 (1971)
2 years
Vermont
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-522(d) (1950)
2 years
Virginia
WASH. RED. CODE ANN. § 21.20.430(3) (1950)
3 years
Washington
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 32-1-18 (1931)
1 year
West Virginia
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 551-59(5) (1974)
3 years
Wisconsin
Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 17-117.22(2)(e) (1957)
2 years
Wyoming
*(1) Or one year after discovery, whichever expires first.
**(2) Three years for fraud or one year after discovery, whichever expires first;
two years for registration violations or one year after discovery, whichever expires first.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

EXEcUTIVE IMMUNITY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL TORT
By

WILLIAM

G.

HORLBECK,* LORING

E. HARKNESS IH**

In Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents' the
United States Supreme Court recently recognized that private
citizens have an implied right of action in tort against federal law
enforcement officers who violate their constitutional rights. Specifically, the Court held that the plaintiff Bivens had stated a
cause of action under the fourth amendment against federal narcotics agents who had unlawfully entered and searched his home
and thereafter had subjected him and his family to great fear and
indignity. Quite clearly, the defendants had committed no mere
common law tort, such as false arrest or false imprisonment, but
one of a nascent variety which shall become known as the constitutional tort. Following the Supreme Court's lead in Bivens, federal courts may soon be entertaining actions for damages against
federal officers based not only on the fourth amendment but potentially on any provision of the Constitution which confers a
right upon private citizens. In short, the decision in Bivens has
apparently created a private right of action against federal officials which is analogous to the right of action authorized against
state officials by section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.2 A right
so structured is appealing for both its symmetry and fairness.
*Associate, Law, Nagel, and Clark, P.C., Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1969, University
of Colorado; J.D., 1973, University of Colorado Law School.
**Associate, Rovira, DeMuth & Eiberger, Denver, Colorado; A.B., 1970, Bowdoin
College; J.D., 1973, University of Colorado Law School.
1403 U.S. 388 (1971).
242 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) [hereinafter cited as section 1983], which reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Pursuant to this language, actions for damages have been allowed for deprivation of
many and varied constitutional rights. See Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir.
1970) (freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures); Sigafus v. Brown, 416 F.2d 105
(7th Cir. 1969) (right to reasonable access to the courts); Cortright v. Resor, 325 F. Supp.
797 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971) (freedom of
speech); Cordova v. Chonko, 315 F. Supp. 953 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (right to due process of
law in suspension proceedings in a public school); Donovan v. Mobley, 291 F. Supp. 930
(C.D. Cal. 1968), modified sub nom. Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1970)
(freedom of speech); Robeson v. Fanelli, 94 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (freedom of
assembly).
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There exists no discernible reason to afford an injured citizen a
right of action against state and local officers who violate his
federal constitutional rights while denying him a comparable
right to proceed against federal officers for the same types of
transgressions.
There still remains, however, the inevitable reckoning with
the common law doctrine of official immunity, which has often
served to shelter public officials from the consequences of their
civil wrongs. In recognizing Bivens' cause of action, the Supreme
Court was not obliged to determine the applicability of the defendants' immunity defense. Rather, that question was left to be
decided by the court of appeals on remand. Subsequently, in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents3 the Second Circuit observed the analogy of the constitutional tort action to the statutory action maintainable under section 1983 and adopted the
view of official immunity it had taken in those cases. The case of
Jobson v. Henne4 aptly illustrates the disposition of that court to
apply the doctrine of official immunity "sparingly in suits
brought under 1983." Thus, in Bivens the Second Circuit concluded that the narcotics agents who had violated the plaintiff's
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures were not entitled to immunity for their acts.' This holding was critical to the plaintiff, as a contrary result would have
rendered his newly recognized cause of action worthless. Despite
the result, however, the Second Circuit's opinion in Bivens reflects a need to reexamine the justification for and operation of
the doctrine of official immunity as applied to executive officers
F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
4355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966).
1Id. at 134.
In suits brought under [section 1983], police officers enjoy no immunity
... . the Civil Rights Act does not, however, apply to federal officers
3456

In its decision in this case, the Supreme Court recognized a right of
action against federal officers that is roughly analogous to the right of action
against state officers that was provided when Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Act. It would, we think, be incongruous and confusing, to say the
least, if we should rule that under one phase of federal law a police officer
had immunity and that under another phase of federal law he had no immunity.
Accordingly, we hold that the Agents in this case are not immune from
damage suits based upon allegations of violations of constitutional right.
456 F.2d at 1346-47.
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and to consider the role that executive immunity should play in
constitutional tort cases. It is the purpose of this article to respond to that need.
I.

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUNITY

Where the doctrine of official immunity applies, it absolves
government officers of civil liability in tort for official acts or
omissions which result in injury or damage to private citizens.
The most frequently cited justification for such a doctrine is to
encourage fearless public service.7 Legislative immunity, for example, is necessary to encourage the zeal and candor which typify
legislative advocacy at its best.' Likewise, judicial and quasijudicial immunity are essential to enable officers of the courts to
maintain the independence so critical to the exercise of their
judgment and discretion. Finally, the immunity sometimes
granted to executive officers is necessary to remove the threat of
civil liability for official acts in order that men of ordinary prudence will not hesitate to accept government service as a career nor
thereafter to perform their official duties fearlessly in the public
interest.' 0
A second justification for the doctrine of official immunity is
to limit the use of the tort action as a form of review to cases
where review of the official act is permissible under the separation
of powers doctrine." When judicial review of an official act serves
only to police the methods employed to achieve the result as
determined, without touching upon the propriety of the determination itself, no separation of powers problem arises, and review
is proper. In such a case there is no need for the doctrine of
immunity as a device to avoid judicial review. However, where
the legislature delegates to a specific agency or official the power
to make a rule of law determining the legal rights and obligations
of a private citizen, then de novo judicial review of the exercise
'See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, which
provides in part that "any speech or debate in either house shall not be questioned in any
other place."
'See note 7 supra.
'See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335
(1871); Kelly v. Dunne, 344 F.2d 129 (1st Cir. 1965); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir.
1926), aff'd mem., 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
"See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959);
Spaulding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896); Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 86 (1845);
Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d
Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
"See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, 5.03 (1958).
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of that power results in a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine insofar as such review permits the judgment of the court
to be substituted for that of the agency or executive authorized
to make that judgment. 2 In such a case official immunity precludes review.
II. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE TO EXECUTIVE OFFICERS
The traditional test employed by federal courts in deciding
whether official immunity is available to a federal executive officer,' 3 in a suit charging him with tortious conduct in the performance of his duties, is ostensibly a simple one. It requires (1) that
the tortious act or omission be done within the legally prescribed
scope of the officer's authority, and (2) that the act or omission
be discretionary in nature. 4 The court of appeals in Bivens
adopted this traditional standard, holding that the acts of the
narcotics agents were not discretionary acts to which immunity
should attach. 5 This holding, however, did not conclude the issue
of liability. The court went on to hold that even when immunity
is not granted, good faith and a reasonable belief in the validity
of the conduct and in the necessity of the manner of its performance are a complete defense.' This is a questionable approach,
since the recent trend of the courts has been to deny absolute
immunity to executive officers. 7 If, as a matter of law, an officer's
immunity is predictably only qualified at best," it would seem
12d.
"This article focuses on the application of the doctrine of immunity to executive
officials and does not attempt to discuss its potential application to legislators and judges.
'4See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir.
1964); Hughes v. Johnson, 305 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579
(2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950). For a discussion of the test, see also
Comment, Bivens v. Six Unkown Agents: A New Direction in Federal Police Immunity,
24 HASTINGS L.J. 987 (1973).
"5456 F.2d at 1343-47.
'Id. at 1348.
"See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhoades, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974), where specifically with respect
to the Governor of Ohio, the President of Kent State University, the Adjutant General of
the Ohio National Guard, and various lesser officials, the Supreme Court held that "in
varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of
Government .....
Id. at 1692 (emphasis added). Scheuer was brought pursuant to
section 1983.
"Id. As a consequence of the Court's conclusion that the named officials did not enjoy
an absolute immunity, it reversed the lower court holdings, which had dismissed the
complaints without the filing of an answer on the ground that a claim of executive immunity was an effective plea in bar. At least as to state officials in a section 1983 action,
therefore, it is apparent that executive immunity is properly raised only as an affirmative
defense. This is appropriate since the scope of authority and discretionary function standards each present questions of fact which cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss.
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illogical and counterproductive to allow the officer's subjective
intent to absolve him from liability. For this and other sound
reasons, it is suggested that good faith, subject to the requirements of pleadings and proof, be incorporated as a third element
of a defense of executive immunity rather than be regarded as an
independent defense in itself.
Scope of Authority
The concept of scope of authority plays what may be considered a dual role in determining whether a government officer is
to be held liable in tort; it determines the outer limits of both
liability and immunity.
First, that the official was acting within the scope of his
authority is a prerequisite to liability whenever the cause of action asserted is founded on a deprivation of constitutional rights.
This is so whether the cause of action is an implied right under
the Federal Constitution, as in Bivens, or an express right conferred by a federal statute, as in the section 1983 cases. The
underlying notion is that a deprivation of constitutional rights is
a tort cognizable by the Constitution or its implementing statutes
only if it was committed by an officer of government. In order to
be acting as such, and not as a mere citizen, the tort-feasor must
necessarily have been acting within the scope of the authority
delegated to him by the government. 9
Second, that the official was acting within the scope of his
authority is also a condition to be satisified before a government
official may be granted immunity for his tortious acts. The reasons supporting this requirement are clear enough. Immunity for
government officials, whether granted for the purpose of encouraging fearless public leadership 0 or for the purpose of enforcing
the separation of powers doctrine," can only be justified if the
activity occasioning the injury complained of is a governmental
and not a private one.
The Supreme Court decision in Bivens accents the need to
reconcile these two roles. The threshold question is whether the
scope of authority prerequisite to official immunity is to be coexA.

"This analysis is not to be confused with the requirement that an official be acting
within the scope of his authority in order to establish the liability of the government under
the doctrine of respondeatsuperior insofar as recognized by the Federal Tort Claims Act.
"See notes 7-10 and accompanying text supra.
"See notes 11-12 and accompanying text supra.
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tensive with the scope of authority prerequisite to official liability. Assuming that both symmetry and fairness require that it
should be so, the only remaining task is to define the extent to
which a constitutional tort-feasor will be deemed to be acting as
an officer of government rather than as a mere private citizen.
1. Scope of Authority in Determining Liability
The definition of the scope of authority has, of course, been
considered by federal courts in the past. For purposes of official
liability, however, it has been significant only in cases arising
under section 1983. The scope of authority concept is there embodied in the "under color of law" language. The meaning of this
language was explained in Monroe v. Pape.2 The defendants,
Chicago police officers, allegedly entered and searched the plaintiff's home without a warrant and unlawfully arrested and detained the plaintiff, depriving him in violation of section 1983 of
his rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.
It was urged by the defendants that the complaint stated no cause
of action under section 1983 on the grounds that
"under color of' enumerated state authority excludes acts of an
official or policeman who can show no authority under state law,
state custom, or state usage to do what he did. 3

The Court, however, explicitly rejected this contention. Adopting
the same construction of the phrase " 'under color of' state law"
for purposes of section 1983 as that announced for purposes of its
criminal counterpart 4 in United States v. Classic,5 the Court
approvingly quoted a portion of Mr. Justice Stone's majority
opinion:
Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state
law, is action taken "under color of" state law. 2'

All acts made possible solely by reason of the badges of governmental office are included in this phrase. Any other construction
of the statutory language would have been productive of the most
manifest injustice. The defendants, having done their misdeeds
under the cloak of their ostensible authority as officers of govern22365

U.S. 167 (1961).

21d. at 172.

2418 U.S.C. § 242 (1970).

25313
2

U.S. 299 (1941).
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184 (1961), quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.

1Monroe

299, 326 (1941). See also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
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ment, would then have been permitted to assert that their acts
had been so outrageous as to be beyond the scope of their duties
and thus would have escaped liability under the statute
altogether.
It was to be expected, then, that the Supreme Court would
refuse to sanction such a narrow view of scope of authority when
it recognized the constitutional tort in Bivens. Rather, it adopted
the precise view taken in the section 1983 cases:
[Plower, once granted, does not disappear like a magic gift when
it is wrongfully used. An agent acting-albeit unconstitutionally-in the name of the United States possesses a far greater
capacity for harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own ...
A private citizen, asserting no authority other than his own, will
not normally be liable in trespass if he demands, and is granted,
admission to another's house. But one who demands admission
under a claim of federal authority stands in a far different position.Y

Indeed, to have done otherwise would have been to ordain that a
breach of a constitutional guarantee or a violation of a criminal
statute could never be the basis for the liability in tort of an
official qua official, even in the absence of immunity-the precise
negation of the theory on which the constitutional tort is founded.
Nor could the official be held liable as a private individual, for
an action will not lie against a private individual for a fourth
amendment tort. That amendment was designed to protect individual rights from governmental, not private, infringement."8
2. Scope of Authority in Determining Immunity
The decisional law attempting to define scope of authority
for purposes of determining official immunity has, by contrast,
evolved largely in the context of common law torts. The prevailing scope of authority test was aptly stated in the leading case of
Barr v. Matteo, 5 a libel action against the Acting Director of the
27403 U.S. at 382, 394 (citations omitted).
2
"Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). See also Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v.
City of Lackawanna, 318 F. Supp. 669 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Farmer v. Moses, 232 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
As a result, only a common law action such as trespass would then be available as a
means of redressing the breach of a constitutional guarantee, and often that remedy is
wholly inadequate to compensate the plaintiff for his injury. State courts in which a
trespass action would have to be brought have been notoriously reluctant to award com-

pensation for impairment of the kinds of interests the fourth amendment seeks to protect.
See W. PROssER, LAW OF TORTS § 11 (4th ed. 1971).
29360 U.S. 564 (1959).
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Office of Rent Stabilization by certain former employees of that
Agency. The issue raised was whether the defendant was entitled to unqualified immunity by virtue of his position as the
head of a Federal Agency. The Court held that the allegedly
libelous statement "was an appropriate exercise of the discretion
which an officer of that rank must possess ..
."30 Although the
question was close, the Court found that the action of the Acting
Director "was within the outer perimeter of [his] line of duty"3 '
thus rendering his actions privileged.
Thereafter, this "outer perimeter" test was narrowly construed by the Ninth Circuit in Hughes v. Johnson.2 In that case
the court examined and upheld the duty of the defendants as
game wardens to inspect the plaintiffs' premises under the authority of a federal statute.3 3 However, the court found that
"search without warrant and unsupported by arrest, in violation
of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution ' 34
could not be said to be within the scope of the official duties of
the defendants. Thus, the court would not grant the officials the
benefit of the immunity defense.
The more typical approach to the scope of authority test is
that adopted in Norton v. McShane,31 which permitted even outrageous conduct to be considered within the "outer perimeter" of
the official's scope of authority. In Norton, it was alleged that
various Justice Department officials had unlawfully and maliciously arrested the plaintiffs without probable cause and had
subjected them "to all manner of vile abuse and mistreatment. '36
Damages were sought for false imprisonment, assault, battery,
and a deprivation of equal protection. In attempting to delineate
more precisely the "outer perimeter" of an official's line of duty,
the court adopted some of the broad language of its earlier decision in Spalding v. Vilas:37
The requirements that the act be within the outer perimeter of the
line of duty is no doubt another way of stating that the act must
have more or less connection with the general matters committed by
"Id. at 575.
"4Id.

F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962).
"'18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1970).
"1305 F.2d at 70.
-332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964).
"Id. at 857.
3161 U.S. 483 (1896).
32305
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law to the officer's control or supervision, and not be manifestly or
palpably beyond his authority.1

This view has enabled federal courts to expand the boundaries of an official's scope of authority so that even where his conduct is obviously unconstitutional, it can be made to fall within
the outer perimeter of his duties, thereby satisfying the first prerequisite to assertion of the immunity rule as announced in Barr.
That, in fact, was the result in Norton. In holding that the defendant officials were acting "more or less [in] connection with the
general matters committed by law to their control,"39 the Fifth
Circuit suggested that as long as the ultimate result of their acts
was permissible, any means to achieve that result were within
their scope of authority and therefore potentially deserving of
immunity. On the scope of authority question alone, this was also
the approach taken by the Second Circuit in Bivens:
[W]hat these Narcotics Agents are charged with, despite the allegations of illegality because of lack of a warrant and probable cause,
and the use of unnecessary force, is precisely what Narcotics Agents
are supposed to do, namely, make arrests in narcotics cases. So we
hold they were alleged to be acting "within the outer perimeter of
[their] line of duty.""0

Liability was found in Bivens only because the defendants failed
in their entitlement to immunity on other grounds."
Unfortunately, cases arising under section 1983 disclose little
in the way of discernible trends regarding the contours of scope
of authority as a condition to official immunity. This is true even
where the courts have devoted much energy to defining scope of
authority as it relates to statutory liability. The courts seem to
have been compelled, and not unreasonably so, to adopt the same
standards regarding scope of authority in both contexts, notwithstanding their conspicuous desire to grant official immunity
"sparingly" in order to limit the instances in which the defense
will bar recovery.4"
Given the necessity for espousing a scope of authority test for
purposes of constitutional tort liability which is analogous to that
adopted by the courts in section 1983 cases, and given the breadth
of the scope of authority test as it relates to immunity under the
3332 F.2d at 858-59.
39

Id. at 862.

F.2d at 1343.
"See notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra.
"Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966).
4456
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prevailing common law decisions, there is good reason for adopting the expansive concept of scope of authority for purposes of
both liability and immunity in the constitutional tort setting.
Perhaps this test is best formulated in the language of the law of
agency: If the act or omission of the defendant official which
results in the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights is
committed under the cloak or color of the authority apparently
vested in the defendant by the government, then the act or omission is both cognizable as a constitutional tort and, if the discretionary function requirement is satisfied,4 3 the act is also privileged under the doctrine of official immunity. In articulating the
test, then, the reference is to agency power rather than to agency
authority.
This approach admittedly gives with one hand and takes
with the other. It prevents an escape from liability on the premise
that the constitutional tort theory is inapplicable;" at the same
time, it admits of the potential for immunity with regard to any
actionable conduct.45 However, absent limitations on the types of
official conduct to which immunity attaches, the very act which
creates a cause of action in constitutional tort would also preclude
recovery. Thus, there is a compelling need to impose such limitations by manipulation of the second prerequisite to immunity,
the discretionary function.
B.

DiscretionaryFunction
As previously indicated, the discretionary function requirement is perhaps the most critical in limiting the immunity doctrine to those cases actually warranting its application. It is therefore surprising to observe that what constitutes a discretionary
function is by no means settled.
The normal and familiar meaning of the word "discretion"
is both imprecise and deceptive in the present context. A discretionary act is not simply one which entails the exercise of judgment." Were it so, few human acts could fail to satisfy the test
of discretion. What constitutes a discretionary act, and what dis' 3See notes 46-63 and accompanying text infra.
"See notes 22-28 and accompanying text supra.
"See notes 46-63 and accompanying text infra.
"In determining whether a particular government function falls within the scope of
official immunity, it does not suffice to consider simply whether the officer has "discretion" in the sense that he exercises judgment in choosing among alternative courses of
action. Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 362 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub
nor. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
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tinguishes a discretionary act from a ministerial one are questions
which defy such simplistic analysis.
Unfortunately, the leading cases on federal executive immunity shed little light on the matter. In Barr v. Matteo,47 for
example, the Court assumed more than it revealed about how to
identify a discretionary function for purposes of executive immunity. Apparently the Court felt that because the defendant,
the Acting Director of Rent Stabilization, was given great latitude in choosing the means of discharging the duties of his office,
he was consequently engaged in the performance of a discretionary function." The Court therefore concluded that any act done
in the exercise of such a function is a discretionary one, deserving
the protection of official immunity.49 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court weighed two very broad policy objectives: the need to
protect the individual citizen from oppressive or malicious governmental action and the exigency of protecting "the public interest . . . . [from] the harassment and inevitable hazards of
vindictive . . . damage suits" against public officials.5" On finding the scales tipped in favor of the latter, the Court found it
necessary to grant unqualified immunity based on the status of
the official, rather than merely to grant a limited privilege based
on the character of his allegedly tortious act. Such a rule is both
arbitrary and unjustifiable. Furthermore, it fails to promote in
any consistent and discriminating fashion the policies underlying
the doctrine of executive immunity.5' Instead of making the official's position dispositive, the courts must shift the focus of inquiry to the act which occasioned the injury. This latter and
better approach has been adopted by the federal courts in section
1983 suits against state and local officials and has been instrumental in facilitating proper application of the doctrine."
'7360 U.S. 564 (1959).
"Id. at 574-75.
"Id. at 575.
SId. at 565.
5
See notes 7-12 and accompanying text supra.
"See Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533, 536 (9th Cir. 1965), where the court recognized that "the key to the immunity [afforded to a county prosecuting attorney] is that
the acts, alleged to have been wrongful, were committed by the officer in the performance
of an integral part of the judicial process." See also Donavan v. Reinhold, 433 F.2d 738
(9th Cir. 1965); Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955); Balistrieri v. Warren,
314 F. Supp. 824 (W.D. Wis. 1970). Cf. Corsican Prod. v. Pitchess, 338 F.2d 441 (9th Cir.
1964). With these cases compare, e.g., Scherer v. Morrow, 401 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1084 (1969); Skolnich v. Campbell, 398 F.2d 23 (7th Cir. 1968);
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1. The Lawmaking Test
In contrast to Barr and its predecessors, 3 a line of cases
beginning with Dalehite v. United States,5 4 in which the
"discretionary-ministerial" language of the Federal Tort Claims
Acts was construed, represents a productive attempt to give content to this elusive distinction. In Dalehite the Supreme Court
held discretionary acts to mean those done at a "planning rather
than operational level."" Otherwise stated, the act is a discretionary one if done in the authorship and determination of policy;
the act is a ministerial one if done in the execution of predetermined judgments. 57 While this formulation of the discretionary
function requirement begins to focus on the kind of act deserving
of the protection afforded by official immunity, it does not yet
isolate such acts and exclude all others. For example, the supervisor of a police academy who negligently plans and supervises a
riot control training program acts at the planning level; yet there
appears to be little justification for not holding him accountable
for his failure to train police in the proper use of tear gas or other
weapons. On the other hand, the police officer who makes an
arrest without a warrant based on probable cause acts at the
operational level; yet his act is of such a nature as to warrant the
application of the immunity doctrine.
A better approach to defining the discretionary function was
suggested by Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion in
Dalehite:
When an official exerts governmental authority in a manner which
legally binds one or many, he is acting in a way in which no private
person could. Such activities do and are designed to affect, often
deleteriously, the affairs of individuals, but courts have long recognized the public policy that such official shall be controlled solely
Scherer v. Brennan, 379 F.2d 609 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1021 (1967); S & S
Logging Co. v. Barker, 366 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1966); Houtenville v. Dunahoo, 286 F. Supp.
5 (N.D. Miss. 1968); Mullins v. First Nat'l Exch. Bank, 275 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Va. 1967)
(where immunity was granted on the basis of the officer's status).
53
Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896);
Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87 (1845); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir.
1964); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
-346 U.S. 15 (1953).
5528 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2674, 2680 (1970).

58346 U.S. at 42.
5
"Discretionary" acts are those which require personal judgment, deliberation, and
decision in carrying out the duties the job requires, while "ministerial" acts require only
an obedience to orders, leaving the official with no choice as to how to perform. See W.
PROSSER supra note 28, at 132.
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by the statutory or administrative mandate and not by the added
threat of private damage suits."

According to Jackson's view, a discretionary act can be identified
by determining whether or not the official act creates a rule of law
which is designed to operate upon private persons without their
consent and to determine their legal rights and obligations.
The power to make a rule of law, whether a legislative rule
affecting the many, or a judicial rule affecting the few, has always
been protected in the hands of those authorized to wield such
power.59 Hence, immunity has been granted to legislators, judges,
prosecutors, and jurymen for acts done in pursuit of their official
duties. What the Jackson test recognized is that executive officers
frequently act in legislative and judicial capacities. Applying the
immunity doctrine to executive officers poses some special difficulties. Legislative and judicial immunity have traditionally been
considered absolute. Once the status of legislator or judge attached, immunity for all acts performed within that officer's
scope of authority irrevocably followed.6 0 However, given the
range and variety of duties commonly performed by members of
the executive branch, it cannot be said that executive immunity
should afford such extensive protection. Executives should enjoy
the same immunity as legislators and judges, but only to the
extent that their acts are of a legislative or judicial character.
Hence the need arises to look beyond the status of the official to
the nature of the act performed.
Professor Borchard recognizes this need in considering the
separation of powers justification. He maintains that the classification of discretionary acts "has justification only to the extent
that deliberation and action as to policy constitutes legislation
• . .upon which it would therefore be inappropriate to predicate
tort liability."'"
2. Uniform Rules for High and Low-Ranking Officials
Identification of discretionary functions by resort to the process suggested here not only accords with the policies underlying
"1346 U.S. at 59.

"See text accompanying notes 12-18 supra.
"E.g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (legislators); Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547 (1967) (judges); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators); Bradley

v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871) (judges).
"Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 129, 135 (1925).
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the doctrine of official immunity, but it also applies the same
criteria to Cabinet officers and police patrolmen alike. Heretofore
the law has never recognized, for example, that a policeman could
exercise a discretionary function so as to be entitled to immunity
for his acts.2 But if Jackson's test is adopted, it follows logically
that any time a police officer determines that he has probable
cause to arrest or to search without a warrant, then he has exerted
his governmental authority in such a way as to adjudicate private
legal rights. Even when a warrantless arrest is challenged on the
grounds that probable cause was not present, "it is the function
of the court to determine whether the facts available to the officers at the moment of the arrest would 'warrant a man of reasona6' 3
ble caution in the belief' that an offense had been committed.
One explanation for the historical disparity between the
treatment of police officers and the treatment of higher ranking
officials may be that the common law allowed police officers sued
for false arrest or imprisonment to plead in lieu of official immunity the defense of good faith and probable cause.64 When the
Second Circuit held that the defendants in Bivens were not entitled to immunity for their acts, it simultaneously recognized this
common law defense of good faith and probable cause 5 and remanded the case to the district court for findings of fact on this
issue. It would seem, though, that the discretionary function test
proposed above subsumes the notion of probable cause in a fourth
amendment case,"8 and that there would, therefore, be no need to
pursue the matter further. The finding of no probable cause as a
matter of law would not only compel the conclusion that the
"See Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev 'd on othergrounds sub nom.
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973).
3
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 95 (1964).
'See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
"Thus the officer must allege and prove not only that he believed, in
good faith, that his conduct was lawful, but also that his belief was reasonable. And so we hold that it is a defense to allege and prove good faith and
reasonable belief in the validity of the arrest and search and in the necessity
for carrying out the arrest and search in the way the arrest was made and
the search was conducted. We think as a matter of constitutional law and
as a matter of common sense, a law enforcement officer is entitled to this
protection.
456 F.2d at 1348.
"Likewise, for example, where a police officer disperses a crowd assembled to petition
the government for redress of grievances, he would have to show that he believed that
there existed a "clear and present danger" to the community in order to be entitled to
immunity for his act. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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defendant had been engaged in a ministerial act, but it would
render futile any attempt to raise the common law defense. However, such a rigid rule would not be fair, nor would it promote the
policies underlying immunity. Reversing a policeman's determination of probable cause is no different in the abstract than reversing a judge who issues a warrant on similar facts. There must
be a means of distinguishing honest errors of judgment from
abuses of authority.
Good Faith
Requiring the policeman or other executive officer to have
acted in good faith and without malice provides the means
sought. The effect of this requirement would be to permit inquiry
into the subjective motivations of the officer. The permissibility
of such an inquiry in the immunity context has historically varied
with the status of the officer. Legislators and judges have always
been immune for acts motivated by malice so long as they had
not acted "clearly beyond their jurisdiction." 7 So, too, with highranking federal executives. 8 However, the motives of low-ranking
executives" have always been subject to scrutiny in common law
actions against them for false arrest and imprisonment." Even if
this regrettable disparity were to persist in the application of the
immunity doctrine to constitutional tort claims, it would not
work great injustice because most constitutional torts will be
committed by low-ranking executives whose motives will be open
to examination. Ideally, however, good faith should be a third
prerequisite to immunity for all executives of whatever rank.
There is no good reason why the Acting Director of Rent Stabilization in Barr v. Matteo, like the police officers in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, should not be required to
C.

7

1 Tenney

v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legislators); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 335 (1871) (judges). Cf. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd
sub nom. O'Shea v. Littleton, 94 S. Ct. 669 (1974) (judges).
" Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
"Although the Second Circuit's holding in Bivens as restricted to its facts makes the
defense of good faith and probable cause available only to federal law enforcement officers,
there is no reason why it should not be extended to apply to all operational-level officials
who cause injury to private citizens. By making this defense available to all government
officers, the courts can satisfy their legitimate desire to protect ministerial executives from
personal liability where their individual conduct has been above reproach and at the same
time impose such liability where warranted.
'"See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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demonstrate his good faith before claiming official privilege. 7'
Surely the public cannot wish its government to be so fearless
that it dares by its agents to violate the constitutional rights of
its citizens in bad faith without fear of reprisal. Surely, too, the
judiciary will not be loath, on separation of powers grounds, to
require that executive officers charged with a lawmaking function
discharge that function in good faith and without malice.
7

'But see Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), where the court held

that:
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of
using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal
motive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for
the injuries he may so cause; and if it were possible in practice to confine
such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstruous to deny recovery. The
justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim
is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials,
the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties . . . The answer must be found in a balance between the evils . . ..
In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed
the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do
their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.

CHILDREN IN NEED: OBSERVATIONS OF PRACTICES OF
THE DENVER JUVENILE COURT*
By LYNNE M. HUFNAGEL,** JOHN P. DAVIDSON***
I.

INTRODUCTION

There are a growing number of empirical studies of the juvenile court, focusing most particularly on the implementation and
impact of rights accorded juveniles in In re Gault' and subsequent
decisions. One certain impact of the Gault decision is that lawyers may now discuss the juvenile court and its problems, apparently secure in the knowledge that the juvenile court is, afterall,
a forum that trades in rights and remedies in much the same
manner as the civil and criminal courts in which lawyers have
traditionally performed their services. Law review articles paying
homage to Gault have billowed forth in recent years, not unlike
a Gargantuan sigh, as though reflecting communal relief at the
entry of juvenile law into the familiar adversary arena.
Another apparent impact of the Gault dec'sion has been increased public interest in and access to what is happening in the
juvenile courts, about which much has been written and little is
known. One who spends time in the juvenile court may easily
develop a vague feeling that the law ultimately has very little to
do with a vast portion of the day-to-day processing of juveniles
through the juvenile justice system. While the historical parens
patriae orientation of the juvenile court would certainly have accounted for that impression at one time, the feeling comes as
something of a surprise in the context of Gault and its progeny.
Five years after Gault, the likely explanation for this feeling is
that the rights accorded juveniles by Gault have probably not
been implemented-so the question of whether implementation
has occurred arises rather naturally.
* This article is the result of a study conducted by Lynne M. Hufnagel and John P.
Davidson under a grant from the American Bar Foundation to the Denver Law Journal.
The author and the Journal wish to express their sincere appreciation to both the American Bar Foundation and to the Project Director of the American Bar Foundation's Law
Review Research Project, Barlow F. Christensen, for their continued support and interest.
** Research Consultant, Colorado Department of Institutions, Office of Youth Services; J.D., 1971, University of Denver College of Law.
* ** Partner, Kastler, Erwin, and Davidson, Raton, New Mexico; B.A., 1969, University of Denver; J.D., 1972, University of Denver.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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It was such a question that originally motivated the study
from which this article resulted. The result, however, is not principally an implementation study. The typical focus of an implementation study is to determine whether there has been local
compliance with a legal mandate, whether compliance accomplished the policy goals which the mandate was designed to
achieve, or whether compliance is possible at all. The focus of an
implementation study, consequently, is on the law and its relationship, in practical terms, to the situation in which it is intended to operate. An implementation study in the juvenile area
might be motivated by one of two assumptions: first, that because Gault is the law (and therefore assumed to be beneficial),

it should and can be enforced; or second, that because Gault
represents a recent judicial re-evaluation of recognized problems
in the juvenile court, its enforcement will solve the problems of
the juvenile court.
The alternative assumptions on which this article is based
are that the problems facing the juvenile court are not so simple
that mere implementation of the recognized rights of juveniles
will serve to alleviate them; that the juvenile laws are merely one
element among a group of forces that influence the behavior of
the juvenile court bureaucracy and its success, however defined,
in dealing with the problems assigned to it, and that these laws
may in fact have only a negligible influence; that the juvenile law
may be, at any given time, as much a part of the problem as a
part of the solution; that a bare examination of court practices
to determine whether a court has complied with the express requirements of Gault and other decisions, though legitimate for
that limited purpose, fails to account for the impact of such subtle factors as the child's capacity to comprehend his rights, systematic pressures on the child which influence him to waive his
rights, or the effectiveness of counsel when that right is not
waived; that the concept of "implementation" in the juvenile
area has not developed beyond "compliance" and fails to take the
above factors into account; and that, consequently, the problems
of the juvenile court are deserving of a broader, less restricted
approach, in which both legal and social issues are given cognizance.
No attempt is made here to quantify practices or trends in
the court. The object of this article is to identify problem areas
and to suggest topics for further study. The objective of the study
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was exploratory and the data presented are predominantly impressionistic in form. It is submitted that approaches of more
narrow scope at the present time fail to comprehend the complex
interrelation of law, bureaucracy, and social problems that meet
in the present-day juvenile court.
II.

METHODOLOGY

Various legal and administrative requirements connected
with the processing of a child through the juvenile court system
have resulted in the development of a series of critical
junctures-established decisionmaking points, each of which has
the result of either progressing the child in the system, or turning
him out of it. These critical junctures may involve the input of
several individuals with differing functions or, in some instances,
may be controlled by a single individual. The child may or may
not be an active participant in the particular decisionmaking
process. The critical junctures identified in this study and used
as units for the organization and presentation of the observational
results of the study include: (1) referral to the juvenile court by
police, parents, and school officials; (2) probation department
decision to detain pending detention hearing; (3) detention hearing; (4) decision to file a petition, handle informally, or handle
unofficially;' (5) plea hearing; (6) omnibus hearing; (7) adjudicatory hearing; (8) dispositional hearing; and (9) subsequent hearings to review placement.
The critical junctures listed do not include the taking of a
child into custody (arrest) or the eventual decision to release the
child from institutional commitment, but do cover all other decisions resulting in referral to or severance from the court system .'
I See

note 85 infra concerning recent statutory changes affecting this critical junc-

ture.
One additional decisionmaking point which is not covered in this study is the
transfer hearing provided for in ch. 110, § 19, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 391, amending
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-8(1) (Supp. 1969):
(1)(a) At the transfer hearing, the court shall consider:
(b) Whether there is probable cause to believe that the child has
committed an act for which waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction
over the child and transfer to the district court may be sought. ..
; and
(c) Whether the interests of the child or of the community would
be better served by the juvenile court waiving its jurisdiction over
the child and transferring jurisdiction over him to the district
court.
While this decision certainly involves a juvenile court decision of a critical nature, it was
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Observations relating to each juncture will include specific examples from particular case studies, as well as aggregate impressions.
Following a description of the facilities and personnel of the
Denver Juvenile Court and of the characteristics common to all
critical junctures, each decisionmaking point will be viewed from
several perspectives. Second, the legal bases and administrative
guidelines which are intended to govern each critical juncture will
be discussed. 4 Third, the decisionmakers at each critical juncture
will be described, both as they are contemplated in law and as
they function in fact. Both the consequences of their actions upon
the child and his family, and the legal alternatives open to the
court and to the attorneys at each critical juncture will be analyzed.
The primary research method utilized was in the form of
informal and structured interviews with participants in Denver's
juvenile justice system, observation of court practices and procedures, and the assumption of the role of student counsel in the
Denver Juvenile Court by the principal investigators. Under Rule
226 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, law students are
"authorized to appear in . .. courts of the state as if licensed to
not included in the series of critical junctures discussed fully for two reasons. First, in the
Denver Juvenile Court, the transfer hearing is a fairly rare occurrence. A past presiding
judge estimated that only about twelve transfer hearings per year are requested by the
district attorney's office, and less than half of those result in a transfer of jurisdiction over
the child from the Denver Juvenile Court to the criminal division of the district court.
Secondly, the transfer hearing does not result in progressing the child through the system
or turning him out of it in the same manner as do the critical junctures discussed in the
text. If the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the child, the child proceeds to the plea
hearing as if the transfer hearing had never occurred and from that critical juncture on is
subject to the same procedures as any other child. If the transfer hearing results in a
transfer of jurisdiction to the criminal division of the district court, the child has been
turned out of the juvenile justice system, but must still wend his way through the adult
system. Because of the narrow scope of the transfer hearing, no findings or decision other
than these two can be made by the juvenile court. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541 (1966), for discussion of due process requirements in transfer hearings.
I This study does not purport to be a comparative analysis of legal precedents and
administrative procedures in juvenile courts throughout the country. While such an analysis of extant juvenile law and procedure would be extremely valuable, it is the purpose of
this study to give an in-depth analysis of a-single urban juvenile court-Denver Juvenile
Court-and the law and procedures which govern it. It is recognized that important case
law is being formulated in other states; however, it is suggested that differing administrative procedures in the urban juvenile courts of other states and the relative breadth and
liberality of the Colorado Children's Code would in most instances significantly reduce
the import and impact of those decisions in Colorado.
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practice" when they are representing poor persons under the auspices of a legal aid dispensary. Early in 1971, this rule was construed to cover the representation by law students of Children in
Need of Supervision (CHINS) in the juvenile court under the
auspices of the Legal Aid Society of Metropolitan Denver and the
University of Denver College of Law Student Internship Program.
Since January of 1971, student attorneys, under the direct supervision of staff attorneys of the Legal Aid Society have been involved in the bulk of representation of CHINS in the Denver
Juvenile Court.
Both principal investigators participated in the Juvenile
Court Internship Program as student attorneys at various times
during the period of the study and therefore had relatively easy
access to the personnel and procedures in the court on a rather
informal basis. Other observations and interviews were conducted under the direct auspices of the Denver Law Journal
study. Impressions of the researchers cover generally the period
from January 1971 through June 1972.1 Both as student attorneys
and as researchers not directly involved in the proceeding being
observed, we observed all critical junctures at random times. As
student attorneys we had the additional exposure of interviewing
children detained by the intake division of the probation department, representing them in detention hearings, discussing the
filing of the petition with the probation officers (plea-bargaining,
if you will), interviewing parents involved, and actually representing the child during subsequent critical junctures. As student
attorneys-actual participants in the juvenile justice system-we
were also subjected to many of the same pressures which influence the behavior of the more traditional participants in the
court-judges, probation officers, and police. While the possibility for organizational cooptation of student counsel in the Denver
Juvenile Court was perhaps not as real as for those attorneys who
practice regularly and over an extended period of time in the
court, student counsel certainly felt the press of the court's tremendous workload, the impact of the lack of treatment facilities,
and the role conflict implicit in balancing the best interests of the
child with the necessity of working within the realm of the possiI One of the principal researchers has been continually working as an attorney in the
Denver Juvenile Court and has been able, where necessary, to update information obtained from the interviews which is no longer accurate.
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ble. Maintaining a fairly cordial working relationship with court
staff, in most instances, was essential to moving a case through
the system, but often ran contrary to the adversary role of counsel
necessary to presenting the case properly to the court. As researchers, we attempted to be aware of these pressures, both to
avoid a personal impact on the functioning of the system, and to
be able to assess more objectively the impact of counsel on the
court itself.
Interviews conducted during the major portion of the study
were informal and unstructured and occurred during or following
observations of critical junctures. Among those interviewed were
juveniles and their parents, officers and detectives in the Delinquency Control Division of the Denver Police Department, probation officers, Denver Juvenile Court judges and referees, juvenile
court administrators, public defenders and legal aid attorneys
working in the juvenile court, legislators involved with proposals
affecting the Colorado Children's Code, administrators of various
state and private placement facilities, school administrators, and
a newspaper reporter whose principal function was to cover the
juvenile court. Toward the final stages of research, structured
interviews were conducted with representative groups from the
Denver Juvenile Court itself, including probation officers, juvenile court administrators, and juvenile court judges and referees.
In addition to obtaining additional information, the object of the
final round of structured interviews was to present the tentative
results of previous observations and interviews for the purpose of
obtaining reactions to and evaluations of our conclusions.
III.

PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES OF THE DENVER JUVENILE COURT

[O]ur judges and referees continue to maintain voluminous caseThere can be but few courts in
loads without relief in sight....
Coloradoor the entire country that are sustaining caseloads such as
these.

By 9 o'clock in the morning on any weekday, the wooden
benches in the south end of the Denver City and County Building
are sagging with the weight of parents and children waiting for
their day in court. Passing among them in the dark hallway are
public defenders negotiating last-minute plea bargains, probation counselors trying to ascertain whether necessary parties are
present, private attorneys, and an occasional sheriff's deputy
leading a handcuffed child to a courtroom to face the judge. A
couple of miles to the northeast, parents wait on more comforta-
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ble chairs in Denver's well-lit, air conditioned juvenile detention
facility, juvenile hall, where they strain for glimpses of their children being escorted from detention units to appear before the
juvenile court referee. After what frequently must seem to be an
interminable delay, parent and child appear before the court to
receive "juvenile justice" and be sent on their sometimes separate
ways.
In the 1970-71 fiscal year, judges and referees in the Denver
Juvenile Court were assigned an average of 1,496 cases.' The projected caseload for 1971-72 was 1,344 and for the following fiscal
year, 1,695. The total number of petitions filed in 1970-71 was
5,983, and 5,374 were projected for the following year. Yet by June
1, 1972, the intake division of the probation department had already handled 2,952 cases of delinquency, children in need of
supervision, and out-of-town runaways. This staggering caseload
must be explained briefly to be clearly understood.
Chapter 22 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, 1963, as
amended, hereinafter referred to as the Code,7 confers broad jurisdiction upon the juvenile courts. Exclusive original jurisdiction is
given not only in proceedings concerning delinquent children,
children in need of supervision, and dependent and neglected
children, but also in all adoption proceedings, proceedings to determine the paternity, legal custody, support, or guardianship of
a child or involving the termination or relinquishment of parental
rights, and proceedings in which an adult is charged with contributing to the delinquency of a child. This list suggests the broad
range of proceedings which may be conducted daily in the Denver
Juvenile Court.'
Court Statistics, District 2, Denver Juvenile Court, at 2 (1972). These statistics are
compiled annually by the court and used for analysis as well as budget requests. Any
statistics cited further in this section are drawn from this compilation by the court which
is neither published nor distributed to the public at large. Further mention of statistics
in the text will not be footnoted.
The Colorado Children's Code was enacted in 1967 and preceded the Supreme Court
decision In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the first case according significant due process
rights to juveniles. The Code has been amended yearly to conform with later decisions,
changes in state facilities, and developing views as to what is "in the best interest of the
child and the community."
' The full extent of the jurisdiction of juvenile courts in Colorado may be found in
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-4 (Supp. 1967), as amended, ch. 110, §§ 2-4, [1973] Colo.
Sess. Laws 384-85. There is support among the personnel of the Denver Juvenile Court
for changing the jurisdiction to exclude paternity and support proceedings and concentrate more fully on the problems of adolescent offenders; however, it is unlikely that the
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Since early in 1971, the judicial personnel of the Denver Juvenile Court have included two full-time judges and two full-time
referees. In July 1973, a third judgeship was allocated for Denver
Juvenile Court by the Colorado General Assembly. A juvenile
judge is appointed by the governor from a list of three names
submitted by the Judicial Commission of the Second Judicial
District. Judges face retention elections every 6 years. Referees in
the Denver Juvenile Court are appointed by the juvenile judge
under whom they serve at that judge's pleasure.' By statute, referees must be licensed to practice law in Colorado,'0 and the
administrative guidelines of the Denver Juvenile Court require
that they have practiced law at least 3 years. With the exceptions
of jury trials and transfer hearings," referees are empowered to
hear any case or matter under the court's jurisdiction. Although
parties have a right to an initial hearing before a judge, if they
waive their right a referee will hear the case and make findings
and recommendations to a judge.'2 If no rehearing before the
judge is requested,and if the judge, on his own motion, does not
order a rehearing, 3 the judge will approve or disapprove the recommendations of the referee. The recommendations become a
final order of the court only upon such approval. 4
In the Denver Juvenile Court, the referees hear all detention
hearings, the great majority of plea hearings, a majority of the
dispositional hearings, and most of the review or further dispositional hearings. The judges hear all jury trials, transfer hearings,
and omnibus hearings and the majority of trials to court. 5 Judges
legislature would support such a move in the near future, especially since it is only the
urbanized Denver Juvenile Court which is pushing for the change. As support for their
position, court personnel have documented that in fiscal year 1970-71 paternity and support proceedings accounted for 1,615 of the 5,983 new petitions filed, more than any other
single type of proceeding. There is a feeling, particularly among the judicial officers of the
court, that the Denver Juvenile Court's primary function in these proceedings is to act as
a collection agency for the Department of Welfare.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-10(1) (Supp. 1967).
Id. § 22-1-10(2).
Id. § 22-1-10(1).
Id. §§ 22-1-10(3),(4).
13Ch. 110, § 8, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 387, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 221-10(5) (Supp. 1967).
11Id. See People v. J.A.M., 174 Colo. 245, 483 P.2d 362 (1971), wherein the court held
that the procedure was a two-stage factfinding process and that no jeopardy attached
during the first stage.
11With the exception of support proceedings, which are handled primarily by the
referees, the other proceedings within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court are handled
primarily by the judges.
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and referees both prefer to preside at the dispositional hearings
of those children whose trials they have heard, rather than to
transfer the case to another judicial officer for disposition.
Responsibility for investigating child in need of supervision
cases has been delegated to the probation department of the
court." During the first 5 months of 1972, almost 3,000 such investigations were made by the 22 line-staff probation counselors of
the intake units.'7 The field division of the probation department,
composed of 18 probation counselors,"6 is responsible for investigating referrals of children already on probation and for filing
probation revocation petitions. A total of 408 revocation petitions
were filed during fiscal year 1971-72. This division is also responsible for the supervision of children previously placed on probationary status by the court. In April 1972, each field counselor was
supervising an average of 54 probationers.
The director of court services and his assistant manage the
operations of the probation department. Children in Denver's
juvenile justice system, however, rarely see administrators. Their
contact is largely with counselors at the hall if they are detained,
with the probation counselors in any case, and with the judicial
officers if their case is handled by the filing of a petition.
The Denver City and County Building houses the juvenile
court. About 15 minutes away from the city and county building
is juvenile hall, where the intake division of the probation department is located. Unit III of the intake division, the screening unit,
is responsible for interviewing all children brought to the hall by
" Ch. 110, § 16, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 390, amending CoLo. Rav. STAT. ANN. §
22-3-1(2)(a) (Supp. 1967), which reads:
Whenever it appears to a law enforcement officer or other person that a child
is, or appears to be, within the court's jurisdiction, as provided in section 221-4(1)(c) [CHINS] or (1)(d) [dependency and neglect], the law enforcement officer or other person may refer the matter to the court, which shall
have a preliminary investigation made to determine whether the interests of
the child or of the community require that further action be taken, which
investigation shall be made by the probation department, county department of public welfare, or any other agency designated by the court.
The Denver Department of Welfare investigates possible dependency and neglect cases
and files petitions in this jurisdictional area with the court's authorization.
'1 Line-staff counselors are responsible for the day-to-day handling of cases, whereas
their supervisors generally handle administrative matters and oversee the management
of caseloads. The intake division also includes a director, three supervisory counselors, and
three counselors who deal in the specialized areas of guardianship and delinquency prevention through volunteer services.
"1 The field division also includes a director and four supervisory counselors.
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the police or their parents. Division III of the Denver Juvenile
Court is also located in the administrative wing of this building.
Since 1972, this courtroom has been used on a regular basis for
delinquency and children in need of supervision hearings, in addition to daily detention hearings. The referees rotate assignment
between divisions III and IV approximately-once a month.
IV.

A.

CRITICAL JUNCTURES

CharacteristicsCommon to All CriticalJunctures

While there are apparent differences among the critical junctures, there are also some common characteristics. All junctures
occur in the Denver Juvenile Court and are presided over by staff
persons of the court. Thus the philosophies, pressures, and vagaries of the court, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of court
personnel, are influencing factors in each juncture. Each of the
junctures takes place in the facilities of the court, and whether
those facilities are cramped or luxurious obviously influences the
behavior of the participants in the decisionmaking process. A
child, moreover, may be placed in or released from detention' 9 as
a result of a decision made at any of the junctures. In most instances, detention decisions are made by judicial officers.
Finally, statutory definitions of delinquent children and children in need of supervision are employed at each critical juncture,
although the interpretation imposed in practice varies. The Code
defines delinquent children as follows:
(17)(a)(i) "Delinquent child" means any child ten years of age
or older who, regardless of where the violation occurred, has violated:
(ii) Any federal or state law, except state traffic and game and
fish laws or regulations;
(iii) Any municipal ordinance, except traffic ordinances, the
penalty for which may be a jail sentence; or
(iv) Any lawful order of the court made under this chapter."

Important exceptions to the above definition are children who,
having been previously adjudicated delinquent, commit an act
11Detention

is defined as secure custody in physically restricting facilities. COLO.

REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-3(12) (Supp. 1967).

,0 People v. D.R., 29 Colo. App. 525, 487 P.2d 824 (1971), held in essence that a
"lawful order of the court made under this chapter" did not include conditions of probation imposed as a result of an adjudication that a child was a child in need of supervision,
if violation of the conditions of probation would not in themselves be sufficient to sustain
a delinquency petition.
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which would be a felony if committed by an adult, or who are 14
years or older and commit crimes of violence.'
Children in need of supervision, referred to by judges and
children alike as "CHINS", are defined in the Code as follows:
(18) (a) "Child in need of supervision" means any child:
(b) Who is repeatedly absent from school in violation of the
requirements of Article 20 of Chapter 123, C.R.S. 1963.2
(c) Who has run away from home or is otherwise beyond the
control of his parent, guardian, or other legal custodian; or
(d) Whose behavior or condition is such as to endanger his
own or others' welfare."

B.

Referral to the Denver Juvenile Court by Police, Parents, or
School Officials
1. Police Referral

Approximately 1,350 juveniles per month pass through the
Delinquency Control Division (DCD) of the Denver Police Department, some to be sent to juvenile hall and others to be released to their parents. Typically, DCD will receive a report of
suspicious activity by juveniles. Officers will be sent to the scene
and, after an investigation, will decide whether to take the children into custody. If the officers do take the children into custody,
they will be taken to DCD where the arresting officers will attempt to notify the parents and will determine whether there are
any juvenile case histories on the children. The children may then
be interrogated about the alleged offense. On this basis, a DCD
detective will decide the course of action to be taken. In the more
"serious" cases, the children will be transported to juvenile hall
for detention.
The children in this typical situation might also be dealt
with in a number of other ways. The arresting officers will often
lecture the children on the street and then release them, or merely
take them home to their parents, especially if the officers feel that
either the DCD detective or the complaint deputy at the district
"' COLO.

REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 22-1-3(17) (Supp. 1969), as amended, ch. 110, § 1, [1973]

Colo. Sess. Laws 384.
Basically the requirement, with exceptions listed in the statute, is that "[elvery
shall
child who has attained the age of seven years and is under the age of sixteen ...
attend public school for at least one hundred seventy-two days during each school year."
CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 123-20-5(1) (1963).

SCOLO.

REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 22-1-3(18) (Supp. 1967).
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attorney's office will conclude that the offense does not require
the filing of a petition.
Similarly, the officers might choose to take the children
home immediately after they are taken into custody and to leave
with each child and his parents a request to appear at DCD at
some later time for investigation by a detective."' The police officers might also have contacted the children's parents before
transporting the children to DCD. Officers at DCD have observed
that if the parents are present at DCD during the questioning and
willing to take their children home at that time, the detectives
are much more inclined to release them, especially if the parents
seem able to assert control over their children.
If the parents appear at DCD, they may be asked to participate in the interrogation. In this case, the children and their
parents will usually be advised of their legal rights.2 5 A statement
of these rights is generally read in a perfunctory manner by the
officer, and the parents and children are then left alone to discuss
the matter. Often the officer suggests that if the children waive
their rights, matters will be facilitated, or states as an inducement that the case is not going to be referred to the court anyway
(a decision which the detective and not the officer makes). If any
child decides voluntarily to speak with the officers, he and his
2
parent are asked to sign a juvenile advisement form. 1
The Code is fairly explicit in its directives to "law enforcement officers." While it does not require that a specific division
be established to deal with juvenile offenders, the Denver Police
Department has nevertheless created one. Any person taken into
custody by a police officer who informs that officer that he is
These requests carry no legal significance as far as most attorneys who practice in
the Denver Juvenile Court are concerned, and any appearance by child or parent is wholly
voluntary on their part. Furthermore, there is no provision in the Colorado Children's
Code for these requests, which have become known as "order-ins."
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Except for discussions of police conduct with regard to the involuntariness of juvenile confessions in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), and Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S.
49 (1962), the Supreme Court has not dealt with the rights of juveniles in the custody of
the police. Therefore, the legalities of the police relationship with juveniles are determined
by the Colorado Children's Code and the cases decided by the appellate courts of Colorado. Information concerning the guidelines and procedures used by the Delinquency
Control Division of the Denver Police Department was obtained as a result of a lengthy
interview conducted with the chief of the division in August of 1971, and several observation and interview sessions within the division were conducted during the summer of 1971.
Procedures have not changed appreciably since the dates of those interviews and observations.
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under 18 years of age, or whom the officer believes to be under
18, is processed through DCD regardless of the nature of the
offense alleged. If an offense is processed through the burglary
division, for instance, and it is later discovered that the person
charged is a juvenile, the case will be transferred to DCD.
Once a child has been taken into custody by a law enforcement officer,27 the Code defines the duties of that officer:
(1) When a child is taken into temporary custody, the officer
shall notify a parent, guardian, or legal custodian without unnecessary delay and inform him that, if the child is placed in detention,
all parties have a right to a prompt hearing to determine whether
the child is to be detained further. Such notification may be made
to a person with whom the child is residing if a parent, guardian, or
legal custodian cannot be located ...
(2) The child shall then be released to the care of his parents
or other responsible adult, unless his immediate welfare or the protection of the community requires that he be detained. The parent
or other person to whom the child is released may be required to sign
a written promise, on forms supplied by the court, to bring the child
to the court at a time set or to be set by the court.
(3) (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection
(3), a child shall not be detained by law enforcement officials any
longer than is reasonably necessary to obtain his name, age, residence, and other necessary information and to contact his parents,
guardian, or legal custodian.
(b) If he is not thereupon released, as provided in subsection
(2) of this section, he must be taken directly to the court or to the
place of detention or shelter designated by the court without unnecessary delay ...
(4) The officer or other person who takes a child to a detention
or shelter facility must notify the court and any agency or persons
so designated by the court at the earliest opportunity that the child
has been taken into custody and where he has been taken. He shall
also file a brief written report promptly with the court and any
agency or person so designated by the court, stating the facts which
led to the child being taken into custody and the reason why the
child was not released.a

Generally, the DCD adheres rigorously to these guidelines.
Upon occasion children have been transported through the city
and interrogated in patrol cars before being taken to DCD, and
" The guidelines for taking into custody are found at COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-1
(Supp. 1967). Discussion of the procedure is not included as part of this study. The phrase
used is "taken into temporary custody" rather than "arrested." Id. § 22-2-1(3) (Supp.
1967).
- Id. §§ 22-2-2(1) to -(4), as amended, ch. 110, § 12, [19731 Colo. Sess. Laws 388.
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there have been isolated cases of police brutality to juveniles
occurring between the time a youngster left DCD with the officers
and his arrival at a hospital or at juvenile hall. These cases have
been extremely rare, however, and have frequently resulted in
massive publicity and investigations of the officers involved.
Yet the good intentions of the officers are unfortunately often
frustrated. Sometimes parents do not receive notification of their
child's detention until long after he reaches juvenile hall. The
most common reason for this delay is that many parents simply
cannot be reached. The Code seems to contemplate that parents
will respond positively when notified that they may meet their
children at DCD. However, one DCD detective has estimated
thatbetween 10 and 25 percent of the children taken to juvenile
hall every month are placed there not because the police feel they
should be detained, but because parents cannot or, more often,
will not take the child home. Needless to say, this parental decision moves the child forward through the juvenile justice system.
DCD routinely complies with subsection (3) of the abovequoted Code section. Perhaps the reasons underlying this compliance are that there is no holding facility in the division29 and that
the rate of escape would be even higher than the present rate if
processed children were held in the division. The facilities of DCD
are cramped, and an enormous amount of traffic funnels through
the offices hourly.
Subsection (4) is satisfied by the use of the juvenile case
summary sheet, which is forwarded to juvenile hall if the child is
detained and given to the parent if the child is released.
The interpretation given by the police officers and detectives
to the vague statutory language in subsection (2) requires some
discussion. The statute demands release of the child "unless his
immediate welfare or the protection of the community requires
that he be detained." Although this standard was not mentioned
by the receiving officers interviewed, they did delineate standards
which they utilize for deciding whether to send children to juvenile hall. Children on probation or parole are always taken to
juvenile hal13 0 regardless of the offense alleged or the pattern of
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-3(6) (Supp. 1971) prohibits holding children in the
city jail located on the fourth floor of the same building.
I Police officers and Denver Juvenile Court intake personnel who were interviewed
both admitted that alleged parole violators of any age are generally refused entry at
juvenile hall and are confined in the Denver city or county jail. Some court personnel insist
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previous offenses. Juveniles subject to an order of detention 31 or
a request for apprehension of a runaway child are detained unless
the parent who signed the order or request is prepared to accept
the release of the child from DCD. Finally, the officers and detectives look to the seriousness of the offense as a criterion for detention. Apparently, each detective's subjective view of what is "serious" guides the decision. Another obvious, though unstated,
factor is the authority and discipline exercised by the child's
parent. Those who are stern with their children or who promise
retribution gain the release of their children more often than
those parents, especially unmarried mothers, who are tearful,
confused, or seemingly lacking in control over their children.
Because the responsibility for filing a "CHINS" petition is
vested in the Denver Juvenile Court (delegated to its probation
department) and because delinquency petitions are filed by the
district attorney's office, the DCD can refer a case or an offense
for filing to the court or to the district attorney. 2 The procedure
is administrative, and is not provided for in the Code. In the case
of every juvenile brought to DCD, a juvenile case summary sheet
is completed by the arresting officer and checked for completeness by the DCD detective or receiving officer. On the basis of this
summary, any interrogation of the child, and the investigation,
the receiving officer must make his decision whether to send a
formal complaint to the court or to the district attorney. In the
case of a "first offender," the officer is given broad discretion by
the division, regardless of the presence of probable cause, in deciding whether to refer the complaint. Two of the detectives interviewed stated that in addition to the referral criteria enumerated
above, they give great consideration to the attitude of the child
in a first arrest situation. One also indicated that if the parent
the decision is discretionary with the Director of Juvenile Hall, while the police maintain
that no alleged parole violator over the age of 16 years is ever accepted for detention at
juvenile hall. It would seem that both the police and the court personnel are operating in
direct contravention of a directive from the Denver Juvenile Court judges dated April 6,
1971, which states that "no juvenile shall be transferred from Juvenile Hall to either City
Jail or County Jail without a written specific order signed by the Court." In addition, the
practice violates COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-2(3)(b) (Supp. 1967), quoted in the text,
and section 22-2-3(6)(a) (Supp. 1971). While the practice could conceivably be justified
in specific cases, the across-the-board policy administered under the discretion of the
Director of Juvenile Hall is certainly questionable.
1' See CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-4 (Supp. 1969) for requirements.
32 Ch. 110, § 15, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 389, amending COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. §
22-3-1 (Supp. 1967).
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were "uncooperative" or "cocky," he would file on the child, regardless of the child's attitude. The other detective intimated
that if he felt discipline from the parent was forthcoming, he
would not file, preferring to see the matter handled at home.
Exactly what parental actions the detectives were looking for is
unclear.
On a second-time alleged offense, discretion is removed from
the detectives and, upon a finding of probable cause, the child's
case must automatically be referred to the district attorney regardless of whether the child was convicted of the first alleged
offense. This procedure was justified by the chief of the division
in the following manner: "If we waited for a conviction in the
Denver Juvenile Court, we would never refer anyone for further
action." Cases of children on probation or parole are referred
automatically for further action.
The referral goes initially to a district attorney who works
with the division in making a further determination as to the
existence of probable cause. If the district attorney advises the
officers to pursue the case, the investigation is completed and the
complaint usually reaches the probation department of the court
within 15 to 30 days after the alleged offense.
Whether or not a case will eventually be filed was seen by all
the officers interviewed as having a bearing on whether an advisement of rights should be given to the child and his parents. This
was so even though the decision to refer to the district attorney
in most cases is made following interrogation and is automatic.
One detective said: "Advisement is never made unless there is an
intention to file . . . . You always know if you're going to file."
The detective may know, but the arresting officers, who are generally responsible for advisement, may not. It was observed that
advisement was also not given if violations of municipal ordinances were alleged, if the interrogation was for the purpose of
"case clearance" or recovery of property, or if the officers felt that
the case would not result in a court hearing even if it were referred
to the district attorney. This final reason probably explained
most adequately why police officers are lax in following the Code
guidelines with regard to advisement. The chief of the division,
for example, estimated that perhaps 1 percent of the cases referred to Denver Juvenile Court by DCD lead to a formal hearing.3
Ch. 110, § 12, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 388, amending COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN.

§
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This selectivity in advisement is practiced in spite of the
Code provision that all statements or admissions of a child concerning acts which would be a crime if committed by an adult
that are obtained in violation of his right to formal advisement
34
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
2.

Parental Referral

I've been passed from one court to another. I have no money for
private help. I just want to get her off the streets.
Parent"'

Generally parents refer their children to Denver Juvenile
Court by calling or visiting the intake units of the probation
department. Occasionally, however, a parent will bring his child
directly to juvenile hall. " Parental reasons for referral are varied
and difficult to define.
Some parents use the court or a threat of court action to curb
anticipated misbehavior or minor infractions of parental rules by
their children. This "threat" usage of the court has diminished
over the period of this study, primarily because so many serious
problems are presented that probation counselors give little attention to anticipated or minor misbehavior. 7
22-2-2(3)(c) (Supp. 1971). This section of the Colorado Children's Code goes far beyond
the requirements stated by the United States Supreme Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967), which specifically limited the juvenile's right to counsel and right against selfincrimination to the adjudicatory phase of a delinquency proceeding. Id. at 13 & 31 n.48.
Under the cited section of the Code, Colorado courts have recognized "that the juvenile
is entitled to comparable protection in connection with the waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights." This is so even though the section cited in the text refers specifically to
statements and admissions of the child. People v. Reyes, 174 Colo. 377, 483 P.2d 1342
(1971). See also In re B.M.C., 506 P.2d 409 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973).
4 The Denver Juvenile Court personnel would probably dispute the chief's estimate.
The typical filing rate, according to court statistics, is 53.8 percent of all referrals, though
how many of those filings do actually make it to a formal hearing could not be ascertained
from the court's statistics.
3
Keene, God Bless the Child, CERvi's J., July 5, 1971, at 7.
" If this is the case, the hall will either accept the child for detention, or the parent
and child will be asked to speak immediately with the intake screening counselor on duty
to ascertain what further action is required.
" A former judge in the Denver Juvenile Court describes this change in the court's
function as follows:
[Tihe court was visible. If your child was giving you static, you could
go to court and the court had developed, in my mind, this loathsome image
(a) of being everything to all people, and (b) as the whipping boy for parents
and school teachers and administrators and police and everyone, to
psychologically whip youngsters around to say "you better shape up or you're
going to court ..
"
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Some parents refer their children to the Denver Juvenile
Court as a last resort, looking to the court as the ultimate social
agency to deal with family problems. Many of the problems are
real and serious, posing a genuine threat to the health or welfare
of the child or his family. Others reflect the developing life styles
of young people, which although perhaps inimical to parents, do
not result in actual danger or damage to the child, his parents,
or the community. Some parental referrals can also be seen as
conscious or unconscious efforts of the parent to expose his physical, psychological, or marital problems through the child surrogate.
Parental referrals are generally handled as CHINS referrals,
being encompassed within the vague statutory rubric that the
child has "run away from home," "is otherwise beyond the control of his parent," or his "behavior or condition is such as to
' Regardless of the reasons
endanger his own or others' welfare." 38
for parental referrals or their validity, referrals must be considered by the court. That consideration usually occurs in the context of the next three critical junctures to be discussed.
3.

School Referral

The statutory definition of a CHINS includes a child who is
"repeatedly absent from school," 39 presumably without a valid
excuse. The Code thus necessarily involves the court in school
problems. Referrals are generally received by the intake units of
the probation department from a school social worker or assistant
principal. Because the law does not define "repeated" absence,
school officials must use their own discretion in referring children
to the court. If an official allows a problem student to remain
absent continuously, he may never refer a child for court filing.
Other school personnel automatically recommend filing after
seven unexcused absences. Still other cases are referred to the
court only after every effort has been made by school social work[flt's this changing public perception of the court that needs more time
to filter through. Because when you take the old conception which I have
described, then you take the conception that I had of the court as a screener,
as a court of last resort, and as a court of law and a court of lawyers, and
with rather substantial diversion-then you can see public impatience with
the court because they saw the court as the club and as the efficient quick
club where kids really were immediately processed and threatened or banished.
COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-3(18)(a), (c), (d) (Supp. 1967).
Id. § 22-1-3(18)(b) (Supp. 1967).
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ers, community agencies, and teachers to work with the children
and their families in altering class schedules and in making counseling services or psychological evaluation available.
Generally, children alleged to have committed truancy violations are not detained in juvenile hall unless they are subject to
other CHINS or delinquency allegations. Their initial contact
with court personnel is usually an interview with an intake probation counselor in the presence of the referring school official and
their parents.
It is impossible to determine from present court statistics
how many cases are referred by police, parents, and school personnel. The police, through the district attorney, undoubtedly
refer the majority, followed by parental referrals and school referrals. The referral is the means by which the child enters into
Denver's juvenile justice system. It assures him, at the least, of
speaking with a probation counselor, at the most, of passage
through the remaining eight critical junctures to receive "help"
from the court.
C.

Probation Department Decision to Detain Pending Detention Hearing:
I try to look at the child and look at the parents, and I see if there
is a possibility that the parents can supervise that child at home
.... I have to feel that the child can be relatively safe staying at
home ...

ble.

because I think that is where he should be if at all possi-

Intake Probation Counselor'0

Almost hourly, a patrol car will turn into the alley behind
juvenile hall with a child or two for the admissions office. The
door is locked, and a buzzer must be pushed to notify the counselor that another child is awaiting admission. The child will pass
through the door into a poorly lit office area. Behind a large
counter, a juvenile hall employee waits to get basic information
from the child and to relieve him or her of all valuables. If an
intake screening counselor is not readily available,4 the child will
, During fiscal year 1971-72, 4,739 children were admitted to Denver Juvenile Hall.
The projected figures for the following year suggest that 5,876 will be admitted. On an
average day in 1971-72, 83 youngsters were detained at the hall-some serving time on
the school program, some waiting for court hearings, some waiting for placement in group
homes, and some waiting for their parents to want them home again.
1 Beginning in early 1972, unit III of the intake division of the probation department,
located at juvenile hall, initiated a work schedule which required one counselor from the
unit to be responsible for the screening of children brought to the hall. There is a "screen-
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be placed in a small locked room across from the admissions office
until an interview can be arranged which will aid in determining
whether or not the child will be detained pending a detention
hearing before the court.
Frequently, no explanation of the procedures which are being
followed or what can be expected is given to the child; generally
he has a fairly clear idea why he is where he is, but little insight
into what is coming next. Therefore, when the screening probation counselor arrives, he may appear to the child as a friend. The
child has just been impersonally treated by police officers or overwrought parents and a juvenile hall employee, and anyone who
will talk to him is an improvement. The screening probation
counselor already has obtained some information on the child
from the police summary sheet accompanying him. If the child
is currently on probation or awaiting other court action, the
screening counselor will defer to the counselor already involved.
If the child is new to the court, the screening counselor will make
the detention decision himself.
If the screening counselor determines that the child can be
released, the child will usually wait in the admissions area for his
parent or probation counselor to take him home. He and his parents may be asked to promise to return for further interviews at
a later date. Some children who are not potential runaways are
released to shelter care because of parental refusal to respond or
because of the child's fear of returning home.4 2 If it is determined
that the child must be held pending a detention hearing, he will
be taken to one of the units upstairs, relieved of his own clothing,
given juvenile hall clothing, and introduced to his "home" and
"roommates" for at least the next 48-hour period.
Although it is not part of the administrative guidelines for
hold or release from juvenile hall, an informal procedure was
noted by a screening counselor:
Now, if they are 16 or over [and on parole], they'll just be taken to
city jail and you won't have to make that decision. You do have to
make the decision to have them go to city jail . . .but that's kind
ing counselor" on duty from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. daily, including weekends. A child
brought to the hall after 11:00 p.m. would be transferred to a unit upstairs to spend the
night, and would be interviewed the following morning.
11According to one intake probation counselor who serves as a screening counselor
at least 1 day a week, well over half of the children who are brought to juvenile hall are
released prior to their detention hearings-that is, within 48 hours.
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of a policy, if they are 16 or over and on parole, then they go to city
jail.'

The screening unit is a relatively new administrative innovation in the court." Before its inception, children brought to the
hall were interviewed by a juvenile hall employee and transferred
immediately to units upstairs. The probation counselors had the
authority to release a child prior to his detention hearing, but
because there was no efficient mechanism for contacting the
counselor and because a full unit of intake counselors was not
housed in the hall, release was much less frequent. This resulted
in detention hearing dockets of 10 to 20 children daily and massive overuse of detention facilities.
The Code does not provide for the establishment of special
screening units, nor does it delineate, except in the most general
language, the criteria to be considered in deciding to detain a
child." It defines detention and shelter care as follows:
(12) "Detention" means the temporary care of a child who
requires secure custody in physically restricting facilities pending
" See discussion in note 30 supra.

" The efficient operation of the juvenile hall screening unit has probably been the
most notable reform effected in Denver Juvenile Court during the period of time covered
by this study. Its purpose and structure were described by the acting assistant director of
court services as follows:
[Tihe unit at the hall was set up so there would be a professional
approach-dialogue-between the child first coming into detention and professional decisions being made at that point.
The way it's structured is that when a child is picked up anywhere in
the city, the child will go through the Delinquency Control Division and they
have a receiving officer on duty 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. This receiving
officer makes the initial decision whether the child should be released or
detained.
Once that decision is made, if the decision is made for detention, the
child comes to juvenile hall. Immediately upon the child's arrival, he is
interviewed-screened-by an intake probation officer. This officer has the
final say as to whether the child is to be detained or not, and there are
certainly cases where we don't go along with the police department's recommendation. They might have recommended detention but we might release
the child. So it has to be clear-it is clear-to the police department and the
probation department that the final decision is made by that particular
officer. . . . If the police are saying "hold" and the probation officer is
saying "release", the supervisor is contacted and has to agree with the probation officer before the child is released.
But see ch. 110, § 12, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 388, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §
22-2-3-(3)(b) (Supp. 1967).
" There are neither United States Supreme Court nor Colorado appellate court decisions with regard to the preadjudicatory phase of detention.
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court disposition or an execution of a court order for placement or
commitment.
(13) "Shelter" means the temporary care of a child in physically unrestricting facilities pending court disposition or execution
of a court order for placement."

The authority of the intake division of the probation department
to act on detention prior to a detention hearing is apparently
derived, as a delegated responsibility, from the following Code
section:
(4) The court may at any time order the release of any child,
except children being held pursuant to paragraphs (b) and (c) of

subsection (3) of this section, from detention or shelter care without
holding a hearing, either without restriction or upon written promise
of the parent, guardian, or legal custodian to bring the child to the
court at a time set or to be set by the court.47

The Code requires the use of shelter care rather than detention
where appropriate, but it does not require that a hearing be held
to determine its necessity." Presumably, the authority to release
a child to shelter care has also been delegated to probation counselors by the court, although shelter is not mentioned in the
court's administrative guidelines reprinted below. 9
The only other official guidelines on detention standards are
found in the Colorado Rules of Juvenile Procedure. Rule 58(a)
uses as a standard the child's "immediate welfare or the protection of the community," while the comparable language of Rule
59(a) is "the child's best interest or that of the community." 5
The court has interpreted these broad statutory guidelines
and has formulated a court policy on hold or release from juvenile
hall. Its policy statement was written by the director of field
services and the acting director of intake with the help of their
staff supervisors, and reads as follows:
I. Discretion To Release:
A. When any child is brought to Juvenile Hall to be detained,
" COLO.

REV.

STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-3(12), (13) (Supp. 1967).

- Ch. 110, § 14, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 389, amending COLO. REV. STAT.

ANN.

§

22-2-3(4) (Supp. 1967).
4'

COLO.

REV.

STAT. ANN.

§ 22-2-3(1) (Supp. 1967).

One reason for this omission may be the crucial lack of shelter facilities available
to the Denver Juvenile Court and the presumption, probably legitimate, that the agency
charged with the responsibility of establishing and making available to the court adequate
shelter care would respond more quickly to an order for shelter placement by the court
than a request for it by a screening counselor.
0 COLO. R. Juv. P. 58(a), 59(a).
41
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the proper probation officer, Intake or Field, will make the final
determination on the Hold or Release of the juvenile.

II. Reasons For Holding a Child:
A. Unless otherwise committed to a probation program, or
ordered by the Court, no child should be detained in Juvenile Hall,
unless the child is a danger to himself or to the community.
B. A child is not to be held in Juvenile Hall merely as a disciplinary measure.
C. A child is not to be held in Juvenile Hall merely for investigation. If investigation of unsolved complaints becomes a factor in
danger to self or community, the probation officer should take this
into careful consideration.
E. A child should be held if there is strong evidence he is a
danger to himself or the community even though that danger is not
at the moment completely established.
1. Danger to self or community must be established by
taking into consideration all involved factors - probable cause,
seriousness of alleged offense, pending court action, past behavior pattern, social and psychological history, and knowledge of home and community environments.

The discretion allowed a probation officer in deciding to release a child varies depending on the DCD's request to hold or
release. If the DCD wishes the child to be held, the proper supervisor or director must approve the child's release, unless the police hold was requested because the child is alleged to have committed a delinquent act which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, in which case the child must be held for a
detention hearing. 1 Before a release is permitted, a conference
between the probation counselor and the child must take place.
If a decision cannot be reached, the child is held pending a final
decision by the director. If the DCD indicates that the child may
be released, the probation counselor has full discretion over the
detention decision.
After the above guidelines had been promulgated, structured
interviews were conducted with probation counselors to determine their own practices. The counselors were asked what criteria
were used in the decision to hold or release and were asked
whether the decision was theirs alone to make. Most of those
interviewed were familiar with the guidelines but had embellished and interpreted them substantially to reflect their own
51Ch. 110, § 13, [19731 Colo. Sess. Laws 389, amending CoLo.
22-2-3(3)(b) (Supp. 1967).

REv. STAT. ANN.

§
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philosophies and experiences. Many of these embellishments are
consistent with the statutory requirement of detention where the
child's "immediate welfare or the protection of the community"
can be served." Certainly repeated runaways, users of hard drugs,
and juveniles whose conduct suggests the probability that they
will commit further similar offenses might reasonably be detained under this standard. However, detaining a child for the
purpose of forcing parental involvement in a treatment plan or of
gathering investigative information, as one intake screening
counselor suggested, would seem to be only indirectly related to
the best interests of the child. Surely, a recommendation of detention because shelter care or other alternative holding facilities
are unavailable is not acceptable.
All of the line-staff probation counselors questioned indicated that, in most cases, they would not ask that a child be
detained unless a formal petition on the alleged offense was going
to be filed. The acting assistant director of court services, however, did not feel this was an absolute requirement. In spite of the
guidelines promulgated by the court administrators, the counselors felt the detention decision was theirs alone to make in the first
instance. One suggested conferring with the supervisor only for
the sake of communication, another, with DCD for informational
purposes.
The decision to release a child is obviously not reviewed by
the court since the child will not appear for a detention hearing.
Nor can it be assumed that the decision is reviewed by a supervising probation counselor. On the other hand, if the decision is
made to detain the youngster, that decision will be reviewed by
the court within 48 hours.0
D.

Detention Hearing
Effective Monday, December 13, 1971, members of the Court
Intake Staff will advise all children detained at Juvenile Hall of
their right to an attorney and a list will be compiled daily of the
children on the Detention Docket who desire attorneys. This list will
be available to the Public Defenders and Legal Aid Attorneys at the
Admitting Office. The children will be brought from the units to be
interviewed by the attorneys in the interviewing rooms across from
the Admitting Office."
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 22-2-2(2) (Supp. 1967).

5 Id. § 22-2-3(2) (Supp. 1971).
5 Memorandum to Public Defenders and Legal Aid Attorneys from the Presiding
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The referee who sits at juvenile hall in Division Ill of the
Denver Juvenile Court averages eight to nine detention hearings
an afternoon, Monday through Friday. Until the establishment of
the intake screening unit at the hall, hearings were often held for
as many as 20 youngsters in a single day. Most children are now
represented by counsel, and a representative of the district attorney's office attends all hearings, arguing vigorously for detention
in many of the more serious delinquency allegation cases and
taking no role whatsoever in most CHINS cases.
The child who is detained as a result of his interview with a
probation counselor often waits in an upstairs living unit at
juvenile hall for at least one full day following the interview. On
the day of his scheduled detention hearing, he will be brought to
the lobby area of the visiting or interviewing rooms across from
the admitting office. The child may or may not have been advised
as to the purpose of this removal. Generally, promptly at 1 p.m.,
a representative of the public defender's office and a student
attorney from the University of Denver's Clinical Legal Education Program will arrive, detention docket in hand.
The child may be impressed by the youth and the rather
"hip" appearance of his attorney. Most are in their twenties,
many are women, and all have a casual attitude with regard to
their own and the court's status as authority figures. The attorneys, on the whole, show concern for helping the child to understand what is going to happen in the detention hearing, and most
of the children readily choose to be represented. Those who are
unsure or unconcerned about being represented are generally represented anyway.
When the attorney tells the child that the purpose of the
detention hearing is to determine whether he is going to remain
at juvenile hall, return home, or go to a welfare shelter placement,
the child, when asked, will almost always respond that he wants
to go home. In the rare case where the child may fear abuse at
home, he will select the protective closed environment of juvenile
hall. Even though the majority of the children interviewed had
been represented by counsel before, most seemed genuinely surprised that anyone cared about their feelings.
Judge of Denver Juvenile Court, Dec. 9, 1971. The memorandum is court policy only and
is not drawn from the Children's Code which requires only that children and parents be
advised of the child's right to counsel "at his first appearance before the court." COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-6(1)(a) (Supp. 1967).
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The typical attorney-child interview lasts for 5 to 15 minutes,
although often the attorney is able to speak with the child immediately before the hearing to tell him whether his parents are
present and whether the child's assessment of their willingness to
take him home is correct. After all of the children have been
interviewed, they are escorted upstairs through many corridors
and locked doors. The children are then moved downstairs in the
other wing of the building where they sit in a cramped stairwell
to await being called by the sheriff, who attends all detention
hearings."
When each child's name is called, the locked door to the
stairwell opens, and the child is led by the sheriff across a hall to
the courtroom. The child's attorney either is sitting at defense
counsel table or meets him in the hall. The parents of the child,
who have been waiting near the courtroom in a lobby area, are
now called and join the child and his attorney at counsel table.
This is often the first time that the child and his parents have
seen each other in 2 days.
After questioning counsel about his or her willingness to proceed before a referee"6 and to waive formal advisement of the
child's rights,"7 the referee will ask the probation counselor to
proceed. In almost all cases, the probation counselor is the same
person who made the initial decision to detain the child. He will
relate why the child is before the court, often stating as fact the
alleged offense. The counselor's information is derived from the
police summary sheet, past court records of the child, and interviews with the child and his parent. On the basis of this information, the probation counselor makes a recommendation as to detention or release. After this presentation, the child's attorney is
permitted to question the counselor about the statements made
or about omissions in the presentation. In addition, the referee
and opposing counsel may question the probation counselor
about his recommendation. Experienced probation counselors are
careful to recite the alternative litanies that the child is "a danger
"'The sheriff has become a permanent fixture at detention hearings because of the
large number of children who have escaped by running down the carpeted hall about 20
feet to an open door used by the general public as the entrance to the courtroom area. In
fiscal year 1971-72, 76 children were "AWOL" from juvenile hall, a decrease of 22 from
the previous year.
-1 Ch. 110, § 6, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 386, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 221-10(3) (Supp. 1967).
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-6(1)(a) (Supp. 1967).
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to himself or the community" or that his detention or release is
"in his best interest or in the best interest of the community."
With newer counselors, however, the referee may have to consciously lead the presentation so that the counselor ends by articulating these statutory standards for detention.
The evidentiary rules applicable to detention hearings are
informal. Witnesses are rarely sworn, opinion testimony and
hearsay are widespread, and probation counselors often urge as
the basis for detention the commission of offenses by a child
which have not been admitted or proved. Repeated objections by
attorneys are frowned upon by the court.
After the counselor's presentation is completed, the attorney
for the child will present the child's case. Usually this consists of
either relating or having the child relate what he wants to do,
arguing that the child's situation does not fall within the parameters of the standards for detention, and possibly enlisting the
support of the parent for the child's viewpoint. If the parent's
view is contrary to the child's wishes, the attorney will at least
make the parent's view clear to the court and then attack it. The
attorney for the child will also suggest the alternative shelter
replacement if it is appropriate and desired by the child. The
referee may question the child or the attorney following this presentation. In addition, the court will usually ask the parents how
they feel about the situation.
If serious allegations of delinquency are at issue, the representative of the district attorney's office may then present the
case for the "prosecution." If the counselor is recommending release, some elements of a contested hearing may ensue, and the
representative may choose to cross-examine any of the persons
who testified. It must be remembered that the district attorney's
representative generally has available for review only that information which has been developed in the hearing and additional
reports from the files of the police department or district attorney. Rarely has this representative interviewed either the child or
the child's parents.
After listening to these arguments, the referee will make
findings and will recommend further detention, shelter placement, or release to the parents. The recommendation may be
followed by emotional appeals from the parents or child or by an
oral request on the record from counsel for the child for a rehearing before a judge.
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If the child is released to his parents, they may leave the hall
within approximately one-half hour, possibly with orders to return to speak further with a probation counselor about contemplated court action. If a shelter placement is ordered for the child,
the probation counselor is charged with the duty of contacting the
Denver Department of Welfare to request that a child welfare
worker transport the child from juvenile hall to the shelter facility.5 8 This will occur 2 hours to 2 days following the court's recommendation, during which time, of course, the child remains in
detention. Probation counselors are not authorized by the welfare
department to place the child in a shelter facility.
If further detention is recommended for the child, he will be
returned to his detention unit. This recommendation may be reviewed by a judge and can be re-evaluated at any of the later
critical junctures. During detention, psychological and medical
evaluations of the child may be performed, and the probation
counselor will probably visit with him again. However, the child
will receive no counseling or treatment, except for the limited
amount provided by the unit counselors. A detained child may
understandably become depressed following the detention hearing since the average length of stay in Denver's Juvenile Hall in
1971 was 28.7 days.
The provisions of the Code and the Colorado Rules of Juvenile Procedure which deal specifically with the detention hearing
are sparse. As a result, an administrative overlay has been developed. But because the detention hearing is the child's first appearance before the court, it may be instructive to examine the
provisions of the Code dealing with court hearings generally.
The Code provides that upon a first appearance before the
court, the child and his legal custodian are to be fully advised of
their constitutional and legal rights, including the right to a jury
trial and the right to be represented by counsel. 59 It would seem
5 Presently there is one shelter facility for girls available to the court and one for
boys, so this argument for shelter placement may in many cases be futile. The standard
for detention is so vague that almost any behavior can be said to fulfill it, and often does,
when there are no placements available in shelter care. In recent months the court has
shown decreasing reticence in ordering the placement despite the absence of shelter placements. Only upon occasion will it force the Denver Department of Welfare, to whom the
court has delegated the responsibility for the establishment of shelter facilities, to bear
the burden of finding some nonrestrictive placement or risk being held in contempt of
court.
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-6(1)(a) (Supp. 1967). Subsection (b) provides for
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that the rights accorded juveniles as a result of United States
Supreme Court decisions should therefore be explained to the
child at his first appearance before the court. Those rights include
timely written notice to parents and child of the specific charge
and factual allegations to be considered at any adjudicatory hearing,'" retained or appointed counsel for the child in that hearing,"'
the privilege against self-incrimination,62 confrontation and crossexamination of witnesses against the child," and the right to have
the allegations in the adjudicatory hearing proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
These constitutional rights, as well as the right under the
Code to a jury trial, apply only to an adjudicatory hearing. Consequently, referees rarely advise the child and his parents of them
at the detention hearing. In practice, this is of little significance
since in most cases a petition, even if contemplated, has not as
yet been filed, and under Gault, the court has the responsibility
of again advising the child prior to both the plea and the adjudicatory hearings.
Inasmuch as detention hearings are generally held before a
referee, the child and his parents should also be advised of the
child's right to a hearing before a judge in the first instance, 5 of
the effect of the recommendation of the referee,66 and, following
the findings and recommendations of the referee, of the right of
the parties to a rehearing before a judge if requested within 5
days. 7
court-appointed counsel if the family "requests an attorney and is found to be without
sufficient financial means." Id. §3 22-1.6(4)(i), (ii) provide for a "trial by a jury of not
more than six."
" In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967). See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3-2(2)(a)
to -3(1) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 12-14.
6, 387 U.S. at 41. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-6 (Supp. 1969).
'2 Ch. 110, § 12, [1973]
Colo. Sess. Laws 388, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22 2
- -2(3)(c) (Supp. 1971) applies to interrogation by police officers if the information
garnered is to be used in trial against the child; however, no provision was found which
provided that the court must advise the child of this right at any hearing.
63 387 U.S. at 57. While the Colorado Children's Code provides in
sections 22-18(2), (3) for the cross-examination of persons who have submitted reports upon which the
disposition of the child's case may be based, it does not expressly provide for the confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses at the adjudicatory hearing, apparently relying
on the mandate of Gault.
6 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1969); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-6(1) (Supp. 1969).
" Ch. 110, § 6, [19731 Colo. Sess. Laws 386, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 221-10(3) (Supp. 1967).
66 Ch. 110, 93 7-8, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 387, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §
22-1-10(4) (Supp. 1967).
67

Id.
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If a formal advisement is given by the court at the detention
hearing, it generally includes discussion only of the child's right
to a hearing before a judge in the first instance, of the right to
counsel at every stage of the proceedings, and of the privilege
against self-incrimination in the detention hearing. Rarely is the
child or parent advised of the child's right to a rehearing before
a judge if they dispute the recommendations of the referee.
Other provisions of the Code also apply specifically to detention hearings. "[T]emporary care in a shelter facility designated
by the court or the county department of public welfare" is required for those children who must be taken from home but do
not require physical restriction.6 Such children should not be
placed in detention." However, all children taken into custody by
the police and not released to their parents are in fact placed in
Denver's Juvenile Hall at least temporarily, since the police officers are not permitted by the Denver Department of Welfare to
take such children directly to a shelter facility.
Some provisions of the Code are applicable to all hearings in
Juvenile Court. The Colorado Rules of Juvenile Procedure govern,70 hearings "may be conducted in an informal manner," 7' the
general public is not excluded unless the court determines such
exclusion is in the best interest of the child,7 2 a verbatim record
is required in all hearings unless waived,7 3 and publicity including
names or pictures of the parties is forbidden unless specifically
ordered by the court.74
Generally these provisions, as well as those referring specifically to detention hearings, are well followed by the court. Yet in
some instances, the administrative overlay of court structure and
procedure has the effect of abridging or nullifying many of the
rights included in the formal law. For example, all detention
hearing proceedings are recorded by tape recorder, as mandated,
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-3(l); Id. §§ 22-1-3(12) - (13) (Supp. 1967).
" Ch. 110, § 13, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 389, amending CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22-2-3(3) (Supp. 1967). COLO. R. Juv. P. 59 is more explicit in its guidelines for detention,
stating that "[i]f the court finds release will not be contrary to the child's best interest
or that of the community it shall release the child to the custody of its parents or other
responsible adult."
7o CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-7(1)(a) (Supp. 1967).
Id. § 22-1-7(I)(b) (Supp. 1969).
72 Id.

71Id. § 22-1-7(2) (Supp. 1967).
1,Id. § 22-1-7(5)(a) (Supp. 1967).
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and the tapes retained in the court clerk's office. However, even
if counsel immediately files a request for a rehearing of the referee's detention decision, it is often at least 5 days before the
judge receives the request, locates and listens to the tape, and is
prepared for the rehearing. If the child has been detained, the
judge's subsequent decision to release the child benefits him only
after 5 to 10 days of detention, and the child's right to a redetermination of the referee's detention decision thus becomes less
meaningful.
Similarily, although hearings "may be conducted in an informal manner," 5 the detention hearing is the only type of hearing
conducted in the court in which informality is peculiarly pronounced. Although the injustice which may result to the child is
only further detention, and neither commitment nor branding as
a delinquent, the following section of the Gault decision is apropos:
[Tihere is increasing evidence that the informal procedures, contrary to the original expectation may themselves constitute a further
obstacle to effective treatment of the delinquent to the extent that
they engender in the child a sense of injustice provoked by seemingly
all-powerful and challengeless exercise of authority by judges and
probation officers.7"

The brief description of a typical detention hearing contained in the first part of this section gives some indication of the
confused and confusing nature of the hearings in division In of
the court. Because the child is usually represented by an attorney, the allegations and authority of the probation counselor and
the court may not go totally unchallenged. However, because the
informality of the hearing is so extreme, and because those involved generally have only limited information to work with, it
may often seem to the child that the recommendations of the
probation counselor are always followed by the referee, and the
objections of counsel regarding gross hearsay and opinion evidence always ignored. As presently conducted, a detention hearing is an ill-defined hybrid governed only minimally by the formal
law. It is too formal in some respects, devastatingly informal in
others; sometimes evidentiary, other times oblivious of the rules
of evidence; adversary as to participants involved, nonadversary
Id. § 22-1-7(1)(b) (Supp. 1969).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26n.37, citing from PAESIDENr's COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEAND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIEY' (1967).
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as to the conduct of the hearings; governed by a statutory standard and theoretically limited in scope, but far reaching in practice on account of the hopelessly broad and vague terms of that
statutory standard. Influencing every detention hearing is the
lack of placement alternatives other than detention and the lack
of treatment alternatives within the detention placement.
A further problem regarding the fairness of the detention
hearing arises from the role that the probation counselor is forced
to play. Because the representative of the district attorney's office
is rarely prepared to argue for or against detention, the counselor
often appears to the child to be the prosecutor, especially since a
determination to release the child would usually have been made
prior to the detention hearing.
Most probation counselors are uncomfortable with their role
as untrained legal adversaries of the child's attorney, but they
believe that making recommendations about a child's detention
or release is their responsibility. Whatever negative impressions
are left with the child as a result of his perception of the probation
counselor as prosecutor can be mitigated, they argue, by establishing the limits of the counselor-child relationship at an early
stage. Rejected by each counselor interviewed as both deceptive
and inefficient was the suggestion that a hearing officer, who
could relate to the court the probation counselor's recommendations regarding detention, might serve to insulate the counselor
from the negative reactions of his probationers.
The Code provides that "[n]othing in this section shall be
construed as denying a child the right to bail."77 This broad statement is the only reference in the formal law to the right to bail
and must be read together with the vague standards for detention
or release of the child. A conflict arises because a child who must
be detained for his own welfare still has the right of bail, and if
bond is posted, the child's welfare or best interest may be jeopardized. The court's solution has been to detain on the statutory
authority and, if the setting of bail is requested, to set such an
excessive amount that as a practical matter the child cannot be
released. This practice is especially common in CHINS cases. Its
" COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-3(7) (Supp. 1967).

," COLO. R. Juv. P. 59(c) states that "[ilf the court believes that release will be
contrary to the welfare of the child or the community, the court may order further detention and shall support such order with appropriate findings of fact, subject, however, to
the right of the child to bail."

1974
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effect is to abrogate the child's right to bail, which the Supreme
Court has defined as intended only to assure the presence of the
accused at further court hearings.79 Also, because the formal law
and the Colorado Rules of Juvenile Procedure provide no standards for ascertaining the amount of bail calculated to meet this
purpose, the court rarely inquires as to the financial status of the
child or parent, previous appearances or lack of appearance at
court hearings following release, and other factors relevant to
fixing the amount of bail. In fact, one referee in the court, in
response to counsel's argument for reduction of bail, stated that
standards set by the United States Supreme Court did not
apply."o
A final problem in the area of detention is the absence of a
time limit for the filing of a petition against the child. The Code
provides that "[n]o child shall be held in a detention or shelter
facility longer than forty-eight hours . . . unless a petition has
been filed, or the court determines that it would be contrary to
the welfare of the child or of the community to release the child
from detention."'" The court has utilized the latter basis for detaining children longer than 48 hours and has been generally
diligent in bringing children before the court for detention hearings within the time limit. However, once it is determined that a
child must be detained, there is no further time period imposed
by law within which a petition must be filed. 2 In practice, the
filing often takes as long as 10 days, and it is even longer until
the plea hearing is held. The child's detention is not automatically reviewed by the court until 10 days after the detention hearing," and even then there is no remedy for the child unless counsel can convince the court to order filing or release within a specified period of time.
" Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).
" The presiding judge in the same case had initially set bail at $3,000, and then, upon
advice from his clerk that perhaps it would be met, raised it to $5,000 and finally to
$10,000, all without questioning the child or her parents. The girl was alleged to have run
away from home.
81 Ch. 110, § 13, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 389, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22-2-3(3) (Supp. 1967).
92 Id.
1 This 10-day review of detention is merely an administrative practice of the Denver
Juvenile Hall, established following complaints of defense attorneys that children were
getting "lost" up in the living units and many times continued to be detained even after
the probation counselor had decided to file a formal petition.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 51

The child detained following the detention hearing by then
probably feels inexorably bound into the juvenile justice system.
The child who is released to his parents or to a shelter facility may
be just as involved, but the indices of freedom still exist for him.
The decision of the probation department to file a formal petition, handle informally, or handle unofficially probably has the
greatest impact on whether the released child is to be exposed to
the entire system. 4
Meanwhile, the child detained in the living units of Denver
Juvenile Hall waits-for a visit from his family or lawyer, for his
next court appearance, for a chance to escape.
E.

ProbationDepartment Decision to File a Petition, Handle
Informally, or Handle Unofficiallys5
8, See note 85 infra regarding the filing decision.

6 Intense interagency squabbling concerning the discretionary power vested by the
Denver Juvenile Court in its probation department to file formal petitions or handle cases
informally or unofficially resulted in some of the most sweeping amendments made to the
Colorado Children's Code in 1973. The process described in this critical juncture describes
the procedures prior to the enactment of the amendments. Those supporting the amendments argued that if there is probable cause to believe a child was involved in a delinquent
offense, the case should be brought under the jurisdiction of the court, and special consideration for the child because of family background, emotional problems, or educational
or cultural deficiencies should be accorded, if at all, at the dispositional stage of the
proceedings, and should not be used as a tactic to keep the child out of the system
altogether.
In delinquency cases only, the new provisions designate the district attorney's office
as the only agency charged initially with determining "whether the interests of the child
or of the community require that further action be taken." Ch. 110, § 15, [1973] Colo.
Sess. Laws 389, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-1(1) (Supp. 1967). The requirement for a preliminary investigation in cases of suspected delinquency offenses is removed, and the district attorney's office, presumably relying only upon the seriousness of
the offense, whether probable cause exists to believe the child committed the offense, and
on the extent of the child's police record, is given the power to file delinquency petitions
"which shall be accepted by thw court." Ch. 110, § 15, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 390,
amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-1(1) (Supp. 1967). The court no longer has the
discretion to refuse to authorize petitions. If the district attorney's office is unable to
determine whether further action should be taken, the case may be referred to the probation department for a determination regarding filing following a preliminary investigation.
Ch. 110, § 15, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 390, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-1(1)
(Supp. 1967).
Finally, subsection (d) gives the juvenile court permission to "conduct a preliminary
hearing to determine if there is probable cause to believe that the facts alleged in the
petition bring the child within the court's jurisdiction." Ch. 110, § 15, [1973] Colo. Sess.
Laws 390, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-1(1) (Supp. 1967). The final subsection
was added in anticipation of the argument that alleged delinquents might well suffer a
denial of equal protection in that adults charged with criminal offenses are brought before
the court by direct information, filed by leave of court, by grand jury indictment, or have
the right to a preliminary hearing to protect them from the possible tyranny of an overzeal-
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Do the findings of the above investigation indicate that it is necessary for the court to take a strong course of action through the filing
of a petition which would enforce a program leading to the rehabilitation of the child? If not, what resources in the life of the child are
available (both in his family and in the community) to help him
again attain a path of productivity in his life?"

The probation department's decision to file a petition, handle a case by means of "informal adjustment," or dispense with
the case "unofficially" is based on a "discretionary filing" procedure. Nowhere within the juvenile court system does a probation
counselor's absolute discretion have such far-reaching effects.
Through his filing decision, the counselor either prevents a child
from having further court contact or thrusts him into an intimate
and complete involvement with formal court procedures and decisions.
The counselor's choice of whether or not to file is based on a
preliminary investigation. 7 This investigation is initiated following receipt of either a police complaint certified for probable
cause by the district attorney's office or, in the case of CHINS, a
verbal complaint lodged by a parent or school official. Receipt of
a police complaint can take from two days to two weeks or more
from the time the child was taken into custody, depending on the
speed of any DCD investigation conducted.
The counselor's interview with the parents and child is
usually the first step in the preliminary investigation of which the
child becomes aware. No such interviews were observed by the
researchers, but according to the children interviewed, the child
may or may not be advised of his rights, especially the rights
ous district attorney. It is possible that this argument could still be made since the
preliminary hearing provided is discretionary with the juvenile court.
The practical effect of these amendments has been minimal thus far. While an initial
determination to file or to handle informally or unofficially is made by the district attorney's complaint deputy, the cases still are sent to the probation department for a preliminary investigation and a recommendation. If the probation counselor's decision based
upon the preliminary investigation is different from that of the district attorney, a supervisory counselor "negotiates" with the district attorney to present the department's view.
The final decision of the district attorney, however, prevails under the new amendments.
" Taken from a preliminary draft of INTAKE Dtv., PROBATION DEP"T, DENVER JUVENILE
COURT, CarrERU FOR FMNG PrmTONS (1972), which is destined to become part of an
INTAKE PROCEDURES MANUAL for the court.
" For purposes of this section of the study, the practical effect on a child and his
family of a police referral will be discussed. Referrals from parents or schools are processed
in essentially the same fashion although of course there is no police investigation or
certification of probable cause by the district attorney's office, and thus the case can be
processed more expeditiously.
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against self-incrimination, to have an attorney present, and to
8
have the charges proved against him beyond a reasonable doubt.
The child and his parents may expect a broad discussion of
the alleged offense, the child's involvement, the damage to property or harm to persons, and the degree of restitution possible if
the child was indeed involved. While the interview does include
these considerations, its major thrust is an effort to determine the
educational, emotional, legal, and familial strengths and weaknesses of the child and his family. Children may be surprised to
learn that the probation counselor, in most cases, presumes their
participation in the alleged offense, and instead focuses
discussion on school performance, relationships with parents and
peers, runaway patterns, drug use, and what the children think
about themselves and their lives.
In some cases, a child may learn of the counselor's decision
at the end of this interview. If no further preliminary investigation is necessary, the counselor may choose to handle the case
"unofficially" and merely to lecture and release the child. The
child and his parents may be reprimanded or reassured, but they
will not be requested to sign documents or to do anything further.
Most children involved in Denver's Juvenile Court system
are familiar with this process. Although the counselor may suggest rehabilitative steps, such as family counseling, recreational
programs, change in school program, or informal supervision by
the probation counselor, and may even make a referral, the counselor's suggestions are neither mandatory nor enforceable.88 Once
" Neither the Colorado Children's Code nor United States Supreme Court cases
require advisement by probation counselors making the filing decision, although most
counselors interviewed stated they did advise children of their rights during the interview.
The danger of a lack of advisement and general lack of formality in the interview with
the probation counselor would appear to be primarily psychological. If the child admits
participation in the alleged offense to the counselor in the presence of his parents, it is
much easier for that child to agree to admit to the allegations in a formal courtroom setting
or in later interrogation sessions with police officers-even if a full advisement is given at
the later session. The problem is, of course, that absent competent legal counseling, the
child and his parents do not know whether the level of participation in the offense is
sufficient to sustain the charges. As stated previously, most children in the Denver Juvenile Court are represented by counsel and it must be hoped that the input of counsel for
the child prior to the plea hearing is sufficient to overcome any psychological propensity
for admission resulting from prior uninformed admissions to the probation counselor.
"' The Denver Juvenile Court separates statistically those children "merely" lectured
and released, those referred to other community agencies, and those offered limited supervision by the counselor. However, both practically and legally, the child has been handled
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a case is handled unofficially, the child's involvement with the
court is ended.
In some instances a counselor will determine that an "informal adjustment" is the most appropriate manner of handling a
case." The purpose of informal adjustment is to provide informal
supervision for the child and counseling for the family. These
rehabilitative steps cannot exceed 6 months and are usually overseen by a field probation counselor or "Partner."'"
The informal adjustment is a slightly more formalized procedure than unofficial handling, and parents and child must be
advised of their legal rights. 2 Both must sign an "Informal Adjustment Petition," consenting to the processing of the case in
this manner, and the child must admit enough facts to establish
prima facie jurisdiction. Counseling and visits are not mandatory, though it is doubtful that most parents and children understand this. Most children on informal adjustment status who
were interviewed felt they were on probation. Some did not know
what their status was. To the parents and children involved, informal adjustment in most instances must seem identical to a
lecture-and-release procedure, except that they have to "sign
something." This is especially true if, as in many cases, the inforunofficially pursuant to COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-1(2)(b) (Supp. 1967). Whether
parents and child realize that there is no legal obligation upon them to participate in the
suggested counseling is open to question.
0 Informal adjustment is appropriate only for those children who have not already
been placed on formal probation by the court.
" The "Partners" organization is for the most part privately funded and has as its
purpose one-to-one counseling of children who are involved to any degree with the Denver
Juvenile Court, or children who, because of demonstrated problems at home, in school,
or in the community, are likely to become so involved. The "senior" partners are lay
volunteers from the community who receive training and guidance from the organization
in counseling and working with troubled children, the "junior" partners.
In 1972, as a result of a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration,
the organization began to accept as junior partners children placed on informal adjustment by the court. Referral of such children is made by a liaison officer in the intake
division of the probation department, and reports from the senior partner as to the effectiveness of the "partnership" may be transmitted to the court. Junior and senior partners
agree to spend at least 3 hours a week together. The organization provides opportunities,
particularly in the area of recreation, for the partners to engage in at minimal or no cost.
It is enormously successful in Denver, and children referred to Partners for informal
adjustment are much more likely to receive a substantial counseling input than those
referred to field probation counselors who are already overburdened with caseloads of 40
to 50 or more children who have been placed on formal probation. The commitment of a
senior partner is for at least a 9-month period.
" See discussion of legal and constitutional rights of the child supra at notes 59-67
and accompanying text.
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mal supervision does not begin until well into the 6-month period.
If a Partner has been assigned, the contact may not begin any
sooner, but at least it is more constant and continuous. Again the
family's involvement with the court is essentially over, except for
limited contacts which may be made over a 3-month period, unless another parental, school, or police referral is received by the
probation department.
The final option open to a probation counselor is the filing
of a formal petition. When this option is pursued, the preliminary
investigation is usually more complete, if only because the court
and the defense counsel will scrutinize the petition's validity. The
decision to file a formal petition also requires more extensive
paperwork, arrangements for court filing and service, and court
appearances for the probation counselor. Unofficial treatment of
cases requires less work and such decisions are never reviewed.
The counselor will explain his decision to file a petition to the
parents and the child in an interview with the family. Generally
during this interview, which is probably at least the second, the
counselor will present a copy of the petition to the child and
parents. The allegations are usually written in legalistic terminology and probation counselors feel they are under some obligation
to clarify them as well as to advise the family of their legal rights,
especially the right to be represented by counsel. Some probation
counselors automatically refer the family to the public defender's
office for legal representation. In spite of the probation officer's
attempt to explain the petition, few parents of children seemed
to comprehend it.
If the petition has been filed and the plea hearing set, many
counselors will "serve" a copy of the petition and summons during the interview, or if the hearing has not been set, request a
waiver of service to be signed by the parents. 3 The parents can
then be notified by phone of the date, time, and place of the
hearing and will receive a copy of the summons and petition at
the plea hearing."
,3 If the petition involved is a Child in Need of Supervision petition, the parents may
also be required to sign the petition as petitioner. If the CHINS petition alleges truancy,
a school social worker may be present at the interview, and in any case will be required
to sign as petitioner.
11 The illegality of such a procedure is obvious. First, under the Colorado Rules of
Civil Procedure, service is to be completed by a person who is not interested in the action;
a probation counselor who is often the petitioner can hardly be said to fall into the category
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Once the probation counselor has opted for the decision of
filing a formal petition, the child is projected into a very formal
court system, at least in the Denver Juvenile Court. His next
contact will be the plea hearing which is set one to two weeks after
the petition is filed with the court. For the child in detention, this
means more time waiting in Juvenile Hall; for the child at home,
it means at least a week or two more of freedom. For both, the
process is just beginning."
The vagueness of the probation department's decisions to file
a petition, handle informally, or handle unofficially can be justified to some extent by the broadness of the statutory standards
guiding discretionary intake."
The Colorado statutes specify that the choice of manner of
handling the case must be based on a preliminary investigation.
However, the statutes give no guidelines as to what information
should be included in this investigation or what criteria should
be used to determine whether the case should be filed or handled
unofficially. The only guidance offered is the flexible standard of
taking whatever action is required by the "interest of the child
or of the community."97
These vague standards surrounding the decision to handle
unofficially, informally, or to file a petition are not clarified by
of disinterested persons. Secondly, neither the notice requirements of the Code, COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3-2, to -3 (Supp. 1967), nor that of In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967),
are fulfilled by such a procedure, as administratively easy and commonly practiced as it
may be.
" A fairly substantial class of offenders has thus far not been discussed. They are the
out-of-town runaways or escapees from juvenile facilities in other states. One hundred and
sixty-five such runaways were processed from January to June of 1972 by the intake
division of the probation department located at juvenile hall. These children go through
the detention procedure outlined above and are detained, almost without exception, pending transportation back to their home states under the Interstate Compact on Juveniles,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-8-1 to -8 (Supp. 1967). Most children are returned under the
voluntary return procedure of article vi of the Compact, although a small percentage are
requisitioned by the home state pursuant to articles iv and v. Almost as a matter of course,
if the child agrees to return voluntarily or is requisitioned by the home State, any charges
pending in Colorado are dropped or dismissed. These children rarely appear before the
court except in detention hearings and on occasion in requisition hearings, but they do
constitute a considerable portion of the Intake Division workload because their numbers
are both great and increasing, and because arrangements for their return are often complex.
" Ch. 110, §§ 16-17, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 390, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 22-3-1(2)(a) to -1(3) (Supp. 1967).
97 Id.
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officially promulgated administrative guidelines in the Denver
Juvenile Court. The only directive concerning filing which has
been issued is one by the presiding judge that felony offenses
alleged to have been committed by children already on probation
must be filed.
Because of the dearth of court-promutgated guidelines regarding this most important decision, it is necessary to rely for
information on probation counselors' practices as related by them
in structured interviews.
Eight different probation counselors were interviewed-field
and intake workers, both line staff and supervisory staff, and the
presiding judge of the Denver Juvenile Court. There were definite
trends among their comments. Most preferred to handle a case
unofficially as often as possible and viewed filing a petition as a
means to force cooperation or acceptance of a treatment plan by
the child or parents. One very candid subject noted that even
court-ordered treatment may not produce a positive response
from an intransigent family. Another mentioned the possible
harmful effects on the child which could easily result from court
intervention which was not needed.
Those interviewed saw the preliminary investigation as an
effort to obtain a "total picture" of the child, with the alleged
offense constituting only a part of that picture. Except for "very
serious" offenses, which counselors feel pressured to file, the
major concern seems to be first, whether the child needs help, and
second, whether formal court processing will facilitate receipt of
help by the child and his family. The comments continually emphasized the discretionary judgment exercised and the lack, and
perhaps impossibility, of strict guidelines.
The decision to file a petition is twofold; once a counselor has
made the personal decision to file a formal petition, he must
decide whether to file a delinquency or a CHINS petition. At one
point in the court's history, this decision was relatively uncomplicated. If a violation of a state law or a municipal ordinance were
alleged, a delinquency petition was filed; if truancy or runaway
were the problem, a CHINS petition was filed. However, recently
many counselors have begun to use CHINS definitions to encompass delinquency allegations. A child who is an inveterate shoplifter could certainly be said to be "beyond the control of his parent,
guardian, or other legal custodian," 98 and a child alleged to be
2

,1 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2 -1-3(18)(c) (Supp. 1967).
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using drugs regularly can be seen as a child "[w]hose behavior9
or condition is such as to endanger his own or others' welfare." "
Generally, CHINS petitions alleging delinquent acts are filed by
probation counselors if a child's age suggests he is really beyond
the control of his parents and only tangentially a threat to the
community, if he is under the age of 10 years and a delinquency
petition cannot be filed, if the basic problem is perceived by the
counselor as a family problem and not a violation of the law or if
the child must come before the court but has no prior record and
the counselor feels a CHINS label will be less detrimental to the
child than a delinquency label.'00 The question in all cases obviously is, is it a legal problem?
Unless a case is disposed of by informal adjustment or unofficially, the case, the child, and the parents will proceed to the next
critical juncture, the first hearing on the petition itself.
F.

Plea Hearing
I would guess about 90% of the delinquency cases in juvenile court
are bargained out.' But the pleas are better from the DA's point of
view because the kids plead out to offenses as alleged on the petition-the original charge-instead of to a lesser included charge, as
occurs in the adult system.
Deputy District Attorney
in the Denver Juvenile Court

Although hundreds of children in the Denver Juvenile Court
participate each year in the tactic of plea bargaining, very few
understand the process. Plea bargaining in the juvenile system
results in substantially less benefit to the accused than it does in
the adult system, where a guilty plea nearly always reduces the
potential extent of the punishment. Under the Code, however,
almost exactly the same dispositional alternatives are open to the
Id. § 22-1-3(18)(d) (Supp. 1967).
One point which should be mentioned regarding the developing practice of filing
delinquency allegations under CHINS petitions is that the reverse does not occur, at least
in such an obvious manner. Children who run away from home could in most cases also
be cited for curfew violations, prostitution, panhandling, drinking under age, or some
other delinquency offense which occurs as a result of their new-found "freedom." Probation counselors, in such cases, usually file the primary offense-the runaway-under a
CHINS petition, and the DCD usually does not push filing of the relatively minor municipal ordinance violations which result from the runaway.
1*1In fiscal year 1971-72, 1,817 petitions were filed in the Denver Juvenile Court as
CHINS, revocation of CHINS probation, delinquency and revocation of delinquency probation. Of these, only 176, just under 10 percent, resulted in trials, 50 to a jury (all
delinquency) and 126 to the court (123 delinquency).
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court, regardless of the number or types of offenses admitted. 02
The negotiating positions of the participants in the plea bargaining process are comparable in both the adult and juvenile
systems. The district attorney usually is unwilling to dismiss several charges if one allegation will be admitted for three reasons:
1) his perceived responsibility to the police department, to victims of juvenile offenses, and to society as to prosecute all wrongdoers on all charges filed; 2) his opportunity to use a lengthy
record of admissions by a juvenile to argue at the dispositional
stage for commitment to the Department of Institutions or more
harsh sanctions, or if the juvenile reappears before the court, for
a transfer of jurisdiction to the adult system;'0 3 and 3) his belief
that mass dismissals contribute to a diminishing respect among
juveniles for the legal system.
Defense counsel participate in the practice of plea bargaining
to limit the severity of the disposition of each case and to thwart
possible attempts by the district attorney to have juvenile court
jurisdiction transferred later. Some defense counsel also believe
that parole can be obtained more quickly if there are fewer admitted offenses, although this has not been substantiated. Finally,
many counsel, especially private counsel, conclude that if they
get half or more of the charges in each case dismissed, the childclient will perceive that he has been well represented.
Most children are represented at plea hearings ' 1 by the public defender or by an attorney or student from the Legal Aid
Society. The attorney may not have represented the child at the
detention hearing, and, in any event, counsel usually does not
receive a copy of the petition sufficiently in advance of the hearing to conduct an investigation or to speak with the child prior
to the morning on which a plea must be entered.
Counsel generally asks the child if he has seen a copy of the
02 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-9 (Supp. 1967); Ch. 110, § 22, [1973] Colo. Sess.
Laws 392, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-13(1)(b) (Supp. 1969); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 22-3-12(l)(h), (i) (Supp. 1967).
103 Ch. 110, § 20, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 392, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22-3-8(4)(a) (Supp. 1969). An adjudication for a delinquent act which would be a felony
if committed by an adult also brings into play the possibility of a direct filing in the adult
criminal system as discussed in Ch. 110, § 1, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 384, amending
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-3(17)(b) (Supp. 1969).
104Almost all plea hearings are scheduled before a Denver Juvenile Court referee, and
since July 1, 1973 the child no longer has a right to request a judge to hear his entry of
plea. Ch. 110, § 7, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 387, amending CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-110(4) (Supp. 1967).
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petition. Most answer "no," indicating that they have not seen
it, do not remember it, or do not know what a petition is. After
the petition is shown to the child and the charges explained,
counsel advises the child of his rights'05 and explains the purpose
of the plea hearing,'"1 making clear that whether or not the
charges are true, the child may insist that the district attorney
prove them. If the child wishes to admit one or more of the allegations in the petition, counsel advises the child that probation,
removal from his family, or commitment may be the consequence
of entering an admission.' ° If the child persists in his desire to
enter a plea of admission, counsel then probes the voluntariness
of the plea.'" s
The voluntariness of pleas of admission in the Denver Juvenile Court is often questionable, primarily because of the involvement of probation counselors in planning the disposition. The
child's attorney must carefully explain that while the probation
counselor may already have made some plans, they are only recommendations and the judge or referee is free to reject them. 0 9 If
10 See discussion of legal and constitutional rights of the child supra notes 59-67 and
accompanying text.
"" A typical and understandable explanation might be worded:
"In the hearing today, the referee just wants to know whether you admit
the charges (or the burglary, runaway, etc.) or whether you deny the charges
and want the district attorney to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. He
would have to call witnesses to prove that the charges are true, and we could
ask those witnesses questions and have our own witnesses to show that the
charges are not true. We could have a jury trial or we could just let the judge
decide. Even if you think that the charges are true, you don't have to admit
them-you don't have to help the district attorney out; you have a right to
have them proved against you. Can you decide what you want to do?"
"0 Counsel might utilize the following format:
"You know that if you admit this charge, that will give the court power
over you for 2 years or maybe even longer. The referee (or judge) could put
you on probation which means that you would have to visit with a probation
counselor probably once a week or so, and he or she would be keeping an eye
on you. The court could also take you away from your family and put you
someplace else to live-like in a group home or on a ranch. The court could
even lock you up for 2 years at Mountview or Lookout. The court can't do
any of these things unless you admit the charges or unless they're proved
against you in a trial. Do you still think you want to admit the charges?"
"
"You know you don't have to admit the charges? Do you think anyone made you
decide to admit them? Has your probation officer or anyone else promised you anything
if you admit? Is this what you want to do even though you know what could happen?"
I Whenever delinquency allegations are involved, CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-18(1)(b) (Supp. 1967) forbids probation department investigation and study of possible
dispositional recommendations prior to adjudication or entry of a plea of admission.
However, it is broadly known and frankly admitted by probation counselors that planning
for disposition begins probably at the filing stage, but certainly before adjudication.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 51

the child is entering an admission based on a perceived disposition, the plea is involuntary.
A concept which is a source of difficulty for children is the
right of having charges proved against them, particularly if the
children know the allegations are true or know that they were
involved in the alleged offense. Most children feel that if they
"did it," denying the allegations is lying. Often a child can be
educated if his attorney will explain that a denial of allegations
really means that the child wants to have the charges proved in
trial. Counsel might briefly describe trial procedure. Nevertheless, even after such an explanation, some children never understand their right to trial.
If the child wishes to deny the charges, counsel questions him
more thoroughly about the alleged offense and begins to evaluate
possible defenses. On account of their shortened preparation
time, some attorneys deny all allegations in each petition so that
an investigator can establish the facts prior to the omnibus hearing. Others proceed with whatever a child tells them and willingly
enter admissions at the plea hearing.
Because most children desire to admit guilt, because many
already have incriminated themselves in conversations with their
probation counselors, because the majority of attorneys or law
students are inexperienced in practicing in Denver Juvenile
Court, and because some attorneys view probation as an inconsequential punishment, it is possible that some children admit allegations despite the availability of a valid legal defense. It is also
common for prosecutors and defenders to cooperate in gaining a
conviction because "the kid needs some help." The legal ethics
of these positions are certainly questionable.
When counsel and the child have agreed to the plea that will
be entered, they proceed to a hearing before a referee. The plea
hearing is generally very short and routinized. The referee or
probation counselor introduces the case by identifying the parties
present and stating that the hearing is for the purpose of entering
a plea. Generally counsel for the child waives both a formal advisement of the child's rights by the court and a reading of the
petition. The judicial officer than asks whether the child is prepared to enter a plea. Unless counsel requests either a continuance based on lack of notice or a need for further investigation,
or a dismissal based on insufficiency of service, he enters the
child's plea. If a denial is entered, the case is set for an omnibus
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hearing before a judge. Unless the issues of detention or bond are
raised and argued, that terminates the plea hearing.
If an admission of one or more of the charges is entered, the
referee should inquire into the voluntariness of the plea. The
format which should be used is similar to that suggested for use
by counsel"' for the child. However, some judicial officers either
do not inquire into voluntariness or perfunctorily ask if the admission is being made under any threat, promise, or coercion.
Most children will say "no," even if they do not understand the
question. Once the judicial officer is satisfied as to the voluntariness of the plea and some disposition has been made of any remaining counts,"' he accepts the plea and sets the case for dispositional hearing.
Ninety percent of the children named in petitions filed in the
Denver Juvenile Court enter admissions of guilt. It is impossible
to determine how many of these have an informed understanding
of their rights and the consequences of their admissions. Most are
represented by legal counsel, advised of their rights, and formally
questioned as to the voluntariness of their admissions. Although
the statutory requirements are met, it is debatable, in view of the
uncomprehending acquiescence of some children, whether the
constitutional requirements of due process are also satisfied.
The Code, Rules of Juvenile Procedure, Colorado case law,
and administrative guidelines promulgated by the Denver Juvenile Court are silent as to the plea hearing."' The drafters of the
Code and Rules apparently contemplated one or, at the most, two
hearings for an alleged CHINS or juvenile delinquent. The adjudicatory hearing"3 was established to determine "whether the
1W

See note 112 infra.

If only one or two of several allegations is admitted to, defense counsel will move
for the dismissal of the other counts. If those other counts are CHINS allegations, the court
will usually dismiss them forthwith. If they are delinquency allegations, the concurrence
of the district attorney's representative is usually required. If that concurrence is not
forthcoming, the remaining charges will be set for omnibus hearing, usually in a couple
of weeks.
"I The only mention of the hearing is found at Ch. 110, § 7, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws
386, amending CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-10(3) (Supp. 1967), and even there it is not
denominated a "plea hearing." The "advisement hearing" discussed in CoLo. R. Juv. P.
8 could well be the plea hearing if that hearing is the child's first appearance before the
court; however, no mention of entry of plea is made in that rule.
1 Ch. 110, § 18, [19731 Colo. Sess. Laws 391, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
22-3-6(4)(a), (c) (Supp. 1969); COLO. R. Jim'. P. 17.
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allegations of the petition are admitted or, if contested, are supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.""' 4 Once the allegations had been established beyond a reasonable doubt, whether
through admissions of the child or proof at trial, the court was
directed by the Code to "sustain the petition, and . . . make an
order of adjudication .
"5...
" The court could then proceed
with the dispositional hearing or continue the hearing on the
motion of any interested party."' Early in 1971, however, the
Denver Juvenile Court began to split the adjudicatory and dispositional hearings.
The plea hearing is an appropriate time for counsel to make
procedural objections concerning the petition itself or the legitimacy of court jurisdiction over the child. However, because there
is no right in a plea hearing to proceed before a judge in the first
instance, and because such issues are still timely if raised at the
omnibus hearing, most defense attorneys prefer to raise them
before a judge at that time.
G.

Omnibus Hearing
The problem was moderately difficult-the solution relatively
simple.
In January of 1972, we started the experiment of an "Omnibus"
hearing, which is, in effect, a pretrial conference-but more.
Former Presiding Judge of the
Denver Juvenile Court

With the omnibus and adjudicatory hearings, the child's perceptions become more and more confused because the hearings
become more and more legalistic. Especially at the omnibus hearing, the child rarely says anything unless he decides to enter a
plea of admission. Even then he is advised and questioned by the
court. He will probably not see his probation counselor. For the
first time he will probably appear before a judge of the Denver
Juvenile Court rather than a referee, and he will appear in a main
courtroom rather than in the juvenile hall courtroom or a referee's
hearing room.
If further negotiation between the district attorney and defense counsel results in a settlement, the omnibus hearing will
.' COLO. R. Juv. P. 17(a).
...
COLO REV. STAT. ANN. § 2 2-3-6(6)(a) (Supp. 1969).
116Id. §§ 22-1-3(21), -3-6(6)(b) (Supp. 1967).
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proceed as a second plea hearing, following which a date for the
dispositional hearing will be set. When the omnibus process was
first established, the presiding judge estimated that 37 percent of
the cases were settled. Since then this percentage has increased
to at least 50 percent.
If no settlement has been arranged, the judge will make several inquiries of counsel, which in effect comprise the entirety of
the omnibus hearing. The judge will ascertain whether a trial by
jury is requested and, if so, whether it is to be a jury of three or
six persons; whether the jurisdictional matters of age and residence of the child are admitted, and whether there are any discovery problems;" 7 and finally, whether either side anticipates
the filing of motions. A date by which motions are to be filed will
be set, and if an extended hearing will be required, a preliminary
hearing on motions will be set prior to the date set for trial. To
further illustrate that omnibus hearings are at least perfunctory,
if not unnecessary, the Denver Juvenile Court sets all omnibus
hearings on Friday afternoons, at least two, and sometimes as
many as four, to the half hour.
There are no statutory provisions or rules of juvenile procedure governing the omnibus hearing since it is essentially an
administrative procedure utilized only in the Denver Juvenile
Court.
By the end of 1971, delinquency cases in the Denver Juvenile
Court were taking an average of 265 days from the filing of the
petition to trial. Omnibus hearings were introduced to deal with
this problem. The short history of this experiment has been erratic. Initially, omnibus hearings could be set a week or two following the plea hearing. However, because there remained the
problem of lack of notice of the allegations prior to the plea hearing, all those cases which had been set for jury trial were being
set for omnibus hearing, so that by the summer of 1972, counsel
could secure an earlier date for a trial by jury than for an omnibus
hearing. This situation has been alleviated, but at the expense of
I" The district attorneys who practice in the Denver Juvenile Court are generally very
informal about discovery by defense counsel, and are willing, in most cases, to give their
files to the defense for purposes of copying the police summary sheet, copies of any
statements made by the child, and the results of any scientific tests or experiments made
in connection with the particular case. Extensive discovery motions are rarely filed either
by the prosecution or the defense because of the level of cooperation between the two.
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circumventing some of the original purposes of the omnibus hearing.
Omnibus hearings are now generally set upon the entry of a
denial of the allegations regardless of whether a trial by jury is
requested. As noted above, many attorneys set omnibus hearings
for the purpose of having a hearing on motions before a judge
rather than a referee, whether or not a trial is anticipated. Finally, written motions no longer need be filed prior to the date of
the omnibus hearing, nor are pretrial motions argued at the omnibus hearing. Juries and witnesses may well be kept waiting for
extended periods of time while pretrial motions are argued unless
a separate hearing on motions has been docketed. Since adequate
and cooperative discovery has never really been a problem in the
Denver Juvenile Court," 8 the failure of the omnibus procedure to
dispose of pretrial motions really portends a failure of that procedure altogether. If adequate notice and discovery were available
at the initial plea hearing, and counsel for both sides were empowered to enter into binding plea negotiations, most of the settlements now reached at the omnibus hearing likely could be
reached at the original plea hearing, with a saving of court time,
and detention time for the child.' 9
Challenges to the petition, procedures, or relevant statutes
may be raised at the omnibus hearing.'2 0 The completion or ade1,' Because juvenile proceedings are civil proceedings, counsel for either the prosecution or defense could claim very expansive discovery rights under the rules of civil procedure. COLO. R. Cw. P. 26-37. Only one rule, Rule 16, of the Colorado Rules of Juvenile
Procedure deals with discovery and it is very limited in scope and semantically inappropriate in cases where the child's right to discovery is at issue. Requests for a preliminary
hearing could also be utilized as a discovery tactic, though the Denver Juvenile Court has
yet to establish rules or procedures for this new provision of the Code. Ch. 110, § 15,
[1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 390, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-1(1)(d) (Supp.
1967).
"I9The omnibus hearing procedure may be impaired further by the 1973 amendment
to the Colorado Children's Code which allows the court to "conduct a preliminary hearing
to determine if there is probable cause to believe that the facts alleged in the petition bring
the child within the court's jurisdiction." Ch. 110, § 15, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 390,
amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-1(1)(d) (Supp. 1967). Thus far the court has not
dealt with the issues of whether the availability of a preliminary hearing makes the
omnibus hearing superfluous, or if not, when the omnibus hearing should be conducted-before or after the preliminary hearing-or finally, whether the two are mutually
exclusive or if both may be requested by counsel.
,,I It should be remembered that the Denver Juvenile Court is governed in its procedures first, by the Colorado Children's Code, and also secondly, by the Colorado Rules of
Juvenile Procedure. Where the latter are silent or otherwise inadequate, proceedings are

1974

PRACTICES OF DENVER JUVENILE COURT

quacy of the "preliminary investigation" required by the Code 2 ,
is a basis for a challenge to the filing by the probation department
of a delinquency petition,'22 and for a challenge to a CHINS or
dependency and neglect petition. Even if the preliminary investigation has been completed and is adequate, the decision to file a
formal petition may be challenged on the grounds that it is un'
necessary in "the interests of the child or of the community,"'
and a motion can be made to remand the case to the intake
probation division for informal adjustment or dismissal.2 4 The
filing of CHINS allegations in a delinquency petition should result, upon motion of the child, in a dismissal or, at the least, a
refiling.'2 5 Similarly, the filing of delinquency allegations under
the CHINS rubric may be challenged, especially if the statement
2
of allegations does not conform to the statutory requirements. 1
The Denver Juvenile Court has been responsive to arguments
and proof that a child's problems are the result of an abusive
home situation and that the filing of a petition in dependency and
neglect therefore would be more appropriate' 27 than one in delinquency or CHINS. The court's willingness to order the filing of a
petition in dependency and neglect, and the dismissal of other
conducted according to the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure (CoLo. R. Juv. P. 1). Neither
the rules nor the Code discusses whether the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure may
be used. As will appear from the critical juncture dealing with the adjudicatory hearing
or trial, juvenile trials and adult trials are almost indistinguishable. Although Denver
Juvenile Court does not seem to have established any clear policy as to whether the rules
of criminal procedure may be used if the civil rules are inappropriate, the criminal rules
and terminology therefrom are in fact used repeatedly. Generally, counsel is well advised
to draft pleadings and motions under the juvenile or civil rules when at all possible, and
to assume that the court will either interpret those rules to cover what is in fact becoming
at least a quasi-criminal proceeding, or will give permission to counsel to utilize the
criminal rules.
121 Ch. 110, §§ 15-16, [19731 Colo. Sess. Laws 390, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 22-3-1(1)(c), -3-1(2)(a) (Supp. 1967).
2 Ch. 110, § 15, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 390, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §
22-3-1(1) (Supp. 1967). If the delinquency petition has been filed by the district attorney,
the court must accept the filing. Id.
Im Ch. 110 § 16, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 390, amending CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
22-3-1(2)(a), (b), (c), (d) (Supp. 1967).
1 Id. §§ 22-3-1(2)(b), (d) (Supp. 1967).
15 See discussion of In re D.R., 29 Colo. App. 525, 487 P.2d 824 (1971) supra at note
20.
126COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-2(2)(a) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 12.
121COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-3(19), -3-1(2) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 26.
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actions, occurs most frequently when CHINS petitions have been
filed or when delinquency petitions concerning children under the
age of thirteen are at issue. Otherwise, unless a serious and continuing pattern of neglect and abuse can be shown, the court will
rarely take this step.
Other appropriate motions at the pretrial stage include motions for joinder of a respondent parent or legal custodian whose
appearance is deemed necessary to the action," 8 and for appointment of a guardian ad litem.2 " The latter is customary when the
child has no parents or they refuse or are unable to appear, when
there is a conflict between parent and child, or when the court
determines such appointment is in the child's best interest or
necessary for his welfare.
Motions to suppress evidence or statements are filed and
generally heard prior to trial. There is, however, no interlocutory
appeal from the juvenile court of the denial or granting of a motion to suppress. 30 A prerequisite to the admissibility of a child's
statements or admissions in response to police interrogation is a
showing by the people of the presence of the parent at the interrogation, 3' the advisement of both parent and child of their rights,
the comprehension by both of the significance of their rights, the
knowing and intelligent waiver by both of those rights, and the
voluntariness of the statements or admissions made by the
child.'32 An exception to this exclusionary rule exists if the child
is emancipated by marriage or military service, or "if the child is
a runaway from a state other than Colorado and is of sufficient
' 33
age and understanding.'
...
COLO. REV.
...
COLO. REV.

STAT. ANN.
STAT. ANN.

§ 22-3-3(4) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 13(c).
§ 22-3-5(3) (Supp. 1971).

"I People v. P.L.V., 176 Colo. 342, 490 P.2d 685 (1971). COLO. App. R. 4.1 is denominated "Inter-locutory Appeals in Criminal Cases."
3' A recent Colorado case states that "mere physical presence does not satisfy the
requirements of the statute concerning confessions of a child." The parent "must be in a
position to give advice freely [and a] parent who is himself incarcerated is in no such
position." In re L.B., 513 P.2d 1069, 1070 (Colo. App. 1973). Here the father had been
incarcerated for drunkenness and was brought from his cell to advise his son who had been
taken into custody for an alleged burglary.
02 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-2(3)(c) (Supp. 1971). The Colorado Supreme Court
has held in People v. Reyes, that the protections afforded a minor under this statute with
regard to waiver of his fifth amendment rights are equally applicable to waiver of the
minor's fourth amendment rights. 174 Colo. 377, 483 P.2d 1342 (1971). With regard to a
minor's fourth amendment rights in Colorado, see also In re B.M.C., 506 P.2d 409 (Colo.
App. 1973).
11 The evidentiary problems are obvious. Proof of emancipation is a factual determi-
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Counsel for the child may request psychological or psychiatric evaluation prior to the adjudicatory hearing. Generally the
court will deal with the issue of mental illness or deficiency in the
pretrial stage, 34 although the Code provides that such evidence
shall be introduced at the adjudicatory hearing. 35 If it is established that the child is mentally ill, his case must be transferred
to the Probate Court of the City and County of Denver, 3 which
has exclusive jurisdiction in the adjudication of the mentally ill
of whatever age.' 37 The test for whether the Denver Juvenile Court
retains jurisdiction over the child is not the legal sanity test used
in the adult criminal court, but is whether "the child is mentally
ill or mentally deficient to the extent that short-term or long-term
hospitalization or institutional confinement and treatment is required."'' 38 If so, the juvenile court must transfer the case. The
difficulty with the test is that it is even more vague and more
dependent upon the philosophy of the examiner than is the test
for legal sanity.
H. Adjudicatory Hearing
The court which must direct its procedure even apparently to
do something to a child because of what he has done, is parted from
the court which is avowedly concerned only with doing something
for a child because of what he is and needs, by a gulf too wide to be
bridged by any humanity which the judge may introduce into his
hearings, or by the habitual use of corrective rather than punitive
methods after conviction.'

The adjudicatory hearing or trial of a juvenile in Denver so
closely resembles an adult criminal trial that, except for the age
and size of the "defendant," the legal terminology used, and the
nation to be made by the court, and in Colorado, there are no degrees of emancipation; a
child is either emancipated or not, for all purposes or none. Poudre Valley Hospital v.
Heckart, 491 P.2d 984 (Colo. App. 1971). Marriage or military service alone does not confer
an emancipated status on a child under the age of 21 years as the new section would seem
to intimate.
01 The court can do so by utilizing its powers under COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-14(3) (Supp. 1967). The problems caused in the dispositional phase by the Code sections
dealing with mentally ill and deficient children are discussed infra at notes 158, 168, and
169.
' Id. § 22-3-7(1)(a) (Supp. 1967).
OS COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
Id. § 9(3); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-4(1)(k), -3-7(5) (Supp. 1967).
I3
" Id. §§ 22-3-7(2), (5) (Supp. 1967).

,W'
Waite, How Far Can Court ProcedureBe Socialized Without ImpairingIndividual
Rights?, 12 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 339, 340 (1922).
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number of jurors, most laypeople and a substantial number of
attorneys would find the two types of proceedings impossible to
differentiate.
A child and his parents face the trial setting with an increased apprehension. Part of this is attributable to the formality
of the adjudicatory hearing, especially if a jury is involved.4 0 Both
child and parents have probably been told by defense counsel to
dress appropriately, not to chew gum, to speak only when spoken
to, and not to show emotion during the course of the proceedings.
The apprehension of the parties is compounded by the aunts,
uncles, brothers, sisters, and friends of the child who often accompany him.
The trial constitutes the child's "day of reckoning." If a juvenile admits the allegations of a petition in a plea hearing, he
knows what to expect. He knows he will "plead guilty," that the
admission will be accepted by the court in most cases, and that
disposition will be delayed for at least two weeks. A trial is different. The juvenile does not know what the outcome will be. Typically the child will not testify. He will understand little of the
fast-moving colloquy between the prosecution, the defense, and
the court, and his lawyer will not have time to explain much of
it to him. Even after the court has announced its findings, in
many cases the child will not know what decision has been
reached until defense counsel explains the result to him.
The formality of the adjudicatory hearing is in contrast to the
limited number of statutes, rules, and cases which define its parameters. The conduct of the hearing is only partially defined by
the Code' and the Colorado Rules of Juvenile Procedure,' and
has been mostly determined by Supreme Court cases of In re
Gault' and In re Winship.' The rights of children in an adjudicatory hearing as enunciated in these two cases' 5 are embellished
in Colorado by the right to a jury trial,' the right to raise various
I40The informality permitted by the Code in hearings before the juvenile court (CoLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-7(1)(b) (Supp. 1967)) is not practiced in adjudicatory hearings.
' 1 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-3(2) (Supp. 1967); id. § 22-3-6 (Supp. 1967).

COLO. R. Juv. P. 17.
387 U.S. 1, 31-57 (1967).
-11397 U.S. 358, 365-68 (1970).
"'t See discussion of In re Gault and In re Winship supra at notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
14' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-6(4)(a)(i), (ii) (Supp. 1967). This right to a jury
"

1
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legal challenges prior to or during trial,'47 and the right of ap148
peal.
The administrative overlay on the formal law at this stage of
the proceedings is sparse. The court personnel most responsible
for that overlay, the probation counselors, play almost no role
whatsoever in the adjudicatory hearing,'49 which is almost solely
the province of the attorneys and the judge. As such it represents
the best or the worst of the juvenile court, depending upon
whether one perceives it as strictly a court of law, or as a social
agency with powers of legal sanction.
However, if the allegations in the petition are sustained, the
prominence and power of the probation counselor come to bear
fully in the dispositional hearing, the next critical juncture.
I.

DispositionalHearing
(1)(a) The general assembly hereby declares that the purposes
of this chapter are:
(b) To secure for each child, subject to these provisions, such
care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will best serve his
welfare and the interests of society;
(c) To preserve and strengthen family ties whenever possible,
including improvement of home environment;
(d) To remove a child from the custody of his parents only
when his welfare and safety or protection of the public would otherwise be endangered; and
(e) To secure for any child removed from the custody of his

trial for juveniles in Colorado had been maintained in spite of the conclusion reached by
the United States Supreme Court that "trial by jury in the juvenile court's adjudicative
stage is not a constitutional requirement." McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545
(1971).
"I Supra at notes 70, 120 and accompanying text.
Ch. 110, § 110, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 387-88, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-1-12 (Supp. 1971). The 1973 amendment to this section gave the people the right to
appeal questions of law in delinquency cases. Motions for a new trial or a rehearing are
governed by COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-17 (Supp. 1967) and COLO. R. Juv. P. 55, 57,
and by COLO. R. Civ. P. 59. Rule 56 of the juvenile rules of procedure governs motions for
arrest or modification of judgment, and the appellate process itself governed by the Colorado Appellate Rules.
COLO. R. Juv. P. 17 as adopted in 1970, originally provided that no statements
made by the child "to any court employee" were admissible in evidence in the adjudicatory hearing unless the right to exclusion was waived by the child and his parents. This
section was deleted by a rewriting of the rule in 1971; however no probation counselor has
ever to the knowledge of the writers been called by the people to testify in the adjudicatory
hearing as to statements made by the child, and many probation counselors consider such
statements privileged even though they are not in fact privileged under the law.
148

14
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parents the necessary care, guidance, and discipline to assist him in
becoming a responsible and productive member of society."0

The purposes of the Code find their fulfillment, if at all, in
the dispositional hearing, for it is here that the juvenile court can
make real its promise to "[do] something for a child because of
what he is and needs. . . ."I"'The hearing, from the point of view
of the child and his family, is most critical, because it bares their
problems to the court and may destroy their physical unity. The
parents may be surprised to find that the dispositional hearing
does not necessarily focus completely on the child, but may result
in court orders to them as well to participate in a treatment
program designed for the family's benefit.
The Code provides that in all children's cases "the probation
department or other agency designated by the court shall make
a social study and report in writing," unless the requirement is
waived by the court and presumably by the child and his family
as well.' 52 The social study is not to be commenced when delinquency allegations are involved until after the adjudication is
completed, 5 ' but this requirement is unrealistic and therefore
circumvented by the probation counselors.5 4 It would appear
that, at most, the information gathered for the court report is
merely an expansion of the information already obtained in the
preliminary investigation to determine whether a petition should
'50

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-2 (Supp. 1967).

W5'
Waite, supra at note 139.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-8(1)(a) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 19, 20.
'5' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-8(1)(b) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 20(b), (d).
'5' Intake Probation Supervisor:
A. I think an awful lot of information gained at the preliminary investigation can be later used in the social history. . . .An awful lot of the social
investigation is begun at the time of the first interview, and even though the
Children's Code asks for a separate social investigation after the court takes
jurisdiction, I don't see how you can readily separate those totally in reality.
Q. Do you think that it is unrealistic to talk about two distinct investigations?
A. I think that two investigations are necessary, but they overlap so much
that sometimes they become indistinguishable. A preliminary investigation
is often done in a time of crisis; parents and child are going to be more willing
to divulge things at that time, because they want to resolve the problem.
That kind of preliminary investigation is usually only supplemented in your
final investigation by specific things like psychological interviews or definite
school reports with exact grades and this kind of thing, or a more specific
social history in terms of childhood illnesses.
'5
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be filed. The purpose of the report, as described by the Code, is
to help in "determining proper disposition of a child.""'
To aid in accomplishing the purpose of the dispositional
hearing,15 1 which is to determine "the proper disposition best
serving the interests of the child and the public,"' 57 "[t]he court
may have the child examined by a physician, psychiatrist, or
psychologist, and . . .may place the child in a hospital or other
suitable facility for this purpose."' 58 Many probation counselors
avail themselves of the opportunity for outside evaluation, even
though the procedure is often frightening for the child because it
"' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-8(2) (Supp. 1967). An intake probation Supervisor
interviewed expanded on this definition in a very thoughtful statement:
Especially when we are dealing with people who do have 40, 50, 60 years of
their lives left possibly, to begin with the idea in mind that there are no
mitigating circumstances or there are no circumstances that might put a
different light upon the situation, to assume what is happening around
him-I don't feel that this is a realistic approach to life.
Basically, I think that this is the importance of the preliminary investigation and the social history-that the probation counselor has to be . . .
aware of human nature, family life, community resources, community pressures, [and] individual psyches. In other words, he's got to be that semigod
sitting between the Almighty and the earth, trying to decide exactly what is
in the best interests of this child. I don't know if I answered your question
or not. To me, it's a matter of how you approach life. I don't quantify
life-it's a quality thing-and I can't give this much retribution for so much
infraction. And I think that the whole basis of the Children's Code is
this-that we don't give retribution for infractions. We give remedies for
situations.
56 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-3(21) (Supp. 1967) defines the dispositional hearing.
Id. § 22-3-9(1) (Supp. 1967).
'5' Since in most cases there has been no adjudication of the child's case prior to
examination, as required by COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-9(1) (Supp. 1967), there can
arise the problem of the evaluation information being used in violation of section 22-18(1)(b) (Supp. 1967). However, this legal argument is rarely raised when the court orders
psychological or psychiatric evaluation prior to adjudication. First, the participantschild, family, probation counselors, lawyers and court-assume adjudication once a plea
of admission has been entered or the allegations have been proved at trial. This is generally a valid assumption to be made, unless the child is one who might be placed on a
continued petition under section 22-3-6(3) (Supp. 1967), and such children are rarely
seen to be in need of medical evaluation. Secondly, any objection which might be raised
to the procedure of evaluation prior to adjudication could be answered by the court's
interpreting broadly its powers under section 22-1-4(3) (Supp. 1967) to issue temporary
orders providing for "medical treatment" prior to adjudication or disposition, if deemed
in the best interest of the child. This problem of evaluation prior to adjudication will not
be discussed again but is a problem in almost every critical juncture, since in the Denver
Juvenile Court, the order adjudicating a child delinquent or in need of supervision immediately precedes the orders of disposition in the dispositional hearing.
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means to him that he is "crazy." In the interviews conducted, the
counselors and supervisors were asked in what percentage and
what kinds of cases they requested psychological evaluation. The
extent of variation in their response is illustrated by the following
remarks:
Field Probation Counselor:
Q: When do you refer children to psychological services?
A: I don't refer a kid to [Denver Juvenile Court's] psychological
services' to be quite honest with you. I don't feel like waiting for
two or three months; I want it now. I usually refer to children's
diagnostic center.'6 ' When a kid is not motivated [and] I feel maybe
that he has average abilities, but [is] maybe using diugs and
maybe having a lot of conflicts with the parents, really doesn't know
where he or she is at or where they're going, then I refer to CDC and
get a medical workup-psychological, psychiatric, the whole gamut.
Q: What percentage of your cases do you refer for some sort of
psychological evaluation?
A: Probably 50 to 75 percent.

Intake Probation Counselor:
Q: On what percentage of the children you work with do you request
psychological evaluation?
A: I would say maybe 5 to 10 percent of my cases, something like
that. .

.

. I think most children are all right psychologically; I don't

think they necessarily need the professional services of a psychologist. .

.

. Some people seem to refer a lot of children to psychologi-

cal services when it is really not necessary. They are having some
typical problems that you have at that age. .

.

. Kids are going to

The psychological services of the Denver Juvenile Court are housed in a building
immediately adjacent to juvenile hall. The major function performed by the unit is predispositional evaluation of children detained in the hall. The evaluation generally consists
of an interview with the child which may last from half an hour to an hour and a half,
and the administering of up to two or three psychological tests to determine I.Q., aptitudes, etc. The time necessary to receive a written report is often as long as 6 weeks or
longer. There are no Ph.D psychologists on the staff and there is one consulting psychiatrist who devotes three hours a week to the unit. In addition to the two regular staff
members, there are generally a couple of student interns who participate in testing and
evaluation.
10 Children's Diagnostic Center (CDC) is a unit of the University of Colorado's Medical Center. The evaluations performed by CDC are comprehensive and occur over about
a week. Both parents and child are evaluated psychologically. The child usually sees a
psychiatrist as well, and has a complete physical examination. If indicated, a neurological
workup is also completed on the child. Written reports from CDC are delayed extensively,
although a "staffing" involving the psychologist, social worker, and probation counselor
can usually be arranged within a week or two following the evaluation. CDC evaluations
almost always recommend detailed treatment plans.
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have all kinds of experiences and some people are going to think they
need very professional help when they don't. It's putting a load on
our services there for children who really do need this service. So, I
think it's a lack of understanding. We all grew up in different environments and different experiences. When I refer a child to psychological services, it's because I definitely feel that he needs special
help or he needs special evaluation in determining what to do. In
most situations, I do not refer.

The final dispositional recommendations made by the probation counselor are strongly influenced by the results of the psychological, psychiatric, or medical testing. The child rarely, if
ever, sees the written report of the examination. Any explanation
of the diagnosis camouflages the real meaning of the tests. If the
results of court ordered evaluations are to be used in the dispositional hearing, counsel must receive a copy, and the author of the
report may be required to be present at the hearing to be crossexamined.''
Following the psychological or psychiatric examination of the
child, or perhaps simultaneously with it, the probation counselor
must begin to formulate his own recommendations for the disposition of the child. Although the Code suggests a number of dispositional alternatives, it contains no standards for choosing among
them other than that the determination be in the "best interests
of the child and the public."'' 2 Most alternatives may be utilized
for either delinquents or CHINS.6 3 These include placing the
child on probation or under protective supervision 4 in the legal
custody of his parents' 5 or a relative or other suitable person. "'
COLO.

REV. STAT. ANN.

,02
COLO. REV.

STAT. ANN.

§§ 22-1-8(2), (3) (Supp. 1971); COLO. R. Juv. P.19(b).
§§ 22-3-9(1), .12(1)(g) (Supp. 1967); id. § 22-3-13(1)(a)(ii)

(Supp. 1969).
,13Adjudicated delinquents over 16 years of age can also be committed to the department of institutions with a recommendation from the court that placement be made in
the state training school at Buena Vista, Colorado. If the child is adjudicated delinquent
for an act which occurred before his 18th birthday, but he is 18 or older at the time of the
dispositional hearing, the court may sentence such a person to the county jail for a period
of time not to exceed an aggregate total of 180 days. Finally, the court may impose a fine
of not more than $300 on adjudicated delinquents. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-313(1)(b)(22) (Supp. 1969); Ch. 110, § 22, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 392, amending COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-13(1)(b) (Supp. 1969); id. § 22-3-13(1)(c) (Supp. 1971).
"I The probation or supervision status may include assignment to a constructive
supervised work program provided the child's education is not curtailed and the work
program is designed to promote the rehabilitation of the child. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
22-3-12(1)(d) (Supp. 1967).
"' Id. § 22-3-12(1)(b)(Supp. 1967).
ISO Id. § 22-3-12(1)(c) (Supp. 1967).
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If placement in the child's own home would be detrimental to his
rehabilitation, the court may combine probation or protective
supervision with giving custody of the child to the county department of public welfare or a child placement agency, or the court
may simply place the child directly in a child care center.'67 If the
child requires medical, psychological, or psychiatric examination
or treatment, the court may place the child in a hospital or other
suitable facility for that purpose. 6 8 The court may commit, or
transfer legal custody of, the child to the State Department of
Institutions for placement in a group care facility or other facility
as determined by the evaluation unit of that department. 9
Finally, the court may require, in combination with any of
the other alternatives, that the child pay for damage done to
persons or property, if such payment can be expected "without
serious hardship or injustice to the child."' 70
Because of the overwhelming importance of the dispositional
hearing, the weight given by the court to the probation counselor's recommendation in that hearing, and the vagueness of the
standards and guidelines of the formal law, each probation counselor interviewed was asked what factors he considered in making
recommendations and whether or not the court set any standards.
Considerations weighed by the various probation counselors
were the availability of placement facilities, whether the child is
a prospective repeater, whether he would be better helped in the
community or in his home situation, and the child's attitude.
Most probation counselors put little emphasis on the specific
offense committed and were more child-oriented than publicoriented. Even recommendations for a locked setting were viewed
in terms of protecting the child from himself rather than protecting the community from the child.
Prior to the completion of the court report the district attorney rarely communicates his views on disposition to the probation
Id. § 22-3-12(1)(e) (Supp. 1967).
Id. § 22-3-12(1)(f). This is assuming that somehow the court has determined that
even though the child needs inpatient treatment, he or she is not a mentally ill or mentally
deficient child requiring transfer to the probate court. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
19 Ch. 111, § 1, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 393, amending CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 223-12(1)(h) (Supp. 1967).
7' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-12(1)(g) (Supp. 1967).
117
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counselor. The activities of defense counsel, meanwhile, are governed to a great extent by his perception of his role at the critical
juncture of disposition. Attorneys who believe that the probation
counselor is the only person with the time and expertise to determine what is the child's best interest take a passive role. A more
active role is taken by those attorneys who feel that the child's
wishes must be made known to the counselor and that the counselor should be willing to adjust his recommendations to accommodate the wishes of the child insofar as possible. Any accommodation depends on the development of a positive relationship
between defense counsel and the probation counselor, and is, in
essence, dispositional bargaining. It may take the form of an
agreement, for example, to out-of-home placement through the
department of public welfare in exchange for an abandonment by
the probation counselor of his recommendation to commit to the
Department of Institutions. In this situation, the attorney's
objective is to help the child and probation counselor reach an
agreement which will facilitate the child's adjustment to whatever disposition is finally reached.
Alternately, counsel and the child may propose and justify
their own set of dispositional recommendations without consulting with the probation counselor. This most frequently occurs
when negotiation fails, or when the attorney or child feels that the
assigned probation counselor is either incompetent or not acting
in the best interest of the child. Because the probation counselor
is intended to perform the functions of referral for evaluation or
placement, gathering of school information, and arranging for
preplacement visits, this role is a difficult one for counsel to play.
Indeed he may find that he can obtain information which would
be given willingly to probation counselors only through courtordered discovery. Counsel may also find that while the probation
counselor would have no difficulty removing a child from detention for a preplacement visit, such a visit when arranged by the
child's attorney requires transportation and accompaniment by
a member of the sheriff's department.
Because of these system-imposed restraints, because most
attorneys who practice in juvenile court are somewhat unfamiliar
with the various possible dispositions, and because of heavy case
loads, few attorneys adopt an active role in pursuing dispositional
alternatives. Nevertheless, some, especially student interns with
few cases to handle, choose to negotiate. The approach adopted
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by the attorney dictates, to a great extent, the degree of adversariness in the dispositional hearing itself.'7'
Four of the more common dispositional alternatives are (1)
continued petition, (2) probation, (3) out-of-home placement
without commitment, and (4) commitment to the department of
institutions.
1.

Continued Adjudication of the Petition

Continued adjudication of the petition, "2 commonly called a
"continued petition" is usually granted in cases where a child's
infraction is minor, intensive supervision by the court is unnecessary, and treatment is either unnecessary or has been arranged
through a community resource without the need for a court order.
Continued petitions are also common when, prior to the dispositional hearing, a child has been placed in an out-of-home setting
and responds to it.
In these cases, the juvenile court probably should not have
exercised its jurisdiction at all. The continued petition allows the
court, without dismissing the petition, to continue jurisdiction
and supervision with a minimum of time and resources. Often a
continued petition is granted when a child is very young and the
court wishes to attempt treatment without the necessity of labeling the child as a CHINS or a delinquent, or when the child is
almost beyond the jurisdictional age of the court and has had an
'" A

brief discussion of the role of the attorney in juvenile court at the dispositional
stage is contained in the Counsel Table Feature, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile
Court, 42 CLEVELAND B.J. 127 (1971).
7I Though the alternative of a "continued petition" is not mentioned as a possibility
in the sections of the Children's Code dealing with the disposition because it cannot occur
after adjudication, it is outlined in the section on the adjudicatory hearing as follows:
(3)(a) After making a finding as provided by subsection (6)(a) of this section but before making an adjudication, the court may continue the hearing
from time to time, allowing the child to remain in his own home or in the
temporary custody of another person or agency subject to such conditions of
conduct and of visitation or supervision by a probation counselor as the court
may prescribe, if:
(b) Consent is given by the child and his parent, guardian, or other
legal custodian after being fully informed by the court of their rights in the
proceeding, including their rights to have an adjudication made either dismissing or sustaining the petition.
(c) Such continuation shall extend no longer than six months without
review by the court. Upon review the court may continue the case for an
additional period not to exceed six months, after which the petition shall
either be dismissed or sustained.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3.6(3) (Supp. 1971); COLO. R. Juv. P. 17(c).
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offense-free record prior to the incident at issue. The advantage
to the child of this dispositional alternative is that if there is no
further trouble the petition will be dismissed at the end of 6
months and there will be no adjudication noted on the child's
record.
The Code requirement that a review hearing be held within
6 months and that the adjudication be continued for no longer
than 1 year'7 3 is regularly followed by the court. However, Code
provisions making mandatory court advisement of the parent and
child of their specific right to have an adjudication made either
dismissing or sustaining the petition are rarely complied with.
Because most children given continued petitions have previously
entered pleas of admission to the allegations, the failure of advisement is of negligible effect, as most parties offered the right to
adjudication would certainly waive it.
Few continued petitions have been granted in the Denver
Juvenile Court since the Code was amended in 1973 to allow for
expungement of a child's record prior to the expiration of a 2-year
period if all parties consent.'
2.

Probation

The most common dispositional alternative recommended
by probation counselors and ordered by the court is probation, or
probation in combination with other alternatives.7 5 At least
1 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-6(3)(c) (Supp. 1971).
,7, Ch. 110, § 9, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 387, amending CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 221-11(2)(a) (Supp. 1969).
,15Probationary status is inconsistent with only two of the dispositional alternatives
discussed- continuation of the adjudication and commitment. In the former situation,
protective supervision, which is almost indistinguishable from probation except in name,
is given to the child. The most frequent combinations for adjudicated delinquents are
probation and restitution as provided in COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-12(1)(g) (Supp.
1967), probation and a fine, id. § 22-3-13(1)(c) (Supp. 1971), probation and psychological
counseling, id. § 22-3-12(1)(f) (Supp. 1967), and probation and the intervention of a
Partner, supra at note 91. While probation in combination with psychological counseling
or Partners is also common for adjudicated CHINS, the nature of CHINS problems makes
probation in combination with out-of-home placement with relatives or in a group care
facility more common for this type of child. Out-of-home placement without commitment
is discussed in the following subsection. CHINS dispositions often include as well orders
of protection under id. § 22-3-10 (Supp. 1967) and COLO. R. Juv. P. 48, which orders may
set forth reasonable conditions of behavior to be observed by the parent or guardian of
the child. Protective orders may prescribe conditions of visitation between parent and
child, conditions of cooperation with an involved agency, support orders, or orders requiring improved "parenting." Violation of protective orders subjects the parents to civil
contempt of court proceedings.
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three-fourths of the children appearing before the Denver Juvenile Court for disposition are placed or continued on probation.
Those who are denied probationary status are children whose
offenses are very serious and who are perceived to be a real menace to the community, or those who are in desperate need of
intensive treatment and whose runaway patterns indicate they
will not remain in an open setting. Both types of children are
generally committed to the Department of Institutions for placement in a locked facility.
If a child is placed on probation,' 6 the terms and conditions
of that probation are to be specified by orders of the court, given
to the child in written form, and explained fully to the child and
his parents by the court or the probation counselor.'"
The Code provides for a maximum period of probation of 2
years'7 8 and a mandatory review of the terms and conditions of
probation at least once every 6 months.'79 On the basis of such
review hearings, the court may either modify the terms and conditions of probation or release the child from probationary status.1o
There are virtually no guidelines in the formal or administrative law specifying the responsibilities of the probation counselor
to his probationer. Probation counselors are admonished to keep
themselves informed of the conduct and condition of children
placed under their supervision, to keep complete records of all
work done, and to "use all suitable methods including counseling
to aid each child under [their] supervision."' 8 ' Because failure
of the child on probationary status may indicate failure of the
counselor to meet even the minimum standards of contact and
supervision, because probation is such a common form of disposition, and because revocation of probation often results in commitment, the formulation of standards of probationary supervision
would seem desirable.
In practice, probationers who continue to have problems reCOLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3-12(1)(b), (c) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 22(a).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3-18(1), -5-5(2) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 22(a).
17 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-18(2)(b) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 22(c). See
text accompanying notes 230-36 infra for discussion of revocation of problem.
2
'17COLO. REV. STAT. AN.. § 2-3-18(2)(a) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 22(b). See
discussion of subsequent hearings to review placement or probationary status, supra notes
221-36 and accompanying text.
COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-18(2)(b) (Supp. 1967); COLO.R. Juv. P. 22(b).
178
'"

'~'

COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. §

22-5-5(3) (Supp. 1967).
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ceive attention, and those who do not may never feel the responsibilities of probationary status. The probation counselors who
were interviewed recognized the limited extent of the supervision
given by field probation counselors. The majority felt that the
field probation officer is burdened by a shortage of facilities, a
heavy caseload, and an excessive amount of paper work, all of
which combined to prevent him from providing adequate supervision, carrying through with established treatment plans, and
meeting with the child in the community.
Probation can form the basis for a successful completion of
a child's involvement with the juvenile court, or, if he violates the
terms and conditions of his probation, for increased court involvement through a revocation of probation petition. If the court
grants probation in lieu of incarceration, it is an act of grace
within its discretion. 8 2 Whether or not the child falls from grace
depends on the child and the effectiveness of his probation counselor.
3.

Out-of-Home Placement without Commitment

When a child's home situation is a substantial cause of his
delinquent or CHINS behavior, out-of-home placement without
commitment is often the first dispositional alternative attempted. It is often the second alternative when probation while
living in the home has failed because of family pressures.
Because the Code states that children removed from their
parents should be given "the necessary care, guidance, and discipline to assist [them] in becoming responsible and productive
member[s] of society,"' 83 a determination of the type of out-ofhome placement best suited to fulfill that purpose is essential.
The court may place the child with a relative or other suitable
person,'8 4 such as a friend or neighbor. The court may also place
the child in a foster or family care home, 185 a child care facility
or center, 8 ' a group care facility or home,8 7 a half-way house,M
In re D.S., 31 Colo. App. 300, 502 P.2d 95 (1972).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-2(1)(e) (Supp. 1967).
Id. § 22-3-12(1)(c) (Supp. 1967).
Id. "Family home care" is defined in ch. 340, § 15, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 1224.
''
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-12(1)(e) (Supp. 1967). "Child care center" is defined
in ch. 340, § 15, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 1224.
"I CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-12(1)(e) (Supp. 1967).
12
"

189 Id.
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or temporarily in a hospital or mental health center. 8 '
Placement without the intervention of a placement agency is
most often accomplished when the family agrees with the recommendation of out-of-home placement, does not interfere with it,
and there are no funding problems. Otherwise, a recommendation
may be made to the court that it transfer legal custody 90 from the
parents to the county department of public welfare,' 9' or to another child placement agency. 9 ' Transfer of legal custody, like
commitment, is for an indeterminate period not to exceed 2 years
and must be reviewed by the court within 6 months.9 3 It is
usually accompanied by appropriate protective orders to the parents concerning, inter alia, visitation, support, and mandates to
cooperate with the agency."'
Once the type of placement best suited to a child's needs and
the desirability of a transfer of custody have been decided, the
difficult problem of funding the placement must be faced. If
placement is with a relative, funding often can be arranged voluntarily. However, because out-of-home group placements for adolescents cost from $150 to $2,000 per month,9 5 the great majority
of parents of children exposed to the Denver Juvenile Court cannot make a significant contribution toward the cost.
If either parent is an active or retired member of the military,
C.H.A.M.P.A.S. will pay for treatment at specified facilities.
Some placements, such as Job Corps or L.E.A.A. funded facilities, are entirely financed by the federal government if the child
meets the criteria for admission. There are also some facilities
sponsored by private foundations which require no financial contribution by the child if admission criteria are met. With most
out-of-home group placements, however, the sources of funding
in Denver are the Denver Department of Public Welfare or the
Colorado Department of Institutions. In the past, the department
IN Id. §
92

22-3-12(1)(f) (Supp. 1967).
Id. §§ 22-1-3(6)(a), (9) (Supp. 1967).
Id. § 22-3-12(1)(e) (Supp. 1967).
Id. "Child placement agency" is defined in ch. 340, § 15, [19731 Colo. Sess. Laws

1224.
"3 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-15(4)(a) (Supp. 1967).
194 Id. § 22-3-10 (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 48. Parental rights and responsibilities
which remain after legal custody of the child has been transferred are defined in COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-3(8) (Supp. 1967).
" Forest Heights Lodge, a sophisticated residential psychiatric treatment facility, is
on the upper end of the cost spectrum.
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of institutions had been able to fund placements for noncommitted children through a special federal grant for that purpose, but
since July 1, 1973, when the grant expired, only children committed to the legal custody of the department may be placed and
financially maintained by it.' 6 Excluding parental, federal government, or private support, the largest single source of funding
for out-of-home placements of noncommitted children in Denver
is the department of welfare.
When a probation counselor senses the need for out-of-home
placement financed by the department of welfare, he may refer
the cases to child welfare for placement. Although, statutorily,
" 'child welfare services' means the provision of necessary shelter,
sustenance, and guidance to or for children who are or who, if
such services are not provided, are likely to become 'delinquent',
'neglected or dependent', or 'in need of supervision' "17 and although all children referred to child welfare for placement by
their probation counselors fit that definition, there are many children whose cases are "not accepted" by child welfare or who are
accepted for family counseling but not for placement. If this occurs, the probation counselor must investigate the placement and
request at the dispositional hearing that the department of welfare be ordered to become involved, either by paying for placement of a particular child in a particular facility or by being given
legal custody of the child. 9 '
If child welfare accepts the referral of a case from a probation
I, Ch. 112, § 2, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 395.
1,7Ch. 340, § 3, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 1195.
"I Conflicts regarding the legal interpretation of the juvenile court's power to issue
such orders, and regarding the differing views of the professionals in the court and in the
department of welfare concerning the needs of a particular child resulted in a Colorado
Supreme Court opinion issued in 1973. The court found in City & County of Denver v.
Juvenile Court, 511 P.2d 898, 901 (Colo. 1973) that:
[TIhere can be no doubt that the juvenile court has the power and the duty
to make such determinations as it deems appropriate regarding the custody
and care of a child adjudicated to be within its exclusive jurisdiction ...
When the general assembly said that "this chapter shall be liberally construed," it meant that it should be construed favorably to the best interests
of the child and society. It is the juvenile court's responsibility to determine
what that may be on a case by case basis.
Conflicts between the court and the Denver Department of Public Welfare are not far from
the stage of open warfare, regardless of the statutorily mandated cooperation and the
presumed desire of each to serve the best interest of the child and the community. Cooperation is achieved between individual probation counselors and individual child welfare
workers in particular cases, but administratively the two public bodies are tragically at
odds.
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counselor, if the child welfare worker and the counselor agree on
a specific placement and award of legal custody, if the department of welfare agrees to fund the placement, and if the facility
has an opening and the child meets the admission criteria, the
social worker and counselor can make a joint placement recommendation to the court. Absent persuasive opposition by counsel,
or the child and his family, this recommendation will almost
always be accepted and ordered by the court. Given the possible
conflict with the department of welfare, the difficulty in finding
an appropriate and available placement facility, and the necessity of justifying the selection, many probation counselors recommend either probation, even if out-of-home placement might be
more appropriate to the child's needs, or commitment, which
transfers responsibility for finding out-of-home placement to the
evaluation personnel of the department of institutions.
If the court orders out-of-home placement at a particular
facility, the child will be placed or continued on probation and,
in many cases, moved immediately to his new home. Unless the
child has participated in a preplacement visit to the facility, the
move is a traumatic one usually involving change of neighborhoods, if not communities, and of schools.
4.

Commitment to the Department of Institutions

The final, and most severe, dispositional alternative is commitment to the Colorado Department of Institutions. Commitment requires a transfer of legal custody from the parents, guardian, or agency custodian to the department.
Children adjudicated as either CHINS or delinquents may
be committed to the department of institutions and placed by the
department as provided by law.'9 9 The court may not dictate the
specific placement to be made, although it may recommend either a specific type of placement, e.g. a youth camp, or a specific
placement, e.g. Lookout Mountain School for Boys. A former
legislator and juvenile court judge explains the rationale behind
this centralized commitment procedure:
In 1962, as a legislator, I was trying to get ready for having more
institutions in our state [than Lookout Mountain School for Boys
and Mount View Girls' School], and so I looked at the California
Youth Authority concept and wrote in a provision which was passed,
M"Ch. 111, § 1, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 393, amending CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 223-12(1)(h), (i) (Supp. 1967).

PRACTICES OF DENVER JUVENILE COURT
saying when the judge commits, he commits to the department of
institutions and not to any particular institution. I was trying to
develop the concept that the judge did not have the power to designate the institution. . . .So it was recognized, based on California,
that not every kid who certain judges would [commit] would have
to be institutionalized, and gave authority to the state department
of institutions to spin kids around right away. We know that there
are very discrepant commitment bases-a judge in a rural area with
no services at all will [commit] a very moderate offender instead
of only the most sophisticated offenders.

There have been problems in the Denver Juvenile Court with
the centralized commitment procedure. Sometimes the court has
been incensed when its recommendations have been ignored, and
defense counsel have argued that the court has the nondelegable2 0 responsibility to "secure for each child . . . such care and
guidance . . .as will best serve his welfare ....
Nevertheless, commitment to the department of institutions
now offers the broadest range of placement alternatives on account of the facilities administered by the department itself and
the department's service contracts with many varied private
treatment facilities.
Most children who appear before the Denver Juvenile Court
think of commitment as placement at Mount View Girls' School
or Lookout Mountain School for Boys,20 2 which are closed facilities offering academic training and group living based on a vari-3
ety of behavior modification models. These training schools,20
were once properly called reform schools and fit that definition-custodial penal institutions for young offenders. In the last
few years, however, both schools, but especially Mount View,
have excelled in providing innovative treatment under the most
difficult of circumstances.
The child's misconceptions notwithstanding, commitment
may mean placement at the schools, the youth camps for boys, 204
the closed adolescent treatment center, various preparole release
homes and ranches administered by the Division of Youth ServANN. § 22-1-2(1)(b) (Supp. 1967).
It would seem that this argument has been mooted by the Colorado Supreme
Court's holding that "the [juvenile] court may delegate responsibility for placement."
Denver v. Juvenile Court, 511 P.2d 898, 901 (Colo. 1973).
20o COLO. REv. STAT.
2"'

"

2
2

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-8-7(2),-8-6(2) (Supp. 1971).
Id. § 22-1-3(25) (Supp. 1967).
Id. § 22-8-8 (Supp. 1967).
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ices of the Colorado Department of Institutions, or one of the
numerous private facilities, both in and out of state, with which
the department contracts for the placement of children commit05
ted to its legal custody.
For delinquent boys over 16 years of age, commitment may
also entail placement at the state reformatoly, 00 the most secure
setting available for juveniles. For any committed child it may
2 7
mean release on parole following evaluation.
The drawbacks to the dispositional alternative of commitment are that it necessarily transfers legal custody, usually removes the child from his community, and offers the possibility of
a locked institutional setting for a period of up to 2 years.20 8 Nevertheless, some probation counselors, unwilling to wait for the
provision of community based services and having little time to
counsel their probationers, recommend and receive court orders
for commitment. Most probation counselors, however, still seem
to favor community based treatment when it is feasible, and view
commitment as a last resort.0 9
Court approval is a prerequisite to the placement of CHINS
at Lookout Mountain School for Boys or Mount View Girls'
School.2 10 If the department's evaluation indicates that the "child
requires placement in a state facility for the mentally ill or mentally deficient . . . [the department] shall place the child in the
appropriate facility'"" and, when the committing court is Denver
205

Id. § 22-8-10 (Supp. 1967).

' Id. § 22-3-13(1)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1969); id. § 22-8-16 (Supp. 1969).

Id. § 22-8-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1967).
"I Commitment of CHINS is "for an indeterminate period not to exceed two years."
Id. § 22-3-14(3)(a) (Supp. 1967), while commitment of delinquents is "for an indeterminate period, but institutional placement shall not exceed a total of two years." Id. § 22-314(3)(b)(i) (Supp. 1969). Upon petition by the department to the committing court, commitment of CHINS or delinquents can be extended for an additional period not to exceed
two years if the petition sets forth sufficient reasons why such extension would be in the
best interest of the child or of the public. Id. § 22-3-14(3) (Supp. 1967).
2" One field probation supervisor interviewed stated:
[W]hen you separate them from the community, no matter what they learn,
sometimes they will come back into the community and have the same type
of problem and get involved in the same type of thing. . . .[M~y feeling is
to try to work it out and keep it in the community as long as possible. Then
if it doesn't work, I find that confinement with care is the next best thing.
210 Ch. 111, § 6, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 394, amending CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 228-17(2) (Supp. 1971). No such approval is necessary for committed delinquents.
211 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-8-3(3)(a) (Supp. 1967).
21
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405

to transfer the case to the
Juvenile Court, shall petition that court
22

probate court for a civil commitment. 1
A dispositional order of commitment effectively terminates
the child's relationship with the Denver Juvenile Court, even

though the court retains jurisdiction over him2 31 and even though
the court may require the department at any time to provide
information concerning the child. 21 Probation counselors are
rarely ordered to continue a relationship with a child, although
some do. Nor do attorneys in most cases attempt to keep in touch
with the child. 1 5
If the probation counselor, counsel, and child engage in a
thorough discussion of dispositional alternatives prior to the dispositional hearing, the counselor's recommendations will usually
be uncontested. On the other hand, if the attorney does not receive the court report until the morning of the hearing, and if
neither he nor the probation counselor explains the recommendation to the child, the hearing may be difficult for all parties.
Dispositional hearings are conducted informally as provided
in the Code." 6 The probation counselor introduces the case and
the parties, after which counsel consents to the jurisdiction of the
court if the hearing is being held before a referee, and usually
22 Id. § 22-8-3(3)(b) (Supp. 1967). The department has authority to transfer children

committed to its custody to state facilities for the mentally ill or mentally retarded only
for a period not to exceed 60 days and only for evaluation or emergency treatment, unless
the transfer is followed by a probate commitment. Id. § 22-8-4(4)(a) to -(c) (Supp. 1967).
The one exception to this rule is the closed adolescent treatment center which is a closed
psychiatric facility operated by the department under an L.E.A.A. grant. Children in need
of psychiatric treatment may be placed in that facility without commitment through the
probate court.
213 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-19 (Supp. 1967).
2 Id. § 22-3-14(I)(b) (Supp. 1967).
2 This abandonment of the child by those who have worked with him or her is
described in the following lament by a former presiding judge of the Denver Juvenile
Court:
The important thing is that our court knows this child-our officers have
studied that child from beginning to end, heard the case, and I think we
should . . . track that child, if you will. I want the probation officers to
follow that child. Now the policy has been that once there is a commitment
to the department of institutions, the probation counselor phases out. That
is not right. That counselor should stay right in there and keep the court
advised-keep themselves advised-as to the progress of the child. They
should participate in the staffings that are held by the department of institutions.
211 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-7(1)(b) (Supp. 1967).
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waives a formal advisement by the court of the child's rights.'"
The probation counselor then reads, summarizes, or explains the
information contained in the court report, his recommendations,
and his justification for them. Probation counselors rarely call on
other persons to testify or concur. Hearsay testimony is almost
always readily accepted by the court.
The district attorney and counsel for the child may crossexamine the probation counselor. The more extensive examination is generally made by counsel for the child and usually seeks
to determine whether the recommendations of the counselor do
best serve the interests of the child, whether other alternatives
were considered and why they were rejected, and whether additional alternatives could or should be included in the recommendations." ' If the counselor testifies as to the psychological problems and needs of the child, counsel may question his qualifications. However, unless it is obvious that the probation counselor
is incompetent or has prepared an inadequate social study or
court report, the court may protect him from rigorous crossexamination.
Each side also has the opportunity to cross-examine the authors of any other reports submitted to the court and to present
its own evidence."1 9 The court usually wishes to hear the testi"I It should be remembered that because the dispositional hearing in the Denver
Juvenile Court is almost always the adjudicatoryhearing as well, a full advisement should
be given to the child by counsel or the court. The advisement at this stage should also
include advisement of the child's right to request a new hearing under COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 22-3-17 (Supp. 1967), and COLO. R. Civ. P. 50. Finally, the court or counsel for the
child should inform the child that adjudication in the juvenile court does not impose any
civil disabilities upon him or disqualify him from civil or military service application or
appointment, or from holding public office, nor can the adjudication, disposition or evidence given in juvenile court hearings be used in any other hearings except further hearings in juvenile court. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-9 (Supp. 1967).
"I For example, the additional recommendation of a referral to Partners is often
suggested by counsel and adopted by the probation counselor.
219Counsel may legitimately request a continuance of the dispositional hearing if a
copy of the social study or court report is not received at least 48 hours prior to the hearing,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-9(3)(a) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 20(c); if counsel feels
more tests or reports are necessary, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-9(3)(a) (Supp. 1967); or
if the authors of reports to be considered by the court in making its dispositional orders
are not available for cross-examination, id. §§ 22-1-8(2),(3) (Supp. 1967). If the hearing
is continued, the court must make appropriate orders for the release or continued detention of the child pending the rescheduling of the hearing. Id. § 22-3-9(3)(b) (Supp. 1967).
Even though the dispositional hearings of detained children are given priority on the
docket, id. § 22-3-9(3)(c) (Supp. 1967), counsel for the child may often waive the child's
right to a continuance if it would mean continued detention in suspense, and a delay of
treatment for the child.
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mony of the child and his parents. Counsel may make closing
statements, following which the court announces its findings and
recommendations or orders.
The advisability of predispositional hearing consultation
with the probation counselor is demonstrated in that eight out of
ten of the court's dispositional orders adopt exactly, or with only
minor modifications, the probation counselor's recommendations.
If the child is committed to the department of institutions,
a copy of the commitment order, or mittimus, is signed by the
court and given to the sheriff, who takes or returns the child for
evaluation to Denver Juvenile Hall, the receiving center for the
department of institutions. There is never a review hearing in
commitment cases.
This description of the dispositional hearing does not suggest
the tension and impersonality which are often present. The director of field probation services for the court has commented on
these aspects as follows:
One of the inadequacies of the system is that you work in a vacuum
a lot-the whole court room scene is working in a vacuum. You are
making decisions based on data, impressions, and attitudes that you
are getting that do not belong to the actual happenings.
[I]t's like psychiatry. You are sitting in a room simulating life to
try to determine what to do about it. You are sitting in a courtroom
simulating [an] individual's life, simulating what his problems are,
diagnosing them, and recommending treatment. You are really
working in a think tank; you are working in a made-up situation...
where generally what the kid's whole life is about is told . . . by
people other than himself. . . . [Y]ou rarely hear much from either
[the] family or the kid, and then you are really making decisions
in a vacuum as to the treatment of the kid, based on what other
people say the treatment is all about ....
[W]e are shooting in the
dark like everybody else is.

Following the dispositional hearing, the regular sessions of
most children with the Denver Juvenile Court are over. They
2
need anticipate only review hearings.
The rehearing and appellate processes available to the child in the Denver Juvenile
Court will not be discussed, as they are almost identical to those in the adult system.
Suffice it to say that appellate review of discretionary decisions made by a juvenile judge
"in the best interest of the child and the public" is almost never successful for the child.
See In re M.T. & G. McL., 508 P.2d 417 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973).
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Subsequent Hearings to Review Placement or Probationary
Status

Review hearings before the Denver Juvenile Court examine
placement or other terms and conditions of probation, or are held
on formal petition to consider the modification or revocation of a
child's probation. By the first review hearink, the court and probation counselor can almost always determine whether the disposition is in the best interest of the child, or whether the court must
again try to refashion his life. If the review is a plea on a probation
revocation petition, the court process will begin again.
The Code mandates certain types of review hearings. If a
child is placed on probation as a result of the dispositional hearing, the court must "review the terms and conditions of probation
and the progress of each child placed on probation at least once
every six months."'2 Similarly, a court hearing seems required to
modify the terms and conditions of probation, 2 2 release the child
from probationary status, 22 or terminate the jurisdiction of the
224
court prior to the child's 21st birthday.
If a transfer of legal custody was part of the dispositional
decree, it is valid for a period not to exceed 2 years, and the decree
must "be reviewed by the court no later than 6 months after it is
entered. 2 5 Modification or termination of the decree transferring
legal custody, 221including extension of the 2-year limitation, must
be by court order.m
The requirements for mandatory review are not always met.
Often children are placed for longer than 2 years, petitions for
revocation of probation have been filed long after the expiration
of the 2-year probationary period, and the department of institutions has funded placements of children whose commitments are
no longer valid. Both the court and the department of institutions
seem to lack a good followup system for informing the counselor
in charge when a hearing should be set.
"I' Cow. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-18(2)(a) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 22(b).

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-18(2)(b) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 23(a). But
see id.24(d).

" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-18(2)(b) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 22(c).
14 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-19 (Supp. 1967).
2 Id.
§ 2 2 -3-15(4)(a) (Supp. 1967). Transfer of legal custody to the department of
institutions is exempted from this subsection.

COLO. R. Juv. P. 23.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-15(4)(b) (Supp. 1967). Extension of the 2-year com-

mitment period must also be by court order. Id. § 22-3-14(3) (Supp. 1967).
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Reviews of probation and jurisdiction hearings are conducted
in "nonappearance hearings" in which a probation counselor, ex
parte and with notice to no one, appears before the court, informs
the court of a child's progress, and recommends continuation or
termination of his probationary status. The child's right to appear at hearings held in his interest is diminished and, if probation and jurisdiction are to be terminated, his right to apply for
expungement of his record prior to the expiration of a 2-year
period on the consent of all parties is negated.22 He loses the
opportunity to appear before the court as a "success story" and
to be advised again, or perhaps for the first time, of the general
expungement procedures and that no civil disabilities have been
imposed on him.229 Most seriously, continuing a child on probation on the recommendation of his probation counselor, with the
child and his attorney unable to offer evidence in support of the
termination of probation and jurisdiction, is arguably a denial of
due process. It is therefore suggested that the nonappearance
review be used only if counsel and all parties have been notified
of the hearing and its purpose, and have waived in writing the
rights associated with it.
Review hearings with all parties present are generally very
informal and are used primarily to keep the court informed of the
child's progress. If a modification of the terms and conditions of
probation or a change in placement is recommended, it is usually
the joint recommendation of all concerned. If there is disagreement, the probation counselor will seek to substantiate his recommendation by filing a formal petition alleging violations of the
terms and conditions of probation or of specific statutes. 20 The
case will then be docketed for a revocation of probation plea
hearing, rather than a review hearing.
The rights of the child at a hearing to modify or revoke probation are similar to his rights at his first hearing before the
court2 3' with a few notable exceptions. There is no right to a jury
trial in a revocation or modification of probation proceeding as
-- Ch. 110, § 9, [19731 Colo. Sess. Laws 387, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 221-11(2)(a) (Supp. 1967).
I" COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-1-9 (Supp. 1967).
2 0 Id. § 22-3-18(3) (Supp. 1967); COLO. R. Juv. P. 24. The discretion practiced in
original filings is also present in decisions to file modification or revocation of probation
petitions.
21 See notes 59-67 supra and accompanying text.
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the child has already been adjudicated. 32 A recent case, moreover, has held that revocation of probation hearings may be conducted in an informal manner as provided in the Code, and that
in such hearings the juvenile court is not bound by the traditional
rules of evidence.233 In a later case, the same court concluded that
since hearings to revoke probation are not adjudicatory in nature,
the judge need only apprise himself of facts which convince him
that the conditions of probation have been violated. Proof of any
violation of law is sufficient to revoke probation, even if the proof
does not correspond exactly to the specifics in the petition.3
Proof by a preponderance seems to be the Colorado standard in
probation revocation hearings.
If the court finds no violation of probation, the child continues under the original terms and conditions of probation. 23 5 If the
court finds that the child has violated terms and conditions of
probation, the court in essence returns to the dispositional stage,
may request an updated court report, and may take any action
3
permitted by the dispositional sections of the Code. 1
The child has come the full circle. Whether he is released
from probation or is facing a probation revocation, the juvenile
justice maze through which he has come has been arduous and
painful. Those searching for "what is in the child's best interest"
might agree that the child himself, rather than the juvenile court
system, is the greater source of guidance.
"ICOLO.

R. Juv. P. 24(b).
In re B.L.M., 31 Colo. App. 106, 500 P.2d 146 (1972).
11 In re D.S., 31 Colo. App. 300, 502 P.2d 95 (1972).
' CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-18(3)(d)(iii) (Supp. 1967).
I" See generally, id. §§ 22-3-9, -3-12, -3-13 (Supp. 1967). If the petition for revocation
13

of probation is sustained, the court may revoke the probation of either a CHINS or a
delinquent who is over the age of 18 years and may sentence him to the county jail for a
period not to exceed three months. Id. § 22-3-18(3)(e) (Supp. 1969); Ch. 110, § 22, [1973]
Colo. Sess. Laws 392, amending CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-13(1)(b) (Supp. 1969).
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NOTE
STUDENT EXPRESSION ON CAMPUS AND INTERFERENCE
WITH THE "RIGHTS OF OTHERS"
INTRODUCTION

October 15, 1969 was a date historically distinguished by the
first Vietnam Moratorium. On this occasion college students and
others around the nation observed a suspension of normal activities as a means of emphasizing their opposition to the American
role in the Vietnam War. Many students chose to manifest their
dissent in symbolic fashion by wearing black armbands to school,
and their right to do so ultimately became the subject of litigation
in several localities. Given the applicable case law relating to
administrative restriction of student protest, the response of the
courts was predictable in its vindication of this form of expression
wherever there was reason to anticipate it would have minimal
disruptive potential.'
On the campus of the University of Wyoming a different kind
of conviction gave rise to a contemporaneous protest which likewise was expressed symbolically and resulted in legal action.2 In
this instance, however, the object of the protest was the racial
policy of the Mormon Church, which prohibits black members
from becoming church officers or rising to the priesthood.' Viewing this as a deliberate relegation to second-class status, black
students at Wyoming initiated a plan to publicize their opposi'Compare Butts v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971) (wearing
of armbands on Moratorium Day protected) with Hill v. Lewis, 323 F. Supp. 55 (E.D.N.C.
1971) (wearing of armbands on Moratorium Day prohibited because of large enrollment
of students from military families and resultant potential for violence).
2
Williams v. Eaton, 310 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Wyo. 1970), vacated in part, 443 F.2d 422
(10th Cir. 1971), 333 F. Supp. 107 (D. Wyo. 1971), afl'd, 468 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir. 1972).
'Note, Wearing of Black Armbands by State University Football Players Would Violate Establishment of Religion Clause, 19 KAN. L. REV. 316, 321 (1969), citing CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF THE LATTER DAY SAINTS, DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS § 116 (1960). As summarized here by a quotation from the New York Times, blacks are "figuratively relegated
to the back pew." N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1965, at 15, col. 1.
This is apparently the only other published comment on the legal issues arising out
of the Wyoming armband protest. Although three other decisions were rendered in
Williams subsequent to the publication of the article, it remains a useful source for the
researcher, particularly on the jurisdictional and procedural issues of the case. See
.generally Comment, The Authority of a College Coach: A Legal Analysis, 49 ORE. L. REv.
442 (1970).
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tion in conjunction with an upcoming football game to be played
on October 18, 1969 with Brigham Young University, a school
owned and operated by the Mormon Church.
In anticipation of this occasion, the Black Student Alliance
at Wyoming drafted a letter to William D. Carlson, President of
the University, and Lloyd Eaton, head football coach, articulating its objection to the scheduling of athletic contests with
Brigham Young, and calling for others to offer symbolic support
to this position by "a black arm band worn throughout any contest involving BYU." 4 This letter was subsequently published by
the school newspaper and the campus community was thereby
made aware of the planned protest.
On Friday, October 17, a group of 14 black football players
met with Coach Eaton to discuss their intention to wear armbands during the game the next day. Since they were already
wearing armbands, however, Eaton dismissed them from the
team for violation of a coaching rule which prohibited participation by Wyoming football players in any protest or demonstration. 5 An emergency meeting of the Board of Trustees of the uni'Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 3, 4, Williams v. Eaton, 468 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir.
1972).
5
According to Coach Eaton, campus protest "was getting to be quite a popular thing,"
and so he imposed this coaching rule to "be prepared for it" and "keep our young men
out of it," since "they are here to get an education .... " Id. at 49. In essence, Eaton
"told them that it was not 'Cowboy football' to protest or demonstrate, meaning that they
should not deviate from the main group." Id. at 6.
In that this coaching rule purported to restrict important first amendment rights and
applied to players even when they were off the field, it would appear clearly invalid as a
prior restraint, especially since no criteria were set up to determine its applicability in a
given case and no procedural safeguards were established for review of the coach's decision.
At the trial, Eaton sought to explain the rule by reference to the need for unity on a
football team. Id. at 50. In this instance, however, administrative regulation in the interest
of "unity" would seem to be merely a prescription for the abridgment of student athletes'
freedom of speech. See Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 59-60 (4th Cir. 1971); Vail v.
Board of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592, 597-98 (D.N.H. 1973): "The regulation assailed by the
plaintiffs is a blanket prohibition . . . .It does not reflect any reasonable, constitutional
standards of the First Amendment as applied to the orderly administration of high school
activities."; Dunn v. Tyler Indep. School Dist., 327 F. Supp. 528, 533 (E.D. Tex. 1971):
"The regulation in issue here fails . . . [the required precision of regulation], since it
arbitrarily prohibits all boycotts, sit-ins, stand-ins, and walk-outs without limiting its
proscription to such activities involving misconduct or those which present a material and
substantial disruption of the educational environment."; Hammond v. South Carolina
State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967); Aldrich, Freedom of Expression in Secondary Schools, 19 CLEV. STATE L. REv. 165, 169 n.20 (1970); Nahmod, Black Arm Bands and
Underground Newspapers: Freedom of Speech in the Public Schools, 51 CHI. B. REc. 144,
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versity was then convened for that evening, and this body upheld
the dismissal of the players after a complete review of the facts.
As the basis for their action, the board members reasoned that
the players were irrevocably committed to wearing their armbands during the game, and that the constitutional mandate of
separation of church and state prohibited university accession to
this action.6
The athletes then filed a civil rights suit7 in the United States
District Court for the District of Wyoming, naming various officials of the university as defendants and praying for a temporary
restraining order to have themselves reinstated to the team. In
addition, they sought damages, permanent injunctive relief, and
a declaratory judgment to the effect that the actions of the defedants had abridged their constitutional right of free expression.
Upon an evidentiary hearing, the temporary restraining order was
denied, and the court subsequently granted defendants' motion
to dismiss as to the other claims.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the judgment of the district court with respect to the
dismissal of claims against the State of Wyoming and the claims
for money damages against the named State officers. The judgment was vacated, however, with respect to the dismissal of
claims against State officers for equitable and declaratory relief,
and further proceedings were ordered.' On remand, the district
court held that "[t]he rights of the Plaintiffs to freedom of
speech . . . cannot be held paramount to the rights of others to
practice their religion free from state-supported protest ... " and
again dismissed the complaint. 9
148 (1969); Van Alstyne, The Student as University Resident, 45 DE~vER L.J. 582, 593 n.24
(1968): "[Clolleges should be most clear and confined and provide for the least general
administrative discretion with respect to rules applied to first amendment interests ....
Vague, overly broad, or standardless rules in this area are regarded as unconstitutional
per se due to their chilling effect on these preferred freedoms."; Developments in the
Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045, 1131 (1968): Hammond "made it clear
that a rule requiring prior administration approval of all campus demonstrations was an
unconstitutional restraint on student first amendment rights; a fortiori, a fiat ban on all
campus demonstrations would be impermissible." (emphasis added).
'Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 14, 15, Williams v. Eaton, 468 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir.
1972).
'Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
'Williams v. Eaton, 310 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Wyo. 1970).
'Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1971).
"Williams v. Eaton, 333 F. Supp. 107, 115 (D. Wyo. 1971) (emphasis added). The
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Upon a renewed appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld the trial
court on two disputed factual interpretations." It then observed
that "stemming from state and federal law there is strong support
for a policy restricting hostile expressions against religious beliefs
of others by representatives of a state or its agencies.""2 For this
reason, the, court continued, it would be unnecessary to decide
"whether approval of the armband display would have involved
state action or a violation of the religion clauses," since the university's decision was a "reasonable regulation of expression" in
the interest of "protect[ing] against invasion of the rights of
others by avoiding a hostile expression to them by some members
of the University team."' 3 In accordance with this holding, the
decision of the trial court was affirmed.
I. THE STANDARD FOR STUDENT EXPRESSION
As authority for its emphasis on protecting the "rights of
others" in Williams, the Tenth Circuit relied on Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District.4 Since Tinker
serves as the landmark decision on student expression, the rule
established there was clearly controlling as to the legal issues
presented in Williams. In order fully to understand that rule,
however, it is necessary first to discuss two Fifth Circuit cases,
court also found that under the bylaws of the National Collegiate Athletic Association, it
was no longer possible to reinstate the plaintiffs to the team, since by this time (2 years
after the .incident) they had all either exhausted their eligibility or left the university. It
should be noted, however, that "[wihen controversies present what are essentially recurring issues of public interest they are not mooted because the most recent particular
occasion for consideration of the issue has come and gone." Women Strike for Peace v.
Hickel, 420 F.2d 597, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
"The facts in dispute were: (1) the contention by plaintiffs that one of the reasons
for wearing the armbands was to protest alleged name-calling and "cheap shots" in the
previous year's game with Brigham Young, and (2) the plaintiffs' disagreement with
testimony by various school officials that the athletes had refused to play again for the
University of Wyoming so long as Eaton remained football coach. Williams v. Eaton, 468
F.2d 1079, 1081-83 (10th Cir. 1972).
"Id. at 1083.
"Id. at 1084 (emphasis added).
14393 U.S. 503 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Tinker v. Des Moines]. The Tinker protest
was initiated in December, 1965 by three children (ages 13-15), who testified that their
"purpose in wearing the arm bands was to mourn those who had died in the Viet Nam
war and to support Senator Robert F. Kennedy's proposal that the truce proposed for
Christmas Day, 1965 be extended indefinitely." Their plans had become known to school
officials in advance, and a regulation was adopted "prohibiting the wearing of armbands
on school premises." 258 F. Supp. 971, 972 (S.D. Iowa 1966). When the students chose to
wear the bands despite the regulation, they were suspended and "did not return to school
until after the planned period for wearing armbands had expired ....
" 393 U.S. at 504.
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Burnside v. Byars'5 and Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of
6 on which Tinker
Education,"
was primarily based.
In Burnside, the Fifth Circuit had considered the right of
black students at a segregated Mississippi high school to wear
"freedom buttons" on school property "as a means of silently
communicating an idea and to encourage the members of their
community to exercise their civil rights [of registration and voting].""7 The school administration had responded by enacting a
regulation which prohibited the wearing of political buttons by
students, because such insignia "didn't have any bearing on their
education" and might create a commotion. 8 The court, however,
reasoned that "[tihe right to communicate a matter of vital
public concern is embraced in the First Amendment right to freedom of speech and therefore is clearly protected against infringement by state officials,"'" except where "the exercise of such
rights in the school buildings and schoolrooms . . . materially
and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school." 2 And since here
"the presence of 'freedom buttons' did not hamper the school in
carrying on its regular schedule of activities,"2 the disciplinary
regulation was enjoined.
Although decided by the same court on the same day and
based on a factual situation comparable to that in Burnside,
Blackwell reached a different conclusion. There, several months
after the Burnside protest, black students at a neighboring high
school again wore "freedom buttons." This time, however, the
students "conducted themselves in a disorderly manner, disrupted classroom procedure, interfered with the proper decorum
and discipline of the school and disturbed other students who did
not wish to participate in the wearing of the buttons." 2 Concluding that, "as distinguished from the facts in Burnside," there had
been "an unusual degree of commotion, boisterous conduct,
[and] a collision with the rights of others," the court held that
'5363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
"1363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
'1363 F.2d at 747 (footnote omitted).
1Id. at 746-47. Note the similarity of this reasoning to that of Coach Eaton in Brief
for Defendants-Appellees, supra note 5.
I1363 F.2d at 747.
1"Id. at 749.
"Id. at 748.
12363 F.2d at 753.
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here a material and substantial interference with the work of the
school had resulted.2 The decision of school officials to suspend
participating students
in the interest of restoring order was there4
2

fore sustained.

When the armband protest in Tinker came under consideration, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Iowa made explicit reference to the standard evolved in
Burnside and Blackwell. It observed, however, that "it is the view
of [this] Court that actions of school officials .

should not be

limited to those instances where there is a material or substantial
interference with school discipline," thus rejecting the Fifth Circuit standard. Instead the court decided to apply a simple test of
reasonablenessl under which it upheld the authority of school
27
officials to prohibit the wearing of armbands on campus.
The Eighth Circuit was equally divided on the case, and it
therefore affirmed without issuing an opinion as to the appropriate test to be applied.2 8 Upon appeal, however, the Supreme
Court chose to sanction the analysis developed by the Fifth Circuit. Characterizing the communication of student opinion as a
"direct, primary First Amendment right,"" the Court concluded
that the wearing of an armband for this purpose was constitutionally protected as expression "closely akin to 'pure speech.' ,0
Consequently, it was held that this form of expression could not
be restricted by school officials "in the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons. . . . ,,3 But, the Court cautioned, "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for
any reason . . . materially disrupts classwork [or school activities] or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights' of32
others is, of course, not immunized by. . . freedom of speech.
1Id. at 754. It is important to note that the interference the court found in this case
was based entirely on physical, rather than symbolic, conduct.
2'd.

"5 Tinker v. Des Moines, 258 F. Supp. 971, 973 (S.D. Iowa 1966) (emphasis added).
1d. This is not unlike the approach taken in Williams. 468 F.2d at 1084.
"258 F. Supp. at 973.
"Tinker v. Des Moines, 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967).
"393 U.S. at 508.
"JId. at 505.
1Id. at 511.
"Id. at 513 (emphasis added), citing Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363
F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966). Note the concurrence of Mr. Justice White to the effect that "the
Court continues to recognize a distinction between communicating by words and communicating by acts or conduct.
... Id. at 515.
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Having thereby adopted the Fifth Circuit standard for student expression, the Court applied it to the facts in Tinker and
held that school officials could not under the circumstances have
"forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with
school activities" or the rights of others. 33 Accordingly, the decision of the district court, and implicitly its reliance on the reasonableness test, was overturned.
II. "RIGHTS OF OTHERS" EXCEPTION
The "rights of others" exception to Tinker has received very
little judicial explication since first enunciated in 1969. Though
"not a model of clarity or preciseness, '3 the available authority
seems to have construed it so as to refer to physical interference
with the "substantially educational functions ' 35 of the school and
the safety and educational rights of other students. 3 In short,
"Id. at 514.
3
Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 808 (2d Cir. 1971).
15The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 H~Av. L. REv. 62, 161 (1969).
3
Tinker warned against interference with "the rights of other students to be secure
and to be let alone." 393 U.S. at 508. This somewhat vague statement apparently derived
from the Blackwell fact pattern, where a symbolic protest degenerated into violent disorder, physical coercion, and substantial disruption of school activities. In deciding
Blackwell, the Fifth Circuit had made specific reference to West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), where "the Court was careful to note that the
refusal of the students to participate in the [flag salute] ceremony did not interfere with
or deny rights of others to do so.
... 363 F.2d at 754. In direct contrast, the court
concluded, the Blackwell students had evidenced "disregard for the orderly progression
of classroom instruction, and their complete disregard for the rights of their fellow students." Id. at 753.
Other cases which have interpreted the "rights of others" exception have discussed
it in terms of a student's right to pursue his education unimpeded by those protesting.
When the above quotation from Tinker was written, therefore, it seems probable that the
court had the educational rights and the safety of others primarily in mind. See, e.g.,
Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1087, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969) (discusses
student interference with the rights of others in a case involving "[d]estruction to property, threats to others, frightening passersby, and intrusions upon their rights of travel"),
citing Barker v. Hardway, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969)
(students suspended for "[d]estructive interference with the rights of others") (emphasis
added); Evans v. State Bd. of Agric., 325 F. Supp. 1353 (D. Colo. 1971) (relied on the
"rights of others" exception in a situation presenting substantial potential for physical
disruption and interference with the safety of others); Los Angeles Teachers Union v. Los
Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 71 Cal. 2d 551, 455 P.2d 827, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969): "[lit
is imperative that the courts carefully differentiate in treatment those [students and
teachers] who are violent and heedless of the rights of others as they assert their cause
and those whose concerns are no less burning but who seek to express themselves through
peaceful, orderly means." 455 P.2d at 836, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
See also Denno, Mary Beth Tinker Takes the Constitutionto School, 38 FORDHAM L.
Rv. 35, 47 (1969) (discusses the necessity of finding "physical interference" with school
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judicial attention has focused on preventing interference with the
"educational process,"3 7 taking care that, despite the naturally
distractive nature of some student expression, nonparticipating
students will not be obstructed in the normal pursuit of their
3
academic or extracurricular activities. 1
A.

"Rights"
The underlying rationale of Tinker is that the constitutional
rights of students are generally coextensive with those of adults,
except where there exists a "sufficient educationallyoriented reason," arising from "circumstances attributable to the school environment," which "make[s] necessary more restrictive measures
than generally permissible under the First Amendment . . . .
For example, a student's right to free speech on campus stops
short of the point where he interferes with school work or disrupts
normal school activities." "This is [the] substantive evil . . .
school officials have a right to prevent."' The authority school
functions); Leahy, "Flamboyant Protest," The First Amendment and the Boston Tea
Party, 36 BROOKLYN L. REV. 185, 203 (1970) (limits authority of school officials to prevention of "disorder on the campus and substantial interference with school work"); The
Supreme Court, 1968 Term, supra note 35, at 160-61: "School authorities must be allowed
to protect the primary educational function of teaching in the classroom and the secondary
functions of school administration which necessitate maintenance of at least minimal
order outside the classroom. Schools must also insure the physical safety of their students." For a discussion of the application of the "rights of others" exception in Williams,
see note 57 infra.
"Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 472 F.2d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 1973);
Sword v. Fox, 446 F.2d 1091, 1096-98 (4th Cir. 1971); Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist.,
392 F.2d 697, 703 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1968); Veed v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149, 152 (D.
Neb. 1973); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1336 (D. Mass. 1970).
"8 See, e.g., Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969);
Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1966).
39
Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1336-37 (D. Mass. 1970) (emphasis
added). See Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); Comment, Freedom of
Expression in Student Demonstrations, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 168, 174 (1969).
'"Jones v. State Bd. of Educ., 397 U.S. 31, 33-34 (1970), withdrawing cert. as improvidently granted to 407 F.2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Murray v. West
Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 472 F.2d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 1973): "Although a student
does not discard his First Amendment rights upon entering the school house door, . . .
the First Amendment does not give individual students the right to disrupt openly the
educational process in order to press their grievances."; Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School
Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 703 (5th Cir. 1968); Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363
F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966); Wright, The Constitutionon the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027,
1041-43 (1969): "It seems to me... that a university is not obliged to tolerate interference
with 'any lawful mission, process, or function of the institution,' or, in a simpler phrase,
that 'the normal activities of the University' are protected." For pre-Tinker cases to the
same effect, see Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 588 n.11.
"Leahy, supra note 36, at 203 (emphasis added). See Scoville v. Board of Educ., 286
F. Supp. 988, 991 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
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officials have over the exercise of constitutional rights by students
is limited, therefore, to insuring the normal functioning of the
educational process.4"
Under Tinker, then, a student does not forfeit his freedom of
speech at the arbitrary discretion of a school official, or simply
because his expression is school-related in that it arises on campus. 4 3 If the exercise of a constitutional right does not substantially interfere with school activities, a student is generally free
to express his opinions just as if off-campus." And the burden of
establishing that disruptive interference is on the regulating authority (school officials). 4"
But where simple expression of opinion is transformed into
action constituting a substantial physical interference with normal activities or with the lives of others, school authorities may
take reasonable steps to restore order.46 Even silent or symbolic
protest may be restrained if substantially likely to generate
conduct which might reasonably result in violence." In the ab"Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328, 1340 (S.D. Tex. 1969):
"The schools . . . should be able to control those activities which relate to or affect
education."; Goldstein, The Scope and Sources of School Board Authority to Regulate
Student Conduct and Status: A NonconstitutionalAnalysis, 117 U. PA. L. Rv.373, 387
(1969): "[A] school board has that power, and only that power, over student conduct and
status which is properly related to its function of educating the pupils in its charge."
"Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1966):
"[S]chool officials should be careful in their monitoring of student expression in circumstances in which such expression does not substantially interfere with the operation of the
school."
"Wood v. Davison, 351 F. Supp. 543, 546 (N.D. Ga. 1972): "Although University
administrators once had an almost unrestricted power to deal with students under the
theory of in loco parentis, it is now clear that constitutional restraints on authority apply
on campuses of state supported institutions with fully as much sanction as public streets
and in public parks."; American Civil Liberties Union v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp.
893, 896 (W.D. Va. 1970); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1336-37 (D. Mass.
1970) (noted there was no specific showing that the harm from controversial speech was
greater on campus than on other public property, therefore no justification was shown for
a stricter standard on campus); Wright, supra note 40, at 1042.
"Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969); Vail v. Board of Educ., 354 F. Supp.
592, 597 (D.N.H. 1973); Hanover v. Northrup, 325 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D. Conn. 1970);
Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (D. Mass. 1970); Nahmod, supra note 5,
at 148; The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, supra note 35, at 158; Comment, Right of Free
Speech, 11 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 275, 277 (1969).
"Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1971); Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of
Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
"Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1972) (Confederate flag patch worn in
integrated school with tense racial situation); Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir.
1970); Hill v. Lewis, 323 F. Supp. 55 (E.D.N.C. 1971); Hernandez v. School Dist., 315 F.
Supp. 289 (D. Colo. 1970). But see Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 510 (1969), where
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sence of this kind of potential for disruption, however, the content
of the protest alone cannot afford justification for restraining
speech. 8 In effect, then, any intereference with the "rights of
Mr. Justice Fortas commented that "some [students] even wore the Iron Cross, traditionally a symbol of Nazism." Though certainly mistaken as to its symbolism, Fortas' words
indicate he thought of the Iron Cross as antisemitic and potentially provocative, yet he
apparently did not consider it an invasion of the rights of other (Jewish) students.
Note also that the impermissible conduct must arise with the demonstrators themselves, rather than with the audience:
Even if the record showed . . . some threat of violence by hostile spectators,
it would not constitute a proper basis for restraining [the demonstrators']
otherwise legal first amendment activity.
National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1014 n.4 (4th Cir. 1973),
citing Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951);
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746, 75455 (7th Cir. 1972); Hurwitt v. City of Oakland, 247 F. Supp. 995, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 1965);
Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 109 (M.D. Ala. 1965). See also Watson v. Memphis,
373 U.S. 526, 535 (1963): "[Clonstitutional rights may not be denied simply because of
hostility to their assertion or exercise."; Pickings v. Bruce, 430 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir.
1970): "Such statements may well increase the tensions within the College and between
the College and the community, but this fact cannot serve to restrict freedom of expression."; Comment, supra note 39, at 173: "In order to punish demonstrators the school
must further show that the disruption was made by the demonstrators themselves rather
than by others reacting to the protected expression. Justice Fortas emphasized the importance of this distinction [in Tinker] in his reference to [Burnside and Blackwell]."
"See, e.g., National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1017
(4th Cir. 1973). In dealing here with the right of a political group to assemble in a public
school auditorium for the purpose of communicating racist and anti-semitic views, the
court quoted Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961)
(Black, J., dissenting), to this effect:
I do not believe that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms of speech,
press, petition and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be
accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the
ideas we cherish.
For further general comment on this point, see Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Police
Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21, 24 (1971);
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Jones v. State Bd. of Educ.,
397 U.S. 31, 33 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting): "The leaflet now censored may be illtempered and in bad taste. But we recognized in Terminiello v. Chicago . . . that even
strongly abusive utterances or publications not merely polished and urbane pronouncements of dignified people, enjoy First Amendment protection."; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring): "One's beliefs have long been thought to
be sanctuaries which government could not invade."; Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576,
592 (1969): "[A]ny shock effect of appellant's speech must be attributed to the content
of the ideas expressed. It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to
some of their hearers."; Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965): Persons may not "be punished merely for peacefully
expressing unpopular views."; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964);
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949); West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 632-34 (1943): "Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicat-
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others" must generally arise from the mode or vehicle of communication, rather than the message sought to be communicated."
Thus the Tinker guideline for student expression is really an
adaptation to the school environment of the traditional standard
for free speech, maintaining the essential distinction between
ing ideas." (emphasis added); Goguen v. Smith, 471 F.2d 88, 98, 103 (1st Cir. 1972):
Government may not "subject individuals to punishment for feelings and words-clearly
... ; Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623,
protected First Amendment activities.
633-34 (2d Cir. 1972); Shanley v. Northeast School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970, 971 (5th Cir.
1972); Kalemba v. Turk, 353 F. Supp. 1101, 1103 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Channing Club v.
Board of Regents, 317 F. Supp. 688, 691 (N.D. Tex. 1970): "That the language is annoying
or inconvenient is not the test. Agreement with the content or manner of expression is
irrelevant; first amendment freedoms are not confined to views that are conventional, or
thoughts indorsed [sic] by the majority."; Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329,
1337 (D. Mass. 1970): A "restriction . . . reasonably related to the educational process"
is permissible. "But to tell a student what thoughts he may communicate is another
matter."; Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 23 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Wright,
supra note 40, at 1043, 1051-52.
Banks v. Muncie Community Schools, 433 F.2d 292 (7th Cir. 1970) provides a good
illustration of the general irrelevance of content with specific regard to symbols. There the
court rejected plaintiffs' argument that Tinker "precludes a school from compelling minority pupils 'to endure [offensive] official symbols at a tax supported institution which
they are compelled to attend.' " Id. at 298. As noted by expert testimony, this school's
"official symbols [Confederate flag, "rebels," etc.] represented a system that enslaved
[black students'] ancestors." Id. at 297. Yet the court held that, despite their offensive
nature, "the adoption of symbols by the majority of the students is merely the exercise of
their first amendment right of free speech and the state has not insinuated itself into
private acts of discrimination." Id. at 298 (emphasis added).
Of course, this general rule is subject to traditional exceptions-defamation, obscenity, and "fighting words"-where expression can be restricted on the basis of content:
The First Amendment protects the communication of ideas, not all communication. Incitement to illegal action, libel, obscenity, and "fighting words,"
while communicative, do not express ideas and do not merit First Amendment protection.
Deeds v. State, 474 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). Clearly the Williams protest
was intended to express "ideas" within the ambit of constitutional protection.
"See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971): Governmental interference
with a person's expression "can be justified, if at all, only as a valid regulation of the
manner in which he exercised that freedom, not as a permissible prohibition on the
substantive message it conveys."; Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d 1273, 1380
(D.C. Cir. 1972): "It has always been thought that citizens have an absolute right to speak
when their mode of communication in no way interferes with the rights of others." (emphasis added); Shanley v. Northeast School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 971 n.8 (5th Cir. 1972):
"The more active the methodology of expression, the more inherent its potential interference."; Kalemba v. Turk, 353 F. Supp. 1101, 1104 (N.D. Ohio 1973): "The even more
surprising aspect of the case is that the greatest harm which could be shown to result from
the wearing of the armbands at issue was that . . . [some] would experience emotional
displeasure" in viewing the demonstrators. "Moreover, the displeasure shown is one which
was not related to the wearing of armbands themselves but to the unpopular ideas symbolized by the armbands."
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"a de facto

T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 115 (1966): "The
whole theory rests upon the general proposition that expression should be free and unrestrained, that the state may not seek to achieve other social objectives through control of
expression, and that the attainment of such objectives can and must be secured through
regulation of action." See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445 (1969) (Douglas, J.,
concurring): It is the difference between "free speech" and "free speech plus." Expression
"can be regulated only on the 'plus' or 'action' side of the protest."; Tinker v. Des Moines,
393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (White, J., concurring); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th
Cir. 1966): "[Tlhe mere presence of ... political symbols is not calculated to cause
disturbance sufficient to warrant their exclusion from school premises unless there is some
student misconduct involved." (emphasis added); Denno, supra note 36, at 55: "All kinds
of speech, argument and persuasion are disturbing, possibly causing great anger among
school boards and officials who see their smooth operations ruffled by mere students using
the school to express themselves. But, absent open interruption within classrooms . . .
until students 'pass the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertake incitement to
riot' or similar overt action, they are protected." (emphasis added); Wright, supra note
40, at 1043: "Expression cannot be prohibited because of disagreement with or dislike for
its contents . . . .Expression can be prohibited if it takes the form of action that materially and substantially interferes with the normal activities of the institution or invades
the rights of others." (emphasis added).
On this same point, consider the absence of any discussion in Williams on the distinction between regulating expression and regulating conduct. Aside from Tinker, Williams
cited only one other student speech case, Sword v. Fox, 446 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1971),
apparently for the proposition that a university need only meet a standard of
reasonablenessin governing demonstrations on its campus. Yet Sword specifically related
the test of reasonableness to preserving order on campus, preventing interference with
school activities, and maintaining normal administrative operations. The "rights of others" exception was not mentioned, and the decision even emphasized that the contested
policy on demonstrations in school buildings (presumably sit-ins), unlike the regulation
in Williams, did "not purport to pass on the purpose of the demonstrations" (i.e., the
message sought to be communicated) in determining its claim to protection. Sword v. Fox,
supra at 1097 (emphasis added). (In this respect, note that the regulation overturned in
Tinker also "was directed against 'the principle of the demonstration' itself," since
"[slchool authorities simply felt that 'the schools are no place for demonstrations'
393 .U.S. at 509 n.3).
In effect, then, the Williams court failed to acknowledge that the content of student
dissent cannot be regulated by a standard of mere reasonableness. (See the discussion in
note 53 infra on "clear and present danger.") A reasonableness test can be applied only
with respect to conduct accompanying the dissent or substantially likely to be incited by
the views to be expressed. (See the cases cited in note 47 supra.) This distinction has been
summarized as follows:
The extent to which expression may be restricted varies somewhat, depending on whether the limitation sought is to be placed on the expression
itself (meaning content) or on conduct which is incidental to the expression
(meaning time, place, manner and duration).
The standard devised for direct regulation of expression . . .provides
that the exercise of the expression sought to be limited must interfere to a
substantial and material degree with [normal school activities or the rights
of others].
The standard devised for regulation of conduct [and] which inciden-
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physical interference with the function of the schools ....
Thus, as characterized by one commentator:

$,51

The Supreme Court, in Tinker, continues the application of
basic principles laid down in Dennis v. United States and Cantwel
v. Connecticut where it is apparent that for speech, symbolic or
verbal, to be the proper subject of state abridgment, there must not
only be some "substantial state interest" at stake, but such speech
(or conduct amounting to speech) must inevitably lead to acts adverse to the state interest sought to be protected ....
A "silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied
by any disorder or disturbance" will not be enough to justify prohibition ."2

Tinker may therefore be viewed as merely "a school-related version of the . . .'clear and present danger' rule," where speech
with an inevitable tendency to produce action constituting immitally limits speech ... provides that reasonable restrictions ... are recognized ....
Channing Club v. Board of Regents, 317 F. Supp. 688, 691 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (emphasis

added) (cites Tinker, Blackwell, and Burnside). Channing went on to comment that the
restriction there prohibiting distribution of a student-published newspaper on campus was
constitutionally invalid as "a direct limitation by the State on the content of the expression, rather than an incidental restriction of time, place and manner of distribution." Id.
Wyoming school officials likewise framed their decision in terms of the hostile content of
the Williams protest. In upholding their action, the Tenth Circuit repeated this emphasis
on the "hostile expression" symbolized by the armbands, and chose to "sustain the Trustees' decision . . .as a reasonableregulation of expression under the limited circumstances involved .... " 468 F.2d at 1083-84 (emphasis added). Unlike Sword, therefore, the
Williams court did rely on the purpose of the expression, yet phrased its opinion as if it
were merely following Sword in regulating the time and place for the expression.
In summary, Tinker established that wearing an armband as a symbol of one's opinion is "closely akin to 'pure speech.' " 393 U.S. at 505. It is therefore subject to restriction
only under the constitutional standard for regulating "pure speech." This standard recognizes the need for the state, under a test of reasonableness, to serve an "impartial traffic
function" in minimizing the interference of the expression with normal school activities.
Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The High School as an EducationalPublic Forum, 5 HARv. CIV.
RPGHTS-CIv. Lis. L. REV. 278, 294 (1970). Mere reasonableness, however, cannot be used
as the standard for evaluating the purpose or content of the expression. For that end, the
views expressed must be shown to "interfere in a 'material and substantial' way with the
administration of school activity . . . or with the rights of other students." Vail v. Board
of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592, 598 (D.N.H. 1973) (emphasis added). For the most recent
comment on this point by the Supreme Court, see Papish v. University of Mo. Curators,
410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973): "The mere dissemination of ideas-no matter how offensive to
good taste-on a state university campus may not be shut off in the name alone of
'conventions of decency.' " Here the "petitioner was dismissed because of the disapproved
content of the newspaper rather than the time, place, or manner of its distribution."
I'Denno, supra note 36, at 47 (emphasis added).
sComment, supra note 45, at 276-77 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted), quoting
Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
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nent danger of" 'material and substantial disruption' of the operation of the school" is the evil sought to be avoided.5
It would seem to follow, then, that the University of Wyoming may restrict silent protest of the type in Williams only
where the expression will give rise to that kind of action school
officials have authority to prevent. Yet the Williams panel specifically stated, "[w]e do not base our holding on the presence of
any violence or disruption. There was no showing or finding to
that effect . . . ."5 Instead the court pointed to the need for
protecting "against invasion of the rights of others by avoiding a
hostile expression to them . . . ."I The question necessarily
arises, then, whether others have a right to avoid "hostile expression," including the expression of opinion on their religious beliefs. 5"
Interestingly, Williams cited no case of any kind where silent, symbolic expression, in the absence of violence or disruptive
potential, has been held to violate the rights of others." Indeed,
$Abbott, The Student Press: Some Second Thoughts, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 989, 992-93
(1970). An earlier article by the same author defined the "clear and present danger" rule
as follows:
As originally stated, the test was "whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). The
Supreme Court subsequently restated the test as follows: "In each case,
[courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger." Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
Abbott, The Student Press: Some First Impressions, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 19-20 n.72
(1970). For more recent comment on the test, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969).
See also National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir.
1973); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971); Scoville v. Board of
Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 13 (7th Cir. 1970); Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363
F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1966) (cited with approval in Tinker); Sullivan v. Houston Indep.
School Dist., 333 F. Supp. 1149, 1159 n.ll (S.D. Tex. 1971); Channing Club v. Board of
Regents, 317 F. Supp. 688, 691 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges,
306 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Hammond v. South Carolina State College,
272 F. Supp. 947, 950 (D.S.C. 1967) (cited with approval in Tinker); Divine, A Note on
Tinker, 7 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 539 (1971); Leahy, supra note 36, at 203; Wright, supra
note 40, at 1042; Comment, supra note 39, at 173.
"Williams v. Eaton, 468 F.2d 1079, 1084 (10th Cir. 1972) (emphasis added).
,,Id.
"As previously stated, the burden is clearly on the state to provide authority for its
position that an armband protest under the conditions in Williams would have violated
the rights of those exposed to the demonstration. (See cases cited note 45 supra.)
"1And a complete review of cases which have subsequently cited Tinker has revealed

STUDENT EXPRESSION ON CAMPUS
none. Ironically, another case originating in Wyoming, Jergeson v. Board of Trustees, 476
P.2d 481 (Wyo. 1970), is one of the few to have interpreted the "rights of others" exception
in somewhat similar fashion to the approach taken in Williams. There an article written
for a high school newspaper by a class of journalism students expressed opinions critical
of disciplinary measures taken by certain teachers. Rather than evaluating these student
opinions on the basis of their effect on the educational functions of the school, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that they "collide[d] with the rights of others, namely the
teachers" involved. Id. at 485.
In Tinker, however, it was held that school officials "must be able to show that
[their] action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular [or hostile] viewpoint." 393
U.S. at 509. Moreover, the general interpretation of the Tinker standard runs strongly
counter to the Jergeson analysis. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972);
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968): The "suggest[ion] that teachers
[or students] may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment
rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in
connection with the operation of the public schools in which they work . . . has been
unequivocally rejected ....
" (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, Shelton v. Tucker, and
Keyishian v. Board of Regents); Duke v. North Texas State Univ., 469 F.2d 829, 837 (5th
Cir. 1972); Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 970 n.10 (5th Cir.
1972); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 14 (7th Cir. 1970): The "editorial . . .
reflects a disrespectful and tasteless attitude toward authority. Yet does that imputation
....
without more, justify a 'forecast' of substantial disruption or material interference
with the school policies or invade the rights of others? We think not. The reference
undoubtedly offended and displeased the dean. But mere 'expressions of [the students']
feelings with which [school officials] do not wish to contend' is not the showing required
by the Tinker test to justify expulsion."; Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1391
(N.D. Ind. 1970); Aguirre v. Tahoka Indep. School Dist., 311 F. Supp. 664, 666 (N.D. Tex.
1970) (wearing brown armbands in support of those who advocate certain changes in
educational policies and practices held not "disruptive of normal educational functions");
Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1969): "This lawsuit arises at a time
when many in the educational community oppose the tactics of the young in securing a
political voice. It would be both incongruous and dangerous for this court to hold that
students who wish to express their views on matters intimately related to them.., may
be precluded from doing so by that same adult community."; Dickey v. Alabama State
Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (expulsion of student editor for criticizing
state officials overturned) (cited with approval in Tinker); Hammond v. South Carolina
State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967) (cited with approval in Tinker); Nahmod,
supra note 50, at 287: A "disrespect" test might chill legitimate expression. "An accusation that a principal has 'racist views and attitudes' . . . might also serve . . . a useful,
though controversial, function in the high school. This suggests that a distinction in terms
of educational function between personal attacks against school personnel and other protest against personnel [e.g., against state officials, as in Dickey, supra] is not tenable for
first amendment purposes."; Wright, supra note 40, at 1057: "[Sipeech cannot be punishable on campus simply because it is vigorous or uncomplimentary. . . . [T]he first
amendment did not enact Mrs. Emily Post's book of etiquette."; Developments in the
Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 5, at 1130: "[R]esponsible student criticism of
university officials is socially valuable, since in many instances the students are peculiarly
expert in campus issues and possess a unique perspective on matters of school policy."
Consider also Evans v. State Bd. of Agric., 325 F. Supp. 1353 (D. Colo. 1971), which
likewise involved a proposed protest (following a previous violent protest) by black students at Colorado State University during an athletic contest with Brigham Young. In
upholding a prohibition on all demonstrations at scheduled athletic events, the court
relied on the "rights of others" exception, not in the Williams sense of religious disparage-
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Tinker itself stands for the freedom "to expose others to one's
opinion." 58 In Williams, the opinion expressed was essentially
ideological and secular in both origin and purpose, and touched
on religion only incidentally. 5 As such, it constituted a manifestly political statement aimed at the implications and social
consequences of Mormon racial policy. Consequently, it did not
interfere with the "rights" of anyone, since there is no right of
immunity from the political views of a minority, even though
peripherally related to religious belief.6 As noted above, when
ment, but to emphasize the potential for physical disruption of school activities and the
need for protecting the safety of others. Id. at 1360. See Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp.
228 (S.D. W. Va. 1968) (student protest at football game for correction of grievances "far
exceeded the bounds of a peaceful demonstration" and could therefore be restricted, but
"sing-in" on college president's lawn, though conducted after midnight and intended to
harass and annoy, held not punishable because it remained peaceful).
The net effect of this review is that there is scant authority, if any, for the unusual
interpretation in Williams of the "rights of others" exception. As expressed in Burnside,
"the presence of . . . [political symbols] did not hamper the school in carrying on its
regular schedule of activities; nor would it seem likely that the simple wearing of buttons
[or armbands] unaccompanied by improper conduct would ever do so." 363 F.2d at 748.
To repeat the warning in Blackwell, there is a "fundamental requirement that school
officials should be careful in their monitoring of student expression in circumstances in
which such expression does not substantially interfere with the operation of the school."
363 F.2d at 754. (See the textual discussion of Panarellav. Birenbaum accompanying
notes 99-117 infra, and refer again to the distinction between regulating content and
conduct, note 48 supra.)
5
"Nahmod, supra note 50, at 292 n.58. As observed by another authority: "The Tinker
Court thought that the first amendment protects a learning process in state schools which
is open, vigorous, disputatious, disturbing-a robust dialetic in which error is combatted
with reason, not fiat." The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, supra note 35, at 159.
59
1n other words, the purpose of the demonstration was to protest racial discrimination, rather than to engage in religious bigotry. (Refer to textual discussion accompanying
notes 87-93 infra.) See Todd v. Rochester, 41 Mich. App. 320, 200 N.W.2d 90 (1972), where
a novel (Kurt Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse Five) used in a public school curriculum made
only incidental or ancillary reference to religious matters for essentially literary reasons,
and therefore did not constitute establishment of religion.
Consider also the comment of Mr. Justice Goldberg in School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp to the effect that "many of our legal, political and personal values
derive historically from religious teachings." 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (concurring opinion).
If one accepts the practical truth of this statement, the general relegation of blacks to
second-class status in American society can be viewed as deriving in some small measure
from the racial policy of the Mormon Church, at least in areas like Wyoming where
Mormon influence is strongly felt. When viewed from this perspective, it is easier to
comprehend both the origin and intensity of the black athletes' feelings on this issue and
the reason why a religous group was chosen as the object of the protest.
"See the textual discussion of religious criticism by private individuals accompanying
notes 81-95 infra. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969); The Supreme Court,
1968 Term, supra note 35, at 156: "Because the student's message was political, their
conduct was peculiarly deserving of protection against the unwarranted interference of
public officials."
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school authorities are dealing with noneducational interests, only
those which could also be legally protected off-campus should be
held to have that substantial and material gravity needed to invoke the protection of the "rights of others" exception.
This is especially true where, as in Williams, there was a
valid and logically connected reason for protesting (at the B.Y.U.
game) and the vehicle (armband) of communication chosen was
relatively unobtrusive and unprovocative.6 ' From the viewpoint of
those who proposed to conduct the protest, it was adequately
provoked, calculated to draw mass attention to a legitimately felt
grievance, and served a "useful, though controversial, function." In short, it was an attempt "to express their views on
matters intimately related to them, through traditionally accepted nondisruptive modes of communication .
*"3
B.

"Others"
In Tinker and its foundational predecessors, Burnside and
Blackwell, the audience affected consisted almost exclusively of
school children, and the concern of the courts in each case was
directed toward their educational and physical well-being. In effect, Tinker can be viewed as having established a "variable free
speech" standard for expression on campus." For that reason the
proper application of the Tinker rule in any given situation is
necessarily related to the age level of the particular audience
exposed to the expression.
Professor Charles Alan Wright addressed this point in a recent article, where he noted:
I find no ...

reason to believe that the rules applicable to high

"Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969): The Tinker armband protest involved "a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on the part of petitioners."; Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332, 1337 (6th Cir. 1972)
(Miller, J., dissenting): "The nature of the 'symbolism' . . . is of significance ..
";
Butts v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 436 F.2d 728, 731 (5th Cir. 1971): "The boy who came
to school flaunting his Nazi symbols was also, of course, communicating his ideas in his
own fashion. However, the black armbands were more adult, more rational adornments.";
Watson v. Thompson, 321 F. Supp. 394, 397 (E.D. Tex. 1971): "[T]he wearing of 'freedom
buttons' is not significantly different from the wearing of a black armband. Hence, it is
also closely akin to pure speech; and thus neither is, in and of itself, conceivably classifiable as conduct."; Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
"2Nahmod, supra note 50, at 287.
"3Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). The essence of freedom of
speech is the right to express views on issues which directly affect oneself.
"Cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 635 & n.4, 638-40 (1968), where the concept
of "variable obscenity" was adopted by the Supreme Court.
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schools can be indiscriminately transferred to institutions of higher
learning. . . .The average university student is more than 21 years
old and is surely an adult. The average high school student is in his
mid-teens, and we have been authoritatively taught that even in the
area of free expression important consequences can be made to
"depend upon whether the citizen is an adult or a minor."'

Another authority has emphasized that the'permissible scope of
student first amendment activity is dependent not upon the age
of the person claiming the right to free speech, but upon the age
of those being protected from the expression." Thus, the older the
students in the audience, the weaker the state interest in protecting them from questionable speech. 7
In summary, there is compelling authority for the proposition
that, as in Ginsberg v. New York, 6" the more mature the audience,
the greater should be the tolerance for controversial expression.
The audience being protected in Williams (presumably the football crowd) consisted of a general cross section of the public
rather than school children alone, and taken as a whole its collective sensibility must be held more resilient than these of the
"Wright, supra note 40, at 1052-53 (footnotes omitted), quoting Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968). For the statistical information on student age, Wright
relied on Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 988 (W.D. Wis. 1968), citing U.S. BURzAu
OF THE CENSUS, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20,
No. 110, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 12 (1961). See James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d
566, 574 (2d Cir. 1972): An important basis of distinction here was that the students were
"more mature than those junior high school students in Tinker."; Scoville v. Board of
Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 13 n.5 (7th Cir. 1970); Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238, 242
(E.D.N.Y. 1969): The rights of high school students are more restricted than those of
college students because "the former [are] in a much more adolescent and immature
stage of life and less able to screen fact from propaganda."; Abbott, supra note 53, at 993;
Nahmod, supra note 5, at 147-48: "[E]lementary school students are much more easily
distracted and less able to fend for themselves intellectually than high school students.";
The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, supra note 35, at 160 n.34: "The state's special interest
in the education of children justifies stricter regulation of conduct in public schools than
in an adult education class . . .[since] children are more easily distracted."
"The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, supra note 35, at 157. See also Vail v. Board of
Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592, 598 (D.N.H. 1973) (court may consider "the age or maturity of
those to whom [expression] is addressed").
"7See Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361 (1st Cir. 1969): "Hence the question in
this case is whether a teacher may, for demonstrated educational purposes, quote a 'dirty'
word currently used in order to give special offense, or whether the shock is too great for
high school seniors to stand. If the answer were that the students must be protected from
such exposure, we would fear for their future."; Webb v. Lake Mills Community School
Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791, 799 (N.D. Iowa 1972): "The state interest in limiting the discretion
of teachers grows stronger . . . as the age of the students decreases ..
";The Supreme
Court, 1968 Term, supra note 35, at 157: "(T]he Court has recognized a greater state
interest in protecting the young from harm than in protecting adults .
"390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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children affected in Tinker. 9 To overlook this distinction is to
misinterpret the precedential value of the "rights of others" exception.
C.

Tinker Variables
Enough has been said to suggest the potential for abuse inherent to the uncritical application of the Tinker rule, without regard
to the circumstances or the age of those affected. What is needed,
then, is an evenhanded analytical approach to Tinker, one which
isolates the underlying reasons for establishing a flexible standard for campus expression, and then determines their applicability in each individual case.
The Tinker situation involved a number of variables which
might be viewed as the circumstantial background for the rule
enunciated there. For example, the protest occurred (1) on school
grounds, (2) during normal school hours, and (3) carried over into
the classroom itself where it exposed (4) an audience of high
school students to whatever (5) distractive or disruptive force it
possessed. In effect, these variables encompass those things
which lend themselves to disruption of the normal work of the
school. For this reason, they serve as guidelines for the proper
application of the Tinker standard.
An analysis of Williams with these factors in mind reveals
that the protest there was scheduled to occur during the weekend
when intereference with normal academic activities would be
impossible. In addition, it was to take place in a nonacademic
setting, outside the classroom and open to the general public,
where there was less reason to fear any potential disruptive effect.70 Finally, it was to be entirely passive, and those who were
"As for the potential argument that the protest was forced upon a "captive audience,"
see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971): "[Mluch has been made of the claim
that Cohen's distasteful mode of expression was thrust upon unwilling or unsuspecting
viewers, and that the State might therefore legitimately act as it did in order to protect
the sensitive from otherwise unavoidable exposure to appellant's crude form of protest
... .Yet this Court has consistently stressed that 'we are often "captives" outside the
sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech.' "; Street v. New York, 394
U.S. 576, 592 (1969): "Again, such a conviction could not be sustained on the ground that
appellant's words were likely to shock passers-by. . . .[Any shock effect of appellant's
speech must be attributed to the content of the ideas expressed. It is firmly settled that
under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely
because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers." Cf. Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361-62 (1st Cir. 1969); Kalemba v. Turk, 353 F. Supp. 1101, 1104 (N.D.
Ohio71973).
Cf. Nahmod, supra note 5, at 147: "It may be argued . . .that standards for free
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to be exposed to it were primarily adults. It would seem, then,
that the Williams protest would have involved none of the factors
critical to restriction of speech under the Tinker standard, other
than the fact that it was to have taken place on school property.',
Since the primary reasons for regulating expression on school
property do not obtain during after-class hours, 2 it is difficult to
understand why the Williams court chose to accept such a restric3
tive application of the Tinker rule .
In effect, Williams may have interposed the rationale of
Tinker without carefully examining the limitations and complexities that determine its applicability. Clearly, Tinker represents
a step beyond in loco parentis, 4 but it nevertheless stands for the
authority of school officials to restrict expression by students in
given situations. In order to guard against abuse of this restrictive
authority, it is essential that the criteria for its exercise be precisely defined. Tinker sets up a standard that allows for these
procedural safeguards. Under this standard "the first amendment applies with full vigor on the campus," 5 but it cannot be
"indiscriminately transferred" 6 to campus situations. Instead it
must be "applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment." These special characteristics (or variables) demand what amounts to a "sliding-scale approach" to
administrative restriction of campus speech, where more latitude
is allowed with (1) peaceful, unobstructive protests, (2) in nonaspeech . . .should be less rigorous outside of the classroom, because there is no direct
interference with the close-knit and disciplined teacher-student relationship which is
required in the classroom."
"And even here it was on a college rather than a high school campus.
"See The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, supra note 35, at 160 n.34. See generally
Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 1148 (1961).
"As in Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1336 (D. Mass. 1970), "there has
been no showing that the harm from . . .[controversial speech] in a college setting is so
much greater than in the public forum that it outweighs the danger to free expression
inherent in" adopting a more restrictive rule for campus expression.
"See Beaney, Students, Higher Education, and the Law, 45 DENVER L.J. 511, 513-17
(1968); Van Alstyne, supra note 5, at 590, 591 n.22, citing Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp.
280, 286 (D. Colo. 1968): "We agree with the students that the doctrine of 'In Loco
Parentis' is no longer tenable in a university community."; Note, The Emerging Law of
Student Rights, 23 ARK. L. REv. 619, 632 (1970).
"Wright, supra note 40, at 1042. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972): "Yet,
the precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the acknowledged
need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less force on college
campuses than in the community at large."
"Wright, supra note 40, at 1038.
"Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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cademic settings, (3) during nonschool hours, (4) at the college
level, and so forth.7" This approach allows the specific circumstances of each case to determine the degree of restriction called
for, rather than leaving it to the debilitating uncertainty of arbitrary discretion.79 It likewise avoids an unduly expansive and obscurative construction of the "rights of others" exception in situations where reflexive, uncritical adherence to it would operate
0 Otherwise the
only to circumvent the spirit and logic of Tinker."
Tinker standard for campus expression may serve all too readily
as a tool for the dilution of the first amendment rights of students.
Religious Criticism by Private Individuals
While the planned protest in Williams would not have interfered with the educational "rights of others" (or with normal
school activities), it might still be argued that Mormon fans at
the game had a right "to be secure and to be let alone"'" in their
religious beliefs. It is clear, however, that there is no such right:
D.

[Tihe state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify
prior restraints upon the expression of those views. It is not the
business of government in our nation to suppress real or imagined
attacks upon a particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in
publications, speeches, or motion pictures."

This opinion (along with those cited in the note) stands for a first
amendment "right to speak" on religious matters, even though
the protected expression may not always be supportive of religious doctrine. 3
7

And as observed above, the "special characteristics" which permit restriction of
speech in some campus situations are simply not present in Williams.
7
Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 582 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting):
"When a violation of First Amendment rights is alleged, the reasons for [restriction]
must be examined to see if the reasons given are only a cloak for activity or attitudes
protected by the Constitution."
"The inherent ambiguity in the term "rights of others" brings to mind the "familiar
dangers to first amendment freedoms often associated with vague statutes." Eisner v.
Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 808 (2d Cir. 1971).
"Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). The district court in Williams stated
it this way: "Such protest would have been further violative of... Article 21, Section 25
of the Wyoming Constitution which guarantees perfect toleration of religious sentiment,
and provides that no inhabitant of the State of Wyoming shall ever be molested in person
...
333 F. Supp. 107, 113-14 (D.
or property on account of his or her mode of worship.
Wyo. 1971).
"Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 505 (1951). See Kunz v. New York,
340 U.S. 290 (1951); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940): "Equally obvious
is it that a State may not unduly suppress free communication of views, religious or other,
under the guise of conserving desirable conditions."
"Indeed, many modern denominations are themselves the end result of religious
protest.
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Under Beauharnaisv. Illinois," however, where the publication of one's private views involves expression in the nature of
"group libel," the result might be different, for libel is one of
several classes of speech which are of "slight social value as a step
to truth."8 So libelous utterances are not a protected form of free
speech, and therefore may be restricted upon a showing of something less than a clear and present danger.u
In determining whether the Williams protest would have involved "group libel," one need only again refer to the circumstances under which it would have been conducted and the character
of its expression. Beauharnaisinvolved speech which was unprovoked, served no useful function, and was calculated to offend.
The Williams protest, on the other hand, was provoked by relegation to inferior status, had social value for political purposes, and
was designed to symbolize opposition to racial discrimination
rather than simply to disseminate malicious and gratuitous
invective in the form of religious profanation.87
In short, it was to be a "silent, passive expression of opinion"88 on a policy which classifies people on racial grounds, and
-343 U.S. 250 (1952).
'Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
8
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952). But note the dissent of Mr. Justice
Black: "Every expansion of the law of criminal libel so as to punish discussions of matters
of public concern means a corresponding invasion of the area dedicated to free expression
by the First Amendment." Id. at 272.
"7It was intended merely as a passive and rational means of dramatizing the agreement of the athletes with other black students on campus, all of whom were protesting
what they perceived as their disparagement by Mormons. Moreover, Beauharnaisis limited to libel itself, not mere hostile protest. See Kalemba v. Turk, 353 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D.
Ohio 1973): "Defendants urge the Court to carve out a new exception under the First
Amendment for expressions which are derogatory to a particular race [or religion] on the
grounds that this country has adopted a policy of racial equality. . . . However, the Court
rejects the proposition of limiting free speech to those who will support the national policy,
however important. Indeed, the result of such a limitation would be the curtailment of
all speech related to black power and superiority as well as, in this case, the advocates of
white superiority." Id. at 1103-04. "While defendants cite Beauharnais v. Illinois . . . in
support of their contention that racially degrading speech is not protected, the Court
disagrees and considers that case as one limited to libelous statements, a situation not
presented by this case" which involved the wearing of swastika armbands. Id. at 1104 n.1.
"Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). Contrast this with the vitriolic
attacks protected in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1 (1949); and Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 296 (1951): "Kunz preached...
that 'The Catholic Church makes merchandise out of souls,' that Catholicism is 'a religion
of the devil,' and that the Pope is 'the anti-Christ.' The Jews he denounced as 'Christkillers,' and he said of them, 'All the garbage that didn't believe in Christ should have
been burnt in the incinerators. It's a shame they all weren't.'"
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therefore could most accurately be viewed as a traditional civil
rights protest.89 It would have taken on religious implications, but
only because the discrimination being protested was religiously
sanctioned. It might also have proved unsettling to many in the
crowd, but the "essential feature" of any civil rights demonstration is an "appeal to public opinion." 90 Whatever offensive or
controversial effect it may have had on Mormons in the stands
would have been incidental to a constitutionally protected privilege to speak on the issue involved." While there is a collateral
right to prevent coercion" with regard to the conduct of a church's
religious activities (or the religious beliefs of individuals), there
is no right to forestall private criticism in a secular forum. 3
"Indeed, it was not unlike the protests in Burnside and Blackwell, which occurred
near Philadelphia, Mississippi, where three civil rights workers-Andrew Goodman, Michael Schwerner, and James Chaney-had previously been killed.
"Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1,
11, citing Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 201 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring):
There was more to the conduct of those petitioners than a bare desire to
remain at the "white" lunch counter .... We would surely have to be blind
not to recognize that petitioners were sitting at these counters. . . to demonstrate that their race was being segregated in dining facilities in this part of
the country.
Such a demonstration . . . is as much a part of the "free trade of ideas"
. . .as is verbal expression, more commonly thought of as "speech." It, like
speech, appeals to good sense and to "the power of reason as applied through
public discussion" . . . just as much as, if not more than, a public oration
delivered from a soapbox at a street corner.
"Although some Mormon football fans might have been offended by a protest of this
kind, that could well be viewed as the price of free speech in a free society (or the price of
racial discrimination). Indeed, those who supported racial discrimination must have been
equally offended by the civil rights protests of the Sixties.
"Coercion in the sense of compelling others to violate their religious scruples. See
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965);
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940). But see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), where the practice
of polygamy by Mormons was held violative of an overriding public interest.
"3This might be analogized to Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,
419-20 (1971), where it was held that even though a person's right of privacy may sometimes enable him "to stop the flow of information into his own household," there is no
comparable right to halt the communication of information about him to the general
public. Cf. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
Note also the decision in Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 7,
434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967), which denied the contention of a public transit
authority that political advertisements on its buses would make a "captive audience" of
its passengers. The court went on to comment that "a passenger on a public conveyance
does not possess the same rights of privacy as he does in his home; his rights are subject
to reasonable limitations in relation to the rights of others" to express their views. 434 P.2d
at 988-89 n.3, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 436-37 n.3 (emphasis added). Cf. Public Utilities Comm'n
v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 464 (1952).
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It seems clear, then, that the Williams protest could not have
been prohibited merely because the university hoped to protect
Mormon spectators from "hostile expression." As explained in
Tinker itself:
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opiniorr, it must be able to
.show that its action was caused by something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint .
•

. .

[In the present case] the action of the school authorities

appears to have been based upon an urgent wish to avoid the controversy which might result from [disputatious] expression ....
* . . [There was no] specific showing of constitutionally valid
reasons to regulate [student] speech . . . . [S]chool officials can-

not suppress "expressions of feelings with which they do not wish to
contend.""

In effect, this serves to restate the requirement that school officials must be able to forecast invasion of a legally protected right
before exercising their authority under the "rights of others" exception. To allow the mere elicitation of "discomfort and unpleasantness" from a civil rights protest to serve as a "constitutionally
valid reason" for suppressing freedom of speech is to overlook the
constitutional history of the first amendment9 5 and seriously mis"1393 U.S. at 509, 510, 511, quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1966).
"See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (cited with approval in Tinker).
Note also the warning of Mr. Justice Douglas in Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 56 (1966)
(dissenting opinion) (footnotes omitted):

Today a trespass law is used to penalize people for exercising a constitutional
right. Tomorrow a disorderly conduct statute, a breach of the peace statute,
a vagrancy statute will be put to the same end. It is said that the sheriff did
not make the arrests because of the views which petitioners espoused. That
excuse is usually given, as we know from the many cases involving arrests of
minority groups for breaches of the peace, unlawful assemblies, and parading
without a permit ....
[S]uch arrests are usually sought to be justified by
some legitimate function of government. Yet by allowing these orderly and
civilized protests against injustice to be suppressed, we only increase the
forces of frustration which the conditions of second-class citizenship are
generating amongst us.
See also Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 14 n.7 (7th Cir. 1970): "Ill-considered
suppression carries its own dangers. For example, in Blackwell . . . three students wore
the challenged freedom buttons on Friday. They were taken to the principal who ordered
the buttons removed. The three refused to do so and were suspended. On Monday 150
students wore the buttons."
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construe the import of Tinker.
"Representatives" of the State
The heart of the Williams decision, however, seemed to be
that the expression involved possessed "a greater capacity for
evil""6 in that the protesting athletes were "representatives" of a
state university. And under the "rights of others" exception, the
court suggested, views expressed in this representative capacity
may be restricted, since there is a legal right to demand that
school officials restrict "hostile expressions against religious beliefs of others by representatives of a state or its agencies." 97 Or,
viewed from a different perspective, if a state university failed to
prevent members of its football team from using a state-owned
stadium as a forum in which to protest Mormon racial policy, it
would be "facilitating" religious criticism through "state inaction," thereby involving the state impermissibly in what would
otherwise be protected private expression."
E.

1. Freedom of the Press Analogy
It will be helpful in testing the merits of this argument to
analogize it to student use of another state-owned forum-the
university newspaper. In all probability the University of Wyoming newspaper could have criticized Mormon racial policy editorially or could have allowed an article or letter to be published
which did so. A recent New York decision, Panarella v.
Birenbaum," provides a case in point. There a student newspaper
at a state-operated college'00 published an article attacking the
"Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
11468 F.2d at 1083.
"As previously noted (see textual discussion accompanying note 13 supra), the
Williams court stated that it would be unnecessary to consider "state action" in deciding
the case. However, some variation of that concept was clearly essential to the result
reached, since expression which would have been permissible if purely private was restricted because those involved were held "representatives" of the state. Cf. Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Pkg. Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
"-32 N.Y.2d 108, 296 N.E.2d 238, 343 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1973), 37 App. Div. 2d 987, 327
N.Y.S.2d 755 (1971), rev'g 60 Misc. 2d 95, 302 N.Y.S.2d 427 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
'"As stated at the trial court level:
The basic facts are not in dispute. Both schools are tax-supported institutions. Both publications display the official seal of the City University of
New York; both have faculty members as advisors; both are funded in part
by a mandatory fee collected from the students; both have office space and
telephones on the campus; the official student handbook at both institutions
promotes the publications.
302 N.Y.S.2d at 429 (emphasis added).
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Catholic Church.' An action was then brought by a student and
his father to compel school officials "to adopt and enforce regulations prohibiting derogatory and blasphemous attacks on religion
in student publications.' "' 0 The trial court sustained this petition, basing its decision on the admitted use of State property,
facilities, and employees for what the court saw as an attack on
religion: "A government that finances religion is no longer neutral. Similarly, a government that underwrites attacks on religion
is no longer neutral." 3 The court then reconciled its finding with
the Tinker standard:
The recent case of Tinker v. Des Moines School District ... is
not at variance with these principles.
The petitioners herein have made a "showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate" the contents of these publications-they have shown that the strict neutrality required of government vis a vis religion has not been preserved. The published articles also "collid[ed] with the rights of others," that is, the petitioners' right to have the state refrain from attacking religion.' 5 '

The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court,
however, subsequently overruled this interpretation, despite the
involvement of government facilities:
It has repeatedly been held that, once having established . . . a
forum, the authorities may not then place limitations upon its use
which infringe upon the [first amendment] rights of the students

There is no showing herein . . . that publication of the matter
sought to be suppressed constitutes a threat to the orderly functioning of these institutions. 0 '
"'The case actually involved two student-written articles at separate schools. The one
referred to in the text was entitled "The Catholic Church-Cancer of Society." 302
N.Y.S.2d at 428.
2
10
d.
'"tId. at 431.
"'Id. at 431-32. Note that this is almost precisely the ruling in Williams.
1"37 App. Div. 2d 987, 988, 999, 327 N.Y.S.2d 755, 757, 758 (1971) (4-1 decision), citing
Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966);
Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Colo. 1971); Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138 (D.
Md. 1970); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970); Lee v. Board of
Regents of State Colleges, 306 F. Supp. 1097 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F.
Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613
(M.D. Ala. 1967).
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Upon further appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate Division:
Tax-supported colleges may provide financial assistance for a student newspaper publishing an occasional article attacking religious
beliefs, so long as the nature of the attack is arguably within constitutionally protected publication. The colleges merely provided a
neutral forum for debate, and did not evidence an intent to advance
or destroy religious beliefs. Only if the colleges continued financial
support to a newspaper systematically attacking religion over a period of time, without balance, might there be an attempt to "establish" a "secular religion."'0

Panarellais apparently the only other reported post-Tinker
decision to consider the precise issue of the use of state-owned
facilities for student criticism of religious doctrine. Its implicit
rejection of the lower court's application of the "rights of others"
exception is therefore especially significant. Moreover, it indirectly emphasizes the logical contradiction of holding the passive,
symbolic views represented by the Williams armband less worthy
of constitutional protection than the rather vitriolic opinions expressed in the Panarellaarticle, although each involved "student
extracurricular expression"'' 7 through state-owned facilities.
Surely student expression critical of religious policy is no more
pervasive or affronting if communicated through an armband
rather than a school newspaper. If this expression by one kind of
school "representative" is protected, the state must provide a
"constitutionally valid reason" for denying the same freedom to
others. 08 Yet the reasons advanced in Williams, even viewed in
--32 N.Y.2d 108, 112, 296 N.E.2d 238, 239, 343 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (1973) (6-1 decision).
"'Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 5, at 1129.
1"And clearly the mere use of "state facilities" as a forum for expression cannot serve
as a valid reason. See, e.g., Korn v. Elkins, 317 F. Supp. 138, 143 (D. Md. 1970): "The
fact that the University is involved in the financing of ...
[the school paper] does not
permit its officials to apply a statute unconstitutionally."; Channing Club v. Board of
Regents, 317 F. Supp. 688, 692 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp.
1329, 1337 (D. Mass. 1970): "We are well beyond the belief that any manner of state
regulation is permissible simply because it involves an activity which is a part of the
university structure and is financed with funds controlled by the administration. The state
is not necessarily the unrestrained master of what it creates and fosters." Thus, "the
creation of the form does not give birth also to the power to mold its substance." For this
reason, "there is no right to editorial control by administration officials flowing from the
fact that ...
[the school paper] is college sponsored and state supported ....
; Dickey
v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967); Buckley v. Meng, 35
Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Developments in the Law-Academic
Freedom, supra note 5, at 1129-30. Cf. Palacios v. Foltz, 441 F.2d 1196, 1198 (10th Cir.
1971): "The State of New Mexico's regulatory powers over Las Cruces Public School do
not necessarily implicate the state with the student council's by-laws nor with the action
by the 'principal's office' pursuant thereto."
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light of the difference in circumstances, were nearly identical to
those relied upon by the lower court in Panarella-andrejected
by the appellate courts."'
In effect, then, there is no apparent constitutional basis for
distinguishing between the student expression in Williams and
Panarella.""Indeed, to allow students to communicate views critical of Mormon racial policy while "representing" a state school
through their editorial positions on a school newspaper, yet deny
this right to other students while similarly engaged in extracurricular activity, would suggest the kind of selective enforcement
often held to constitute due process inconsistency."' For this reason, all forms of extracurricular speech must be analyzed under
a single standard.
The applicable standard is apparent from the case law on
student expression. The clear import of the decisions dealing with
the use of school facilities for expressive purposes is that their
utilization may not be restricted except in accord with "the
guidelines of traditional first amendment theory":" 2
'"For example, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, in a 4-1
decision, declined to follow the argument of the one dissenting judge that freedom of
speech "must give way to the right of other students to be free from ridicule about their
religious beliefs." 37 App. Div. 2d 987, 989-90, 327 N.Y.2d 755, 759 (1971).
"'As for the potential argument that the function of a student newspaper is to accommodate student expression, while that is not the function of a school stadium, see text
accompanying notes 131-41 infra.
"'Cf. Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 362-63 (1st Cir. 1969): "It is hard to think that
any student could walk into the library and receive a book, but that his teacher could not
subject the content to serious discussion in class. . . . Such inconsistency on the part of
the school has been regarded as fatal."; Channing Club v. Board of Regents, 317 F. Supp.
688, 692 (N.D. Tex. 1970): "[Nlumerous other publications, not banned, and sold from
the same location as The Catalyst, contained language identical to that objected to here
which doe's sustain the allegation of discrimination and denial of equal protection. There
thus being no legal distinction between the types of publications, the State does not
become privileged to ban a publication merely because it is edited and published by
students."; American Civil Liberties Union v. Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893, 896-97
(W.D. Va. 1970); Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388, 1393-96 (E.D.
Mich. 1969) (student's expulsion for possession of allegedly obscene literature on campus
was held "rank inconsistency" and a denial of due process, since identical expletives were
contained in other literature in the school library); Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230
N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (school regulation calling for substitution of personal discretion by administration officials held too indefinite).
"'Abbott, supra note 53, at 993. As expressed in American Civil Liberties Union v.
Radford College, 315 F. Supp. 893, 896 (W.D. Va. 1970):
A perusal of these cases makes clear a recurring theme that once a public
school makes an activity available to its students, faculty, or even the general public, it must operate the activity in accord with first amendment
principles.
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The notion that the state can condition the grant of a privilege on
the surrender of a constitutional right without compelling justification has been discredited by the Supreme Court in other areas, and
by several lower federal courts in the context of student rights [and
subsequently by Tinker]. With the removal of this obstacle to judicial relief, school regulations restricting student extracurricular
speech and association will be subjected to the requirements of the
first amendment."'

So a student does not retain his first amendment rights in some
extracurricular activities, yet automatically forfeit them in others." 4 This is really the only defensible reading of Tinker, which
specifically noted that a student's constitutional rights apply uniformly to all phases of school life:
A student's rights. . . do not embrace merely the classroom hours.
When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus
during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on
controversial subjects . . . . if he does so without.., colliding with
the rights of others." 5

It logically follows, then, that the state interest needed to restrict
a student's constitutional rights (i.e., protection of the rights of
others) must also be applied uniformly. A comparison of Williams
and Panarella,however, suggests only the lack of uniformity in
this regard. If the state's interest in protecting the rights of others
is somehow distinguishable in these two instances, school authorities must bear the burden of proving the "material and
qubstantial"' 1 nature of this distinction. And if they cannot sustain this burden, there is no "valid university interest""' 7 by
which they can legitimately restrict student expression.
2. Disavowal
A related argument for showing this "valid university interest" is that the Williams protest would necessarily have cast a
negative "reflection" on the University of Wyoming, and through
it perhaps even the State itself. More specifically stated, this
" 3Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, supra note 5, at 1129. See Jones v.
State Bd. of Educ., 397 U.S. 31, 34 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (numerous authorities
cited).
"'Cf. Note, Student Academic Freedom-"StateAction" and PrivateUniversities, 44
TUL. L. REv. 184 (1969): "The decision of this case, resulting in a 'schizophrenic' student
body, some of whom appear to have constitutionally protected rights while the others do
not, seems peculiar in itself."

1-5393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969).
"Id.; Vail v. Board of Educ., 354 F. Supp. 592, 598 (D.N.H. 1973) (emphasis added).
"'Channing Club v. Board of Regents, 315 F. Supp. 688, 691 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
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contention arises from the fact that the athletes would have been
wearing school uniforms while protesting, and thereby would
have been "representing" the State in a unique and more apparent way."8 It seems well established, however, that schools and

other government agencies do not somehow become "advocates"
of private opinions expressed on public property."9 To hold other"'Cf. Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62-63 (1970), where a statute which
permitted the wearing of a military uniform in a theatrical production only "if the portrayal does not tend to discredit" the armed forces was held unconstitutional as a violation
of free speech.
I"In Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 7, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 430 (1967), for example, this issue was discussed as follows:
Defendants assert that the overriding consideration impelling them to
adopt the present [restrictive] policy is the necessity to keep the Government outside the arena of partisan affairs and the acceptance of [antiwar]
advertising . . . might give the impression that the district endorses the
views of the advertiser ....
These pragmatic hurdles are no more relevant to a public forum when
it is a motor coach than they are to a public park or a school auditorium.
The endorsement of an opinion expressed in an advertisement on a motor
coach is no more attributable to the transit district than the view of a speaker
in a public park is to the city administration or the tenets of an organization
using school property for meetings is to the local school board ....
Likewise, the defendants' apprehensions relating to the content of the
messages they would be required to accept are no more significant than those
involved in . . .the making of speeches in the parks and schools. In any
event, the right to utilize a public forum for the expression of opinions and
beliefs cannot be made to depend upon such ephemeral concerns.
It will undoubtedly be true. . . that an occasional advertiser may post
controversial messages which will offend some, perhaps a majority, in the
community. . . .Annoyance and inconvenience, however, are a small price
to pay for preservation of our most cherished right.
Defendants' potential problem of "equal time" for conflicting views is a
straw man. . . . [Clonstitutional standards are satisfied if all those who
wish to exercise their right to state beliefs and opinions protected by the First
Amendment are permitted to do so on an equal basis.
434 P.2d at 989-90, 64 Cal. Rptr. 437-38. (emphasis added).
Consider also Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1962),
where a regulation governing use of school facilities at a public college provided that
programs there must be "determined to be compatible with the aims" of the school. In
applying these regulations, the Dean of Administration stated that the National Review
was "a political group presenting a distinct point of view of its own" and therefore the
college could not allow its facilities "to serve as a forum for such political groups," since
their viewpoint was "opposed by substantial parts of the public." The rationale offered
in support of the regulation was that "academic institutions of a public character must
avoid giving the appearance or creating the suspicion that they favor particular movements or groups over other groups opposed to their positions or their points of view." Id.
at 468-69, 471, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 927, 930. In deciding the case, the court noted that the
school's "motives are . . .to avoid identification with any minority position," but "as
well-intentioned as these aims are, they evidence a temper of mind. . . incompatible with
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wise would be to stifle minority opinion indirectly through a convenient rationalization of government restriction as being necessary to the public interest.
And even aside from the university's legal connection with
the protest, it could also have neutralized any consequent "impression" of school-sanctioned hostility to Mormons through. a
timely public disavowal of any position on the views expressed. 2"
In this way the university officials could have convincingly disasthe philosophy of the First Amendment." Id. at 473, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 932.
This same issue was raised in National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers,
where it was observed:
The state action doctrine has never been thought to extend to cases where
the streets, parks and public meeting places of a particular community are
utilized for the exercise of first amendment rights . . . . No case suggests
that in maintaining a street, park or public meeting place, a state espouses
the views which may be there expressed ...
The essential point here is not that there is insufficient state action, but
simply that the state action doctrine is not applicable where a group seeks
to exercise first amendment rights in a public forum [partially] dedicated
to that purpose ....
473 F.2d 1010, 1016-17 (4th Cir. 1973) (footnote omitted).
We are confident that if the high school auditorium is made available
to all groups, the very diversity and complexity of the views expressed, taken
in bulk, will cure any incidental official identification attendant upon the
use of the building for the articulation of extreme or abusive speech. At least
that is the principle on which we have staked our all.
Id. at 1018 (footnote omitted).
See Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d 1273, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972): "If this
right could be exercised only when government is willing to offer its co-sponsorship to the
speaker, a system of free expression would be indistinguishable from a system of prior
restraint."; Tate v. Board of Educ., 453 F.2d 975, 980, 982 (8th Cir. 1972): In protesting
the playing of "Dixie" as the school song, plaintiffs urged that "the right to free speech
does not give rise to the right to publicly insult or defame ....
" Yet the court held "we
cannot say that the . . . playing of the tune . . . officially sanctioned racial abuse."; Veed
v. Schwartzkopf, 353 F. Supp. 149, 152 (D. Neb. 1973): The plaintiff argued "that in its
program of supporting extracurricular speakers and a student newspaper the university
assumes the role of advocate for the particular philosophy expressed . . . . The evidence
is to the contrary," for no editorial control is exercised over these views. "Indeed, such
control by the university would raise grave constitutional questions."; Panarella v. Birenbaum, 60 Misc. 2d 95, 302 N.Y.S. 2d 427 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (emphasis on display of the
"school seal" and use of school facilities, allegedly resulting in placing "the imprimatur
of the state" on the contested school expression, not followed by two appellate courts in
considering same case); Stanton v. Board of Educ., 190 Misc. 1012, 76 N.Y.S.2d 559 (Sup.
Ct. 1948) (board's refusal to adopt resolution denying use of school and grounds to Communists, Nazis, Fascists, or an organization that fosters racial or religious intolerance
upheld).
""See Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 7: "Indeed, the
[government transit] district is more insulated from implied endorsement since it can,
and in the instant case does, require a disclaimerin the text of the advertisements submitted to it." 434 P.2d 982, 989, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430, 437. (emphasis added).
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sociated the school from the content of the protest, while continuing to extend to the student athletes the full range of liberty
traditionally associated with freedom of speech and the right to
dissent.
With this alternative available, then, a game with Brigham
Young University should have been viewed as a particularly logical and defensible occasion for publicizing dissenting views directly related to Mormon policy. And therefore the conflict in
Williams between religious conviction and political conviction
was an unavoidable aspect of the first amendment obligation of
a university to serve as a public forum,' 2 ' since that constitutional
function entails an equal and impartial accommodation of expression by all students who choose to use school property in a
peaceful, unobstructive manner to communicate legitimately felt
dissent.'2 2
Viewed in this light, the action of the school officials in
Williams seems considerably less justified, since one indispensable prerequisite for government regulation of expression is that
the restriction involved be "no greater than is essential to the
furtherance" of the governmental interest. ' Here a firm public
'2 Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969); United States v. Gourley, 502
F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1973) (right of civilians to enter "public areas" of Air Force
Academy for purpose of exercising their first amendment rights outside football stadium
upheld); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Hammond v. South
Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967) (cited with approval in Tinker);
Abbott, supra note 53, at 19: Hammond "indicated that a college campus is sufficiently
analogous to the 'site of state government' which has been given constitutional protection
for purposes of a demonstration by the Supreme Court, and is thus to be distinguished
from Adderley v. Florida," which involved public property dedicated to a special use
incompatible with the normal standard for free expression.; Emerson, Toward a General
Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 953 (1963): "The most common form
of governmental assistance to freedom of expression is the furnishing of facilities for
communication. Traditionally streets, parks, commons and similar open public places
have been used for meetings, parades and other forms of expression. Clearly there should
be a right for any person or group to use such public property, subject only to restrictions
of the traffic control type."; Kalven, supra note 90; Nahmod, supra note 50, at 293-300:
"Hammond v. South CarolinaState College indicates ...
that a college campus is to be
treated as a first amendment forum for peaceful demonstrations." Cf. Amalgamated Food
Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968); Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth.,
392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968).
' 22Emerson, supra note 121, at 953: Once public property has been made available to
the public, it "should be open to all on an equal basis; no differentiation based upon the
content of the expression is permissible." (emphasis added).
'=United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, (1968) (emphasis added). See Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960): "[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle funda-
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disavowal would have been a "less drastic alternative" by which
the university could have remained neutral politically and religiously. 24 Since it is "incumbent upon . . .[the government] to
demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would . . .
[protect the government's position of neutrality] without infringing First Amendment rights,' 25 it would appear that the
state interest advanced in Williams could have been more narrowly achieved.
3. University "Representation"
The University of Wyoming's argument might be analyzed
further by applying its reasoning to a situation where one of its
professors (as a contractual "representative" of the state) decides
to wear an armband to his classroom (a publicly owned facility
or forum) to protest Mormon racial policy. Under those circumstances it would seem considerably easier to establish a legal
"connection" with the state. Yet even here the professor/representative in all likelihood would prevail on the basis of
academic freedom.
This general issue was tested in the recent case of James v.
Board of Education of Central District No. 1,126 where it was
recognized that "a high school teacher, despite the influential
position he holds in the classroom, does not forefeit his right to
mental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. . . .[Restriction
of speech] must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic
purpose."; Wallace v. Ford, 346 F. Supp. 156, 165 (E.D. Ark. 1972): "It should be emphasized . . .that any such restriction [of student expression] must not exceed that which
is absolutely necessary to carry out [the school's] legitimate objectives." (emphasis
added); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 7, 434 P.2d 982, 989, 64
Cal. Rptr. 430, 437 (1967): "In the realm of the First Amendment, no governmental agency
is permitted to burn down the house to roast a pig."; Kalven, "Uninhibited, Robust, and
Wide-Open"--A Note on Free Speech and the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REv. 289, 299
is not enough that the end be legitimate; the
(1968): Where speech is regulated, "[i]t
means must not be wasteful of first amendment values."
"'Refer again to the quotation from Panarellaaccompanying note 106 supra, where
it was observed: "The colleges merely provided a neutral forum for debate, and did not
evidence an intent to advance or destroy religious beliefs." 32 N.Y.2d 108, 112, 296 N.E.2d
238, 239, 343 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (1973).
"Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963): "Precision of regulation must be the
touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms."; Russo v. Central
School Dist., 469 F.2d 623, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1973); Butts v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 436
F.2d 728, 732 (5th Cir. 1971): In Tinker, "the Supreme Court has declared a constitutional
right which school authorities must nurture and protect, not extinguish, unless they find
the circumstances allow them no practical alternative."
125461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
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exercise his freedom of speech there because of that position.",7
So long as the expression "is not coercive and does not arbitrarily
inculcate doctrinaire views in the minds of the students," ' it
cannot be restricted without a substantial showing of interference
with the educational process or the teacher's obligation to
educate.
Therefore, as in Tinker, "[iut can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school house gate."'2 9 In short,
expression on campus by either students or teachers is protected
by "correlative first amendment rights," in that "the considerations called into play are the same whether the right asserted is
' 3
freedom of speech or academic freedom. '
The question, then, is why a salaried employee of a state
university can criticize Mormon racial policy, even when acting
under a legally binding relationship with the state in a publicly
owned classroom, while student athletes with a much more remote and conjectural connection with the state cannot. In response, the proposition could be advanced that discussion of this
type is the primary function of a classroom (or of the newspaper
in Panarella), while it is not the function of a stadium (or of a
student athlete). Yet this would merely be an indirect way of
saying that students forfeit their right of free expression when not
in the classroom. And, to quote Tinker once again, a school cannot "confine the permissible exercise of First Amendment rights
to . . .supervised and ordained discussion in a school classroom."'13 ' The student does not "shed" these rights either "at the
schoolhouse gate," during classroom hours, "in the cafeteria, . . .on the playing field, or on the campus ... ."I, Nor,
by analogy, should student athletes shed their constitutional
"7Comment, Discharging Teacherfor Wearing Armband Violates FirstAmendment
Right of Free Speech, 7 SUFF. L. REv. 197, 210 (1971) (emphasis added). Cf. Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967); Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972).
'2 'James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 1972).
'z 9Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
'"Comment, supra note 127, at 205 & n.39, citing Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp.
352, 355 (M.D. Ala. 1970). See Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623, 631 (2d Cir.
1972): "[Tjhe school board, as it did in James v. Board of Education, would have us
decide that the rights enjoyed by school children are broader than the First Amendment
rights of their teachers. [As in] James, we decline[d] that invitation."
'393 U.S. at 513.
"'Id. at 506, 512-13.
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rights at the fieldhouse gate. By necessary implication, the right
of free expression is retained throughout all of a student's endeavors, including participation in an extracurricular activity such as
33
football.
Though the Williams protest might well have been planned
for a location other than the stadium, that is essentially insignificant so long as it promised to be peaceful and unobstructive.
Thus, as explained by one authority:
[T]hough students arguably have other means of protesting educational policies-for example, through their parents or, as could have
been done. . . in Tinker, by wearing bands off school premises-the
availability of other alternatives is constitutionally less relevant in
"pure speech" cases [like Williams] than where conduct is involved. Furthermore, the relevant audience is not the same when
these alternatives are pursued."'

Some public property, due to the particular nature of the use to
which it is dedicated, can be reserved for "nonexpressive purposes.' ' 3 Tinker, however, viewed school property as a "public
place.' ' 36 So the public forum right clearly extends to a school
stadium.' 37 Indeed, the "mass communication potential' 3 of the
'3The opportunity to participate in intercollegiate athletic competition
must be considered, even in this day of relevancy and change on college
campuses as an important aspect of the overall educational program offered
by the University of California at Berkeley.
Curtis v. NCAA, No. C-71-2088-ACW (N.D. Cal., filed Oct. 29, 1971), quoted in Reply
Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, Williams v. Eaton, 468 F.2d 1070 (10th Cir. 1672).
34
1 Nahmod, supra note 50, at 281 (citing Tinker). See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 163 (1939): "[Olne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."; Lee v.
Board of Regents of State Colleges, 306 F. Supp. 1097, 1101 (W.D. Wis. 1969): Since "a
paid advertisement can be cast in such a form as to command much greater attention than
a letter to the editor," the fact that plaintiffs could have published their political views
in the letters column was held insignificant; Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 546-47, 171 P.2d 885,
892 (1946): "Once [a school] opens its doors [as a forum] ... it cannot demand tickets
of admission in the form of convictions and affiliations that it deems acceptable. Censorship of those who would use the school building as a forum cannot be rationalized by
reference to its setting. School desks and blackboards, like trees or street lights, are but
the trappings of the forum; what imports is the meeting of minds and not the meeting
place."
'"See Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
'36393 U.S. at 512 n.6, citing Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp.
947 (D.S.C. 1967).

"'37In National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, which involved a controver-

sial political party's request to use a public school auditorium, the Fourth Circuit observed:
[The first] amendment's protections cannot be made to turn on structural
distinctions between, for example, an open public park, a public amphi-
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occasion and the relatively undisruptable nature of the school
activity being conducted make it an unusually effective and desirable setting in which to publicize symbolic dissent.' And as
another federal court has observed:
It is patently unfair in light of the free speech doctrine to close to
the students the forum which they deem effective to present their
ideas. The rationale of Tinker carries beyond the facts in that case.lu

Wyoming officials may have wanted only to funnel the protest into what they deemed "less offensive channels" of commutheatre, a public stadium, or an enclosed public auditorium. While limitations on its use as a forum to permit it to serve its prime function (school
purposes) . . . may be sustained, regulation which limits the exercise of first
amendment guarantees should be stricken down.
. . . Specifically, the expression of racist and anti-semitic views in a public
place . . . [is] protected activit[y] and may not be circumscribed by the
state, except where "advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."
473 F.2d 1010, 1015 (4th Cir. 1973) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted), quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). Cf. Pollitt, Free Speech for Mustangs and
Mavericks, 46 N.C.L. REv. 39, 43-46 (1967).
See United States v. Gourley, 502 F.2d 785 (10th Cir., 1973) (right of civilians to enter
"public areas" of Air Force Academy for purposes of exercising their first amendment
rights outside school football stadium upheld); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.
W.Va. 1968) (peaceful demonstration at halftime of football game protected, but right

exceeded where protest became violent); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist.,
68 Cal. 2d 7, 434 P.2d 982, 64 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1967); Denno, supra note 36, at 59: "Virtually
all the public facilities and institutions in the country have been opened to the presence
of the first amendment ..
"; Homing, The First Amendment Right to a Public Forum,
1969 DUKE L.J. 931, 946: "It would seem clear that the public forum right extends to
streets and parks, subways, mass transportation terminals, mass entertainment areas,
school buildings and grounds, and grounds of general governmental buildings." But cf.
A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 46-47 (1968): School buildings
may not be used "in a way which subverts their purpose and prevents their intended use
by others."
'38Horning, supra note 137, at 948 (describes the public forum right as "a 'constitu-

tional3 obligation' flowing out of the first amendment").
' See Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 90 (2d Cir. 1968): "The [Bus]
Terminal building is an appropriate place for expressing one's views precisely because the

primary activity for which it is designed is attended with noisy crowds and vehicles, some
unrest and less than perfect order." Cf. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972);
Hicks v. State, 294 N.E.2d 613, 616 (Ind. 1973).

110Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See Tinker v. Des Moines,

393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969): "Under our Constitution, free speech is not a right that is given
only to be so circumscribed that it exists in principle but not in fact. . . . [W]e do not
confine the permissible exercise of First Amendment rights to a telephone booth or the
four corners of a pamphlet, or to supervised and ordained discussion in a school classroom."; Los Angeles Teachers Union v. Los Angeles City Bd. of Educ., 71 Cal. 2d 551,
559, 455 P.2d 827, 832-33, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723, 728-29 (1969) (the first amendment contemplates effective communication).
A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT
may
073

AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

46-47 (1968): School buildings
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nication,"4 I but the black athletes in Williams viewed the
Brigham Young game as their single most promising opportunity
to dramatize their feelings about Mormon racial policy to Mormons themselves. Students normally do not have ready access to
the more traditional, and expensive, means of communication by
which public opinion is influenced. As Wyoming football players,
however, these particular students did command considerable
public attention. As in James, their "influential position" should
not serve of itself to deprive them of their right to communicate
their views, particularly when both the content and mode of their
expression were responsible, nondisruptive, and logically related
to the occasion.
Social problems often can best be solved by allowing a
healthy conflict of first amendment rights:
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp
differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the
rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point
of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration,
to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent in church or
state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have
ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of
excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential
to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens
12
of a democracy.

In other words, the open expression of opinion, even on religious
matters, is basic both to freedom of speech and the shaping of
"'That is, they may have been willing to allow the wearing of armbands during times
when the athletes were not "representing" the school.
"'Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940). See Street v. New York, 394 U.S.
576, 593 (1969): "We have no doubt that the constitutionally guaranteed 'freedom to be
intellectually . . . diverse or even contrary' . . . encompass[es] the freedom to express
publicly . . . those opinions which are defiant or contemptuous."; Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536, 551-52 (1965), quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949):
"[Plersons [may not] be punished merely for peacefully expressing unpopular views
....
[A] 'function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute.
It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often
provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have
profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of
speech ...
is ...
protected against censorship or punishment ....
There is no room
under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to
standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community
groups.' "; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964): There is "a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
unpleasantly sharp attacks ....
"
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public opinion. Surely responsible free expression is equally in
keeping with the traditional role and function of a university:
"The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more
vital than in the community of American schools." The classroom
["with its surrounding environs"]"1 is peculiarly the "marketplace
of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
"out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind
of
authoritative selection.""'

4. Private Capacity of Students
Clearly neither the State nor the University of Wyoming were
purposely utilizing publicly owned property to facilitate religious
criticism. The protest was neither prescribed nor mandated by
the State, nor was it conducted at the request of or under any
form of encouragement from the state. Instead it was privately
initiated and merely used State property as a forum for its expression. As emphasized previously, it was merely a peaceful, silent
protest, individually felt and individually expressed.' The participating students did "represent" both the State and the school
in an athletic capacity, but not in an individual capacity and
certainly not in the expression of their private beliefs.' Students
1'3This phrase was added by Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972).
"'Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (citations omitted). See
Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1336 (D. Mass. 1970): "The university setting
of college-age students being exposed to a wide range of intellectual experiences creates a
relatively mature market-place for the interchange of ideas so that the free speech clause
S..
with its underlying assumption that there is positive social value in an open forum
seems particularly appropriate."; Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924
(Sup. Ct. 1962): "I would have thought ... that one of the aims of a college worthy of
the name was to stimulate thought and to provoke intellectual controversy. The action of
the Dean . . . and the President ... in this case bespeaks a contrary belief-they seem
to regard intellectual quiescence and freedom from any conceivable identification with
strongly expressed views as being necessary to their educational goals." 230 N.Y.S.2d at
934. "To be sure, the ... College authorities are motivated by the desire to preserve the
good name of their college, rather than by a desire to stifle minority opinion. But even if
I were to suppose that they were correct in believing that to allow dissenting opinion to
be expressed from their platforms has a tendency to besmirch the institution-and I, in
fact, think they are wrong in this-this would not provide a sufficient reason to deny the
expression of the opinion.
'Only an emergency can justify repression.'" Id. (citation
omitted).

"'See Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642, 656 (D.C.
Cir. 1971): "[Als the Supreme Court has said in the context of classroom debate 'supervised and ordained discussion' is not enough. . . . In other words, there is always a strong
First Amendment interest in opening up channels for more spontaneous, self-initiated,
self-controlled expression." (footnote omitted).
14'Assuming public disavowal by university officials, this would certainly have been
clear to nearly everyone in the stands.
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''may not be confined to the expression of those sentiments that
are officially approved,"' 4 7 and, conversely, a school need not be
held to have officially approved every expression of student opinion. To invoke the relationship of a student with his school in
order to restrict extracurricular speech which is "private" in all
other respects is to misconceive and thereby dilute the meaning
of Tinker.
This is not to say, of course, that students are entitled to be
entirely free of regulation in their extracurricular activities.
Clearly they can be more strictly disciplined in matters where
"basic constitutional values" are not affected.4 8 If only student
appearance is involved, for example, courts may tend to grant
more room to administrative regulation than if the right asserted
were freedom of speech.' The measure of permissible school regulation, then, depends primarily on the nature of the right alleged
to have been infringed. Where that right can be shown to bear a
"'Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
-8Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
"'By way of illustration, grooming regulations concerning student dress and hair
length have on occasion been held of insufficient importance to warrant judicial review.
Compare Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970) (hair code for student
athletes held unconstitutional), with Neuhaus v. Torrey, 310 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal.
1970) (hair code for student athletes held constitutional). See cases cited in Murphy v.
Pocatello School Dist., 94 Idaho 32, 480 P.2d 878, 881-82 (1971); Annot., 14 A.L.R.3d 1201
(1967).
But even student speech may be subject to regulation in accordance with its inherent
"communicative value"-that is, whether frivolous and facetious (as in the case of a
pointlessly crude halftime show or school play) or serious and responsible. See Close v.
Lederle, 303 F. Supp. 1109 (D. Mass. 1969), rev'd, 424 F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1970); Note,
Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1091 (1968) (discusses problems which result when
symbolic conduct is less clearly communicative).
The armband protest considered in Tinker was held to involve responsible first
amendment activity:
These petitioners merely went about their ordained rounds in school. Their
deviation consisted only in wearing on their sleeve a band of black cloth, not
more than two inches wide. They wore it to exhibit their disapproval of the
Vietnam hostilities and their advocacy of a truce, to make their views known,
and, by their example, to influence others to adopt them.
393 U.S. at 514. The Williams athletes, therefore, should have been well within their rights
in wearing armbands for an equally responsible purpose.
They might not have been entitled, however, to wear a black jersey (interference with
the game), shout obscenities at Mormon fans ("fighting words"; little communicative
value), engage in unruly conduct, and so forth. And it could be argued that even the
wearing of an armband might justify regulatory action by the coach if the athletes were
participating in a different kind of athletic event, such as a swim meet, where its presence
would substantially impair their performance. In determining which athletes would compete, a coach might then be entitled to reassess their potential contribution to the team's
showing in light of this predictable impairment of their individual performances.
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high order of importance, the authority of the school to regulate
its exercise will be more carefully limited.
By participating in extracurricular activities, then, a student
may arguably limit his latitude in expressing his personality, but
not in the sincere, nondisruptive expression of his individual
beliefs. Basic first amendment rights are consistently worthy of
protection, whether implicated in extracurricular or classroom
activities. Consequently, they can only be regulated under a single standard addressed to the value of the right itself and the
means of its expression (i.e., the Tinker rule). And in applying
this standard, the relationship of the student with his school is
constitutionally irrelevant, so long as his expression is privately
initiated.
A related quotation from Bond v. Floyd, where members of
the Georgia House of Representatives challenged Julian Bond's
right to be seated because of his antiwar statements, is especially
applicable to this point:
"I stand before you today charged with entering into public discussion on matters of National interest. I hesitate to offer explanations
for my actions or deeds where no charge has been levied against me
other than the charge that I have chosen to speak my mind ....
The posture of my life for the past five years has been calculated to
give Negroes the ability to participate in formulation of public policies. The fact of my election to public office does not lessen my duty
or desire to express my opinions even when they differ from those

held by others.
flnd
.

...........

.

.

."150

position, the Supreme Court observed:

The State attempts to circumvent the protection the First
Amendment would afford to these statements if made by a private
citizen by'arguing that a State is constitutionally justified in exacting a higher standard . . . from its [representatives]than from its
citizens."'

State officials, therefore, have no authority to exact a more restrictive standard for speech on the basis of some alleged "representative" relationship with the state. And so when dealing with
the Tinker standard for campus expression, school authorities are
legally bound to apply it uniformly to all students, without distinctions based on the particular activity in which they are engaged. To restrict otherwise protected private expression by artificially categorizing certain students as "representatives" of the
'1-385 U.S. 116, 124-25 (1966).
"'Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
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state is, as in Bond,
tantamount to circumvention of first amend2
ment guarantees.
IIl.

STATE NEUTRALITY TOWARD RELIGIOUS PROTEST

We have seen that the private expression of peaceful dissent
is permissible, even though it may be directed at a religious group
or belief. Where the state may be unduly involved in that expression, however, the question is more difficult, for "when government activities touch on the religious sphere, they must be secular in purpose, evenhanded in operation, and neutral in primary
impact."'' 3
A. Neutrality
Williams placed a great deal of emphasis on the need for
religious neutrality by the state, quoting School Districtof A bington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp to this effect: "The government is neutral, and, while protecting all [religious opinions
and sects], it prefers none, and it disparagesnone." '54

Admittedly, separation of church and state demands that
government remain neutral in all its dealings with religion. Under
the "secular purpose" doctrine,' however, many instances of
5

'Consider, for example, the fact that other black students at Wyoming were allowed
to wear armbands as an expression of their private opinions on Mormon racial policy. Brief
for Defendants-Appellees at 7-8, Williams v. Eaton, 468 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir. 1972). And
remember that Williams cited no other case which stands for the proposition that some
students can be classified as school "representatives" so as to restrict their first amendment rights.
"'Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971).
" 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963) (emphasis in the original), quoting Minor v. Board of
Educ., (Cincinnati Super. Ct., Feb. 1870) (unpublished opinion of Judge Alphonso Taft).
Note that in relying on Schempp the Williams court placed itself in the ironic position of
restricting the rights of nonbelievers by citing a case which upheld the rights of other
nonbelievers.
In evaluating phrases like "it disparagesnone" and "rights of others," the researcher
would be well-advised to recall the warning expressed in Anderson v. Laird:
"The hazards of placing too much weight on a few words or phrases of the
Court is abundantly illustrated within the pages of the Court's opinion in
Everson [v. Board of Education]." The Chief Justice noted that the Court
had stated in Everson that the government cannot "pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another" but had no
difficulty in upholding a taxing statute which undoubtedly helped children
get to church schools.
466 F.2d 283, 289 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076
(1972), quoting Walz v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970).
"5 The "secular purpose" doctrine constitutes an exception to the traditional principle
of separation of church and state. Periodic elaborations have determined that a "secular
purpose," with "a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion"
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government activity apparently supportive of religion have been
held not to offend the constitutional requirement of neutrality. 5
The reasoning in these cases has generally been that the government involvement consisted only of neutral, nonpreferential provision of government services, facilities, or materials to all on an
equal basis.'57 And if government action only indirectly inures to
the benefit of religion, the establishment clause is not violated.
So the "secular purpose" doctrine means that government
actions "directed toward secular ends are valid even though they
result in incidental benefits for religious purposes. 158 The logical
extension of this doctrine, therefore, should protect action by the
state directed toward secular ends which results in incidental
disparagement of religion.'5 9 As applied to the Williams facts, a
state school's acceptance of its constitutional obligation to accommodate nondisruptive student expression should not be held
to violate the neutrality requirement, even though private criticism of religious policy would be an incidental side effect of meeting this obligation. 6 ° Clearly the "primary effect" of this kind of
and which avoids "an excessive government entanglement with religion," will legitimate
government action which would otherwise appear to violate the neutrality requirement.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
'5 See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (free loan of secular textbooks to
all students); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (uniform day of rest); Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (reimbursement of all parents who sent their children
to school on public buses). In Everson, by way of example, it was held that New Jersey
had not violated the establishment clause since the purpose of its h,,- f-r- rz'bubinent
program "was nnt - _'.' z'g,ub education but to promote the valid public welfare
purpose of providing safe transportation for children attending parochial schools." Kauper, The Warren Court: Religious Liberty and Church-State Relations, 67 MICH. L. REv.
269, 270 (1968).
"'57Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1971): "Our decisions from Everson to
Allen have permitted the State to provide church-related schools with secular, neutral,
or nonideological services, facilities, or materials. Bus transportation, school lunches,
public health services, and secular textbooks supplied in common to all students were not
thought to offend the Establishment Clause."
'5 'Kauper, supra note 156, at 280, citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
See Sutherland, Historians, Lawyers, and "Establishment of Religion," in RELIGION AND
THE PUBLIC ORDER 27, 49-50 (D. Giannella ed. 1969): "I suggest that in no case has the
Supreme Court decided that a nonpreferential governmental activity, with a secular
objective, and with no element of religious compulsion on the individual, is nevertheless
unconstitutional because some incidental advantage may accrue to some religious group."
"'Compare the "incidental burden" on religion held justified by a substantial governmental interest in Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). Note also the similarity
with the "free exercise" cases where substantial governmental interests have been held
to outweigh freedom of religion. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
""See Cohen v. California, where the neutral role of government in regulating speech
was described as follows:
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school policy would be to further a "secular purpose" 6 -the
evenhanded provision of access to school property for use as a first
2
amendment forum.6
Thus the mere "involvement" of religion in government activity does not, of itself, presuppose a violation of the establish6 3
ment clause:
[TIhe usual rule [is] that governmental bodies may not prescribe the form
or content of individual expression . . . . The constitutional right of free
expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours.
It is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena
of public discussion, putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced
largely into the hands of each of us, . . . in the belief that no other approach
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which
our political system rests.
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often appear
to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. These are,
however, within established limits, in truth necessary side effects of the
broader enduring values which the process of open debate permits us to
achieve. That the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in
this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength. We cannot lose sight of the
fact that, in what otherwise might seem a trifling and annoying instance of
individual distasteful abuse of a privilege, these fundamental societal values
are truly implicated. That is why . . . "so long as the means are peaceful,
the communication need not meet standards of acceptability [to others]."
403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971) (emphasis added) (citation omitted), quoting Organization for
a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
"'See Walz v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 692 (Brennan, J., concurring): The "principal effect" of tax exemptions for church property "is to carry out secular purposes-the
encouragement of public service activities and of a pluralistic society."
" 2 nterestingly enough, religious groups have also been extended the right to use
public school property, even for purely religious purposes such as the erection of nativity
scenes. See, e.g., Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 1256, 1268-70 (1971). In such cases it has generally
been held significant that religious symbolism is inescapable during certain holidays, that
schools are out of session during that time, and that the symbols do not occasion greater
influence simply because they are located on school property. In short, the school's action
is merely a "passive accommodation of religion." Id. at 1269-70.
" 3See National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1017 (4th
Cir. 1973) (emphasis added), where a controversial political party was granted the right
to use public school property for the purpose of expressing racist and anti-semitic views:
This case is not unlike Everson v. Board of Education. . . .Just as New
Jersey in Everson did not transgress the establishment clause or unconstitutionally support parochial schools by providing transportation facilities and
"such general government services as ordinary police and fire protection,
connections for sewage disposal, public highways and sidewalks," so too,
Virginia would not transgress the equal protection clause or unconstitutionally support the Party['s racist and antisemitic views] by providing a
public forum. Although the establishment clause prohibited New Jersey
from enacting laws favoring one religion over another, . . . New Jersey was
[also] prohibited from hampering its citizens in the exercise of their own
religion by denying generally provided government services to certain
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What the Framers meant to foreclose, and what our decisions under
the Establishment Clause have forbidden, are those involvements of
religious with secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially
religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of
government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially
religious means to serve governmental ends, where secular means
would suffice."'

In short, "what the first amendment forbids is a classification [or
state action] which results in either preference or discrimination
based on the religious factor."' 5 Furthermore, the state must
have played on active, instigatory role' in the sense that the
action must have originated with the state and must have consisted of something beyond "generally provided government servgroups. Similarly, although the fourteenth amendment in the instant case
prohibits Virginia from practicing the discrimination which the Party practices, the first amendment also prohibits Virginia from hampering its citizens in the exercise of their right to speak and assemble freely by denying a
generally provided public forum.
[Tihe use of facilities partially dedicated as a public forum for the expression of diverse views does not amount to state espousal of racist views ....
In short, the first amendment "requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with
groups of [both] religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be
[the] adversary [of either]." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
"'School Dist. of Abington Tp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294-95 (1963) (Brennan,

J., concurring). Cf. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting):
"The constitutional obligation of 'neutrality' . . . is not so narrow a channel that the
slightest deviation from an absolutely straight course leads to condemnation. There are
too many instances in which no such course can hp j-T+....
.
"Nuper, supra note 156, at 282 (emphasis added), citing P. KuRLAND, RELIGION AND
THE LAw (1962).
'See Walz v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970): "It is sufficient to note that

for the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment the 'establishment'
of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."; Panarella v. Birenbaum, 32 N.Y.2d 108, 112, 296 N.E.2d 238,
239, 343 N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (1973): "Only if the colleges continued financial support to a
newspaper systematically attacking religion over a period of time, without balance, might
there be an attempt to 'establish' a 'secular religion'."; Todd v. Rochester Community

Schools, 41 Mich. App. 320, 200 N.W.2d 90, 93 (1972): "Plaintiff's complaint specifically
pleads only that SlaughterhouseFive is used in a public school and 'contains and makes
reference to religious matters.' We have been cited to no authority, nor has our own
research uncovered any, which holds that any portion of any constitution is violated
simply because a novel, utilized in a public school 'contains and makes reference to
religious matters.' . . . By couching a personal grievance in First Amendment language,
one may not stifle freedom of expression."; Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41
TEX. L. REV. 347, 367 (1963): The role of state law is so pervasive "that it is difficult to
conceive of situations where state action is not present." So a mere finding of state action
does not establish, of itself, a violation of constitutional rights. "Under the terms of the
Constitution, it must be the state which engages in the violation, not the private individual."
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ices."' 7 In Williams, however, privately initiated political belief
came into conflict with private religious belief, and in that situation government intervention on behalf of either conviction would
have been to employ the forces of the state to stifle the free
expression of the other. The only constitutionally defensible alternative for the state, then, was to assume the "politically neutral"
role of holding its public facilities open to all accepted forms of
nondisruptive expression. Surely a passive acknowledgment of its
legal obligation in this respect is hardly synonymous with "insti68
gation."'
B.

Blasphemy Analogy
Both the establishment clause and the concept of neutrality
have assumed new dimensions as courts provide further substance to the constitutional mandate that states neither aid nor
hinder religion. In State v. West,"' for example, the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals considered the constitutionality of a
state blasphemy statute, 0 and found that it constituted an abandonment by the state of its required position of neutrality on
religious matters. The petitioner there had argued that enforcement of the statute "may coerce into holding his tongue anyone
who in the course of promoting his own religious [or antireligious] belief would want to criticize Christianity.""' As in
Williams, the state countered by attempting to portray the statute "as an effort by the State to enable 'those citizens who desire
"'National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1017 (4th Cir.
1973).
"'See id.:
The essential point here is not that there is insufficient state action, but
simply that the state action doctrine is not applicable where a group seeks
to exercise first amendment rights in a public forum [partially] dedicated
to that purpose. . . . We have a . . . [forum] where the position of the state
is required to be neutral and where denial of the use of the place will substantially impair the exercise of first amendment rights.
In short, the state's "interest on this record is too remote and conjectural
to override the guarantee of the First Amendment that a person can speak
or not, as he chooses, free of all governmental compulsion." DeGregory v.
N.H. Atty. Gen., 383 U.S. 825, 830 (1966).
"'69 Md. App. 270, 263 A.2d 602 (1970).
"'Blasphemy has been defined as "maliciously reviling God or religion." Annot., 41
A.L.R.3d 519, 520 n.2 (1972). Its doctrinal foundation has been held to rest on the principle
that "it is not necessary to maintain that any man should have the right publicly to vilify
the religion of his neighbors ....
" Id. at 523. See generally T.A. SCHROEDER, CONsTrruTIONAL FREE SPEECH DEFINED AND DEFENDED

IN AN UNFINISHED ARGUMENT IN A CASE OF

BLASPHEMY (1919).

"'Annot., supra note 170, at 514 (brief of petitioner).
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to worship to carry on unmolested' . . ." ."72 In its decision, the
court adopted the Schempp interpretation of neutrality:
The wholesome "neutrality" of which this Court's cases speak thus
stems from a recognition of the teachings of history that powerful
sects or groups might bring about a fusion of governmental and
religious functions or a concert of dependency of one upon the other
to the end that official support of the State or Federal Government
would be placed behind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies.,

With this potential "dependency" in mind, it then proceeded to
apply the neutrality test to the Maryland blasphemy statute:
It obviously was intended to serve. . . as a mantle of protection by
the State to believers in Christian orthodoxy and extend to those
individuals the aid, comfort and support of the State. This effort by
the State of Maryland to extend its protective cloak to the Christian
religion or to any other religion is forbidden by the Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. As stated by
former Associate Justice Fortas in Epperson v. Arkansas, ". . . The
First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion."''

Under this line of reasoning, then, the University of Wyoming could be held to have done administratively (as an agency
of the State) what the State of Maryland was prevented from
doing statutorily in West. In both cases the government action
could be viewed as favoring a particular religion (or religion in
general) through restricting criticism by those not likewise persuaded. Admittedly, the action taken by the respective States
arose out of a legitimate concern for the role religion plays in our
national.

e-;.

TUiz shud not, however, allow the state to adopt

an overprotective position in tacit support of the immunity of
religion from public criticism. To accept this kind of reasoning is
to lose sight of the real meaning of neutrality as applied to the
separation of church and state. And in Williams it lent support
to action by the State which amounted to deviation from its
position of neutrality in a well-intentioned, though misguided,
effort to preserve its neutrality.
C.

Accommodation of Religious Protest
The lesson to be learned from this discussion of the relationship between church and state is that a government can best be
neutral by not interfering in any way with the dissent of those
"'State v. West, 9 Md. App. 270, 263 A.2d 602, 604 (1970).
73
' Id., citing School Dist. of Abington Tp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
" 4State v. West, 9 Md. App. 270, 263 A.2d 602, 605 (1970).
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peacefully protesting religious doctrine. 7 ' The establishment
clause forbids not only "government preference of one religion
over another . . . [but also] an impartial governmental assistance of all religions."' 76 In other words, the government is also
prevented from "establishing" religion in general' by prohibiting
religious criticism. Instead the traditional state role of "passive
accommodation" of dissenting views is a more acceptable form of
neutrality here. A neutral government policy of this kind "leaves
religion on the solid foundation of its own inherent validity, without any connection with temporal authority .
"..."178
As Mr. Justice Jackson observed in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette:
[The] freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of
the existing order. 7

Once this is understood, it is clear that religious criticism is an
accepted subcategory of the freedom to dissent. To restrict constitutionally protected expression of this kind by undue expansion
of the "rights of others" exception to Tinker is to perpetuate the
outmoded view that the state can place a ban on religious criticism.",
"'This is especially true where, as in Williams, the object of the protest is a racially
discriminatory policy directly affecting those protesting.
"'Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948). See School
Dist. of Abington Tp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366

U.S. 420, 443 (1961).
'Cf. Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.

1076 (1972).
1794DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL

CONSTITUTION 200 (J. Elliott ed. 1907). In this connection consider the facts in Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1951), which involved a controversial and allegedly
"sacrilegious" film ("The Miracle"). The movie was produced in Italy where "[bly the
Lateran agreements and the Italian Constitution the Italian Government is bound to bar
whatever may offend the Catholic religion." Although no action was taken to ban the film
in Italy, an unsuccessful effort to that end was made in New York City. The Commonweal,
a respected Catholic periodical, editorially "questioned the wisdom of transforming
Church dogma . . .into state-enforced censorship for all." In addition, a Commonweal
contributor noted that all the effort at censorship "will have succeeded in doing is insulting the intelligence and faith of American Catholics with the assumption that a secondrate motion picture could in any way undermine their morals or shake their faith." M.
KoNvrrz, BILL OF RIGHTs READER 576-78 (2d ed. 1960).
"'West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
"This point might be analogized to the controversy in the Sixties over university
speaker ban laws. At that time many citizens, legislators, and school officials also felt that
state colleges should not "facilitate" the expression of certain views. See Pickings v.
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CONCLUSION

As has been observed of another case involving symbolic expression, the Williams court "chose not to deal with the complexities" of the problem it faced, "made no attempt to discuss, let
alone to answer, the difficult and disturbing constitutional questions presented," but instead "trivialized the issues and handed
down an opinion that has all the deceptive simplicity and superficial force that can usually be achieved by begging the question."'' As a result, the Williams demonstrators were disciplined
because their message was unpopular, rather than because they
interfered in a material and substantial way with normal school
activities or with the rights of others. In effect, the "rights of
others" exception was used as an excuse to avoid the merits, and
such an expansive interpretation of Tinker can only serve "to
undermine the rule [enunciated] there by the 'disintegrating
8
erosion' of particular exceptions.'

2

The proper legal approach for school administrators to follow
in dealing with a situation such as that in Williams is to look to
traditional first amendment theory as a guideline. In other words,
the days of arbitrary administrative restriction of a student's constitutional rights have passed. The Tinker rule affords a student
the same right any other citizen has to make his views known. Aswith any other citizen, moreover, the exercise of this right on
school property may not be restrictciAwithout a "constitutionally
valid reason."''
Bruce, 430 F.2d 595, 598-99 (8th Cir. 1970): "Recent case law indicates that student
organizations have a broad right to sponsor controversial speakers on campus. We have
been unable to find a single case decided in the 1960's in which a speaker ban has been
upheld by a federal court."; American Civil Liberties Union v. Radford College, 315 F.
Supp. 893, 896-97 (W.D. Va. 1970) (numerous cases cited); Wright, supra note 40, at 105152; "I am strongly tempted to believe that the only good speaker ban is one that has not
yet been tested in court . . . . It will not do to limit speakers to those who 'clearly serve
the advantage of education' or to lease the auditorium only for programs 'determined to
be compatible with the aims of [the college] as an institution of higher learning.' "
"'Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-CardBurning Case, 1968
Sup. CT. Rav. 1, 3, describing the decision in United States v.O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
'"2Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928), quoting Wendt
v. Fischer, 243 N.Y. 439, 444, 154 N.E. 303, 304 (1926).
"'As observed by Professor Wright:
[lilt is a false dichotomy to suggest, as some have, that there are circumstances in which a university can limit or forbid "the exercise of a right guaranteed by the Constitution . . . to persons generally." I do not think such a
conflict ever can arise . . . . [For example, a university] rule barring loud
discussions in the reading room of the library does not limit "the exercise of
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In determining the constitutional validity of the reason offered for restricting expression on public property, whether on or
off campus, courts must look first to the particular use to which
the property has been dedicated.'84 This entails "taking into account its character, its pattern of usual activity, its essential
purpose and the people who use[d] it."' With these factors in
mind, a court is then in a better position to evaluate the extent
to which those engaged in the expression may have interfered
with the normal function of the property, and with the rights of
8
others to use that property in the intended manner. ' And if
substantial interference with the normal use is found, reasonable
regulation of the traffic control type (i.e., time, place, and manner) will be upheld, so that the degree of interference may be
minimized.
When regulation is based on the content of the expression,
however, a standard of mere reasonableness is clearly too restrictive, especially where the audience affected by the expression
consists primarily of adults. It would appear, moreover, that
those exposed to controversial or unpopular views have no legal
right to expect the state to stifle the expression of those views in
a public forum. Conversely, the state has no legal authority to
artificially construct a right of immunity from criticism on behalf
of those in a public audience. For these reasons, the expression
of symbolic "hostility" to others, where there is no showing of
violence or disruptive potential, cannot amount to interference
with the rights of others. The restriction of expression requires
"something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
a right guaranteed . . .to persons generally," for no one [on or off campus]
has a constitutional right to speak in a place so clearly inappropriate.
Wright, supra note 40, at 1042 (emphasis added). Compare the facts in Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 139 (1966), where a group of demonstrators stood peaceably in a public
library as "monuments of protest" against racial discrimination there, with those in
Williams.
" The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommodate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types of
activities. Among these activities is personal inter-communication among
the students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process of attending
school; it is also an important part of the educational process.
Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969).
"'Nahmod, supra note 50, at 296.
"'As noted above, the nature of some public property (e.g., a public library) is such
that even a minimal amount of vocal expression might prove substantially disruptive.
This is not true, however, of school grounds during afterclass hours, especially where the
expression occurs in a school stadium and is symbolically communicated.
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unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."18 7
Nor is this altered significantly when those participating in
the protest are engaged in an extracurricular school activity. The
constitutional standard for student expression must be applied
uniformly to all students and all school activities. Distinctions
based on categorizing some students as "representatives" of the
state, so as to dilute their first amendment rights, are constitutionally indefensible under Tinker.
Likewise, the fact that the expression has religious implications is legally irrelevant, so long as it is privately initiated. The
state may not itself show hostility to religious policy, but it has a
constitutional duty to accommodate the peaceful expression of
others, even when antireligious in character. This may have an
incidental impact on religion, but so long as the state is motivated by a "secular purpose" there is no violation of the neutrality requirement.
Finally, school officials may not restrict student expression
because of some vague apprehension as to the "reflection" it may
cast on the school. This approach is totally inconsistent with the
function of the first amendment in a free society, and amounts
only to a rationalization for censorship:
The danger of our times is not that we as a people have become
aroused to fever pitch by the excitement of ideas. It is rather the
opposite, that we as a people have become inert and cnnfri.', Lrt
we dn -_-t tr.
i hear the vital issues of our day mooted from
5gn
public platforms ....
These being the dangers of our day a college should, to my
mind, pursue a policy of fostering discussion and the exchange of
opinion by providing an open forum for it to all who want to be
heard. A college should generate intellectual excitement, it should
attempt to awaken the public mind from the torpor and quiescence
of accepted and conventional opinion. 88

That is the value of freedom of expression on a college campus.
From this perspective, then, the Williams protest could hardly be
held to have constituted interference with the educational process. Rather, it was an inherent part of that process.
Richard G. Seymour
" 7Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
"'Buckley v. Meng, 35 Misc. 2d 467, 476, 230 N.Y.S.2d 924, 934-35 (Sup. Ct. 1962).

